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ABSTRACT
Prior to this study, no analysis had focused on the 31% failure rate recorded among theme
parks opened in North American between the years 1955 and 2009. This study’s purpose was to
identify the causes of closures among the 23 failed theme parks and inform the industry of what
can be learned from these business failures. Business failure analysis typically stresses the
impact of financial ratios and the accuracy of certain negative numbers to predict impending
failure, but such studies avoid examining the underlying causes that lead to poor financial
performance in the first place. To focus on this question, this study adopted an events approach
to discover the actual event causes that preceded failure and business closure. This study
tabulated the frequency of event occurrences among two samples: failed/closed theme parks and
a comparable sample of surviving theme parks. Event occurrences were more common among
the failed/closed sample than among the surviving theme parks sample. A detailed analysis
revealed that six of the 21 events measured were more common among the failed/closed theme
park sample: declaring bankruptcy; excessive debt or general unprofitability; low customer
satisfaction, defined as not offering enough to do in the park and/or inadequate capacity;
development pressures; limited space for expansion; and a location in a regional geographic
market. Theme parks failed more frequently due to involuntary event causes than due to
voluntary closures. And, in contrast to previous studies, the occurrences of internal
environmental events associated with business failure were not significantly different from the
occurrences of external environmental events associated with failure. These findings identified
events that have preceded failure or closure in theme parks and can provide insights to operators
iii

and industry decision makers on how best to prevent or better manage such business closures in
the future.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Introduction
Globally, the theme park sector recorded an annual attendance of 350.6 million in 2016
among the 70 most attended theme parks. Behind these mega parks is a second tier of theme
parks that, cumulatively, is likely to represent additional attendance equal to half the reported
annual reported figures (TEA/AECOM, 2017) for a combined global annual attendance of 525.9
million guests. Global distribution of theme park attendance market share by geographic region
is 42.2% for North America; 36.3% in the Asia-Pacific region; 17.3% in Europe, the Middle East
and Africa; and 4.2% in Latin America.
Within the North American market (comprising Mexico, the United States, and Canada),
the top 20 parks achieved a combined attendance of 148.0 million in 2016. TEA/AECOM
estimates total North American theme park attendance (the top 20 parks plus the approximately
30 other theme parks) at 199.5 million, with annual revenues of $18.3 billion. The top 20 North
American parks are dominated by the six vacation destination parks of Disney (54.7%),
Universal Studios’ three parks (18.5%), and the three SeaWorld parks (8.2%) (Petrillo, 2016).
Again, there are another 25 to 30 active theme parks in this market that failed to achieve the
annual attendance necessary to be included in the top 20. Many of these parks typically serve
regional markets and operate on a seasonal basis (closing during the coldest months of the year).
These parks were the units of analysis in this study.
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No closures have ever occurred among the largest theme parks. Industry-wide, this is not
the case: of the approximately 74 theme parks that have opened in North America over the past
60 years, 23 have closed. These represent large enterprises, involving large investments, yet
their demise came earlier than their investors, employees, and guests expected. In spite of this
31% attrition rate, no prior study has addressed the topic of business failure in the theme park
industry.
A large body of literature exists on business failure analysis. Theories have been
developed on the types of businesses that fail, when they fail, and how they fail. A rich stream
of analysis has been compiled on how business failure manifests itself in specific industries.
However, no work has examined when or why theme parks fail. This study fills this gap by
unveiling the factors that have contributed to failures and closures in the North America theme
park sector between the years 1955 and 2009.
Many studies in business failure analysis use financial ratios to devise a prediction of
failure; in other words, the occurrence of select financial ratios (working capital to total assets,
market value of equity to par value of debt, sales to total assets, etc.) at a company leads to a
prediction of its likelihood to fail. Fewer studies, however, explore the causes that lead to those
poor financial ratios and the eventual demise of a company. This study concentrates on the
identification of the macro-economic (for example, the degree of competition, the economy,
interest rates, gas prices, wars, terrorism, weather events), financial (for example, revenue
declines, missed loan repayments), and organizational (for example, internal culture, processes,
leadership characteristics) events that occur in the pre-failure life of theme parks that ultimately
fail or close.
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This study’s methodology uses an events approach (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa &
Parsa, 1990; Tavlin, Moncarz, & Dumont, 1989). The events approach analyzes discrete
occurrences in the past history of the sample parks (“events” such as changes in ownership,
declaration of bankruptcy, sustained revenue/attendance declines, poor word of mouth,
development pressures, etc.). The analysis was conducted on equal sample sizes of 23
failed/closed theme parks and 23 surviving theme parks. The incidence of events was collected
through an extensive content analysis of the business and trade literature focused on the outdoor
entertainment industry. The identified events served as the independent variables in this study.
Some of the events were similar to events that have been included in prior events approach
studies (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa & Parsa, 1990); some of these events had been
identified as contributors to failure from a review of the business failure analysis literature (see
Chapter Two); and some of these events were revealed through the primary research conducted
as a part of this study, for example, ride accidents, excessive maintenance expenses, or a lack of
space for expansion. Once all of the relevant events were inventoried for each of the theme
parks in the study, a chi-square analysis was conducted to determine whether there was a
significant difference among the frequency of occurrences of any event between the failed theme
park sample and the surviving theme park sample. The study’s assumption is that certain events
are significantly more likely to occur in the lifespan of failed theme parks than in the lifespan of
surviving theme parks. Therefore, these events can be considered the contributing factors to the
business failure of the theme parks in the study.
To organize these many events, the theoretical framework of Ooghe and De Prijcker
(2008) was adapted for this study. Five categorization constructs were used to group individual
failure causes into logical clusters. This model recognizes that sources of failure for a business
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entity can come from events external or internal to the organization. External events can relate
to the greater operational environment: the economy, politics, international events, social or
technological changes, and even the environment. External events can also be related to events
that can be only partly controlled by the organization: suppliers, competitors, financial
institutions, shareholders, and public relations.
Internal sources of failure are more common and range from characteristics of the
organization (age, size, industry), to internal operational tactics (investments, operational
policies, finance, human resources, corporate governance), to leadership and employee
capabilities (skills, motivations, qualities).
A nuance introduced into this model is the acknowledgment that not all failures are
involuntary; some entities are voluntarily closed by their owners for very personal reasons such
as desiring to retire or the pragmatic recognition that more lucrative business investments are
available.
Identifying the events that have preceded failure or closure at theme parks can inform
current theme park operators of the potential pitfalls that can befall their current operations.
Additionally, foreknowledge of the events that have contributed to failure in this industry can
inform future developers as they evaluate the potential of expanding into the burgeoning theme
park markets of Asia and Latin America (TEA/AECOM, 2016).
Background
The theme park industry traces its origins to Walt Disney’s development of Disneyland,
which opened in Anaheim, California, in July 1955 (Price, 1999). Other amusement park
developments had preceded Disneyland’s opening and can trace their origins back to the pleasure
gardens, trolley parks, beer gardens, and world’s fairs of the 19th century (Weinstein, 1992).
4

However, Disneyland was planned to be distinctly different from these earlier ventures: Walt
Disney’s park emphasized cleanliness and elaborately planned and designed environments,
buildings, costumes, food offerings, and merchandise, coordinated to communicate a theme or a
story to the visitor (Milman, 1993). Most importantly, Walt Disney envisioned Disneyland to be
a place where an entire family could share experiences and rides together (Price, 1999), as
opposed to the contemporary amusement parks of that era, which often did not feature rides and
experiences that could be enjoyed by both children and adults together. Since Disneyland’s
debut, an additional 73 theme parks have opened in the North American geographic region. It is
acknowledged that there is a concentration of theme parks in the destination markets of Southern
California and Central Florida, but most large metropolitan areas have at least one regional park
of their own (Kaak, 2010).
Over time the theme park sector has grown in both the number of parks and number of
visitors each year, yet along the way, a surprising number of theme parks failed. Of the
approximately 74 theme parks that have opened over the past 60 years or so, 23 have failed
(Kaak, 2010). Theme park failure is defined in this study as more than just filing for bankruptcy
with the intent to reorganize and reopen. Failure in this study means that the parks have ceased
operations and, in over half of the cases, have been torn down and the underlying land converted
to another business use, even if the closure was due to a voluntary decision by the parks’ owners.
Theme Park Failure Rates in Comparison to Overall Business Failure Rates
The above-mentioned figures equate to a theme park failure rate of 31%. Failure is not
uncommon in business. According to studies, within the past half century of analysis, 25% of
startup businesses in general fail in their first year of operation, 36% within two years, 44%
within three years (Statisticbrain.com, 2014), 56% within four years (Campbell, 2005), and 71%
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have failed by ten years of operation (Static Brain Research Institute, 2014). The average
lifespan of a multinational Fortune 500–type corporation is 40 to 50 years; a survey conducted in
Japan and Europe indicated that the average life expectancy of all firms, regardless of size, was
only 12.5 years (De Geus, 2002).
Theme parks are large businesses, representing a significant investment. A survey of 51
U.S. theme parks (Kaak, 2010) revealed that the average construction cost for a North American
theme park was $282 million (converted into current dollars). Additionally, theme parks are
frequently developed by large corporations, yet they still fail or are voluntarily closed by their
owners. This study focused on determining why this happens.
Ratio Analysis—The Most Common Form of Business Failure Analysis
Most studies of business failure analyze ratios derived from financial numbers reported in
publicly available financial instruments such as financial statements and annual reports (Altman,
1968,1983; Beaver, 1966; Gu & Gao, 2000). In these studies, financial metrics serve as the
independent variables in a multiple regression analysis that makes a prediction of survivability;
for example, 79% of firms that exhibit certain financial traits will be bankrupt within a certain
amount of time. Another stream of bankruptcy analysis employs logistic regression with failed
firms and surviving firms serving as the two dependent variables (Kim & Gu, 2006; Ohlson,
1980; Zavgren, 1985). Again, financial ratios are used as the predictor variables, with the
findings concluding that certain financial ratios predict the fate of a firm. Both of these methods
are limited by the need to have access to financial data that are available only from publicly
traded companies subject to public financial reporting requirements.
Theme parks tend to be either privately owned, which means they are not required to
publicly report their financials, or are part of large publicly traded companies where the financial
6

numbers are reported at a consolidated level, with no means to break out the results at the
individual park level. Another limitation of these methods is that they predict only the likelihood
of a business to fail, without considering the causes of these business failures.
A Focus on the Causes of Business Failure
To put this in perspective, an analogy can be drawn. Just as predictions can be made of
the likelihood that a business will fail, compiled statistical data can be used to predict the
likelihood that any given plane will crash. But, when a plane does crash in the U.S., the Federal
National Transportation and Safety Board (NTSB) is tasked with investigating the cause of the
accident (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014). From this deliberate process, the
mechanical and/or human errors (or events) that contributed to the accident can be isolated in
order to inform the greater aviation community on how to improve operations and prevent
subsequent accidents. Within the business failure analysis research stream, the method that best
analyzes the “why’s” of businesses failure is the events approach (Kwansa & Parsa, 1990). The
events approach methodology in this study examined what firms (theme parks) closed or
survived and why. Through an extensive literature review, the events that preceded failure were
identified and now can serve to instruct current theme park operators and potential theme park
investors on the best practices and potential pitfalls of this industry.
Problem Statement
The Lack of Business Failure Literature on the Theme Park Sector
Robust literature exists on business failure analysis. Less literature exists on business
failure analysis within the hospitality industry, but there is research on failure in the restaurant
segment (Gu, 2002; Parsa, Self, Njite, & King, 2005), the lodging segment (Baum & Haveman,
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1997; Baum & Ingram, 1998; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997), and even the
special events segment (Getz, 2002).There was no academic research on business failure in the
theme park business segment.
Negative Impacts Stemming From Theme Park Failures
Within the theme park business segment, theme park failures or closures result in
financial losses for investors, the loss of income for employees, and damages to the reputation of
the management team (Daily, 1994; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). There are also collateral
damages for the rest of the industry that follow from any failure of a theme park firm: theme park
closures frequently become media sensations, with correspondingly negative connotations for the
overall industry (Daily, 1994; Hill, 2014; Jacques, 1985). Preventing such collapses can serve to
enhance the professional credibility of the industry.
Neglecting to Include Failed Subjects in Studies
Another need for this research was to explore a neglected segment of this industry, failed
or closed theme parks, and the associated event variables that are not included in the typical
business failure analysis study. Steven Shugan (2007) cautioned against “passive data
collection” (p. 1). He warned researchers against accepting variables into a study solely because
they were used in prior studies, since the use of typical variables will only produce typical
results. This study acknowledges the variables used to detect business failure in prior studies but
willing accepts alternative variables that were revealed from the data collection and analysis
process.
Unlike many studies that have inherent data collection biases by unintentionally
excluding from the analysis segments of the sample that have already failed (a limitation known
as survivor bias) (Shugan, 2007), this study actively included failed firms within the study
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approach. Examples of survivor bias and its impact include the comparison of mutual funds,
where random samples of these managed financial instruments can overestimate their average
earnings since those funds that failed were not included in the study sample (Bleiberg & Regan,
1986). Similarly, customer satisfaction feedback overstates the positive because those truly
dissatisfied customers are no longer customers and are not queried (Golder & Tellis, 1993). The
overall effect of survivor bias is that the sample of observations does not represent the population
that was intended (Shugan, 2007); there is less variation among the subjects because they all
share the trait that they survived. Half of the sample of theme park firms in this study is
composed of failed or closed firms. The variables, or events, included in the analysis were
representative of both survivors and failed theme parks. More complete insights on the North
American theme park industry can be gained from this study due to its inclusion of the entire
spectrum of theme parks.
Issues—why no theories of theme park failure have been developed, what are the
economic losses that follow in the wake of a theme park failure, and how uncovering the
knowledge of events that foretell theme park failure can inform current theme park operations—
will be addressed in the following discussion of this study’s purpose statement.
Purpose of the Study
Closely related to the identification of the study problem is the study’s purpose statement.
A study’s purpose statement establishes the intent of the study: what will be accomplished from
the effort (Creswell, 2009). It answers the question “why bother?” It becomes the rationale and
even the justification in economic or business terms. It shows that the findings of the study will
contribute to the existing body of knowledge and will provide insights that can be applied to
current management practice.
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This study seeks to propose a theory as to the overarching causes of theme park failure.
The failure rate of the North American theme park industry (approximately 31%) would appear
to be exceedingly high, especially considering the high initial investment costs (Kaak, 2010), the
extensive planning and construction time (multiple years) to bring a park to fruition, and the
significant financial backing required (often originating from major institutional investors such
as corporations) to conceive and launch such a venture. Although the academic literature has
included numerous bankruptcy studies within the hospitality industry (Adams, 1995; Getz, 2002;
Gu, 2002; Gu & Gao, 2000; Kim & Gu, 2006; Kwansa & Parsa, 1990; Olsen, Bellas & Kish,
1983; Parsa et al., 2005; Tavlin et al., 1989; Youn & Gu, 2010), none has included, much less
specifically focused on, business failure within the theme park industry sector. This study
provides such an analysis for the first time.
Additionally, this study renews the use of the events approach study of business failure
analysis that has been neglected since the 1990s (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa & Parsa,
1990; Tavlin et al., 1989).
Just as with any business failure, a theme park closure results in financial loses for its
investors, lost salaries for its workers, lost revenues for surrounding support businesses, and lost
tax revenues for the local economy (Gu & Gao, 2000). However, the closure of a theme park
also results in the loss of memories among those who had visited the park and retain fond
recollections of the experience. The insights this study provides into the business failure process
can serve to prevent or help to better manage such business closures in the future.
The events approach’s potential to identify the events / actions that have preceded
business failures within the theme park industry can provide current and future theme park
managers with foreknowledge of specific issues that are likely to foretell impending troubles
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within their current operations. With such knowledge, actions can be taken to correct operational
problems and thwart potential business failure. And, most specifically, this study has provided
the means to identify the specific attributes that contribute to business failure within the theme
park industry. These results can add to the collective knowledge of the business failure / closure
/ bankruptcy academic stream.
Research Question
A research question represents the central issue addressed in a study but it tends to be too
general to be studied directly (that is the purpose of the study’s hypotheses). Additionally, a
research question is typically phrased within the context of a theory (Trochim, 2001). This study
resides within the theory of business failure: why and how specific firms experience a decline in
their economic prosperity or ability to function that results in their eventual reorganization or
dissolution (Altman, 1983). More specifically, this study’s research question is concerned with
the causes of business failure within the theme park industry.
Research Question: What have been the financial, environmental, and internal events
that have contributed to the business failure and closure of almost one-third of all North
American theme parks opened between the years of 1955 and 2009?
Study Methodology
This study investigated the causes of theme park failure and/or closure in the North
American market using an events approach methodology. This method uses two independent
samples of 23 theme park units of analysis. One sample is composed of theme parks that have
failed/closed; the other sample comprises theme parks currently in operation. A comprehensive
literature review of Amusement Business, the trade journal of the outdoor entertainment industry,
was performed to identify event occurrences in the lifespans of the 46 parks. Events can be
11

financial in nature (declining revenues, high debt ratios, or cash flow troubles), operational in
nature (attendance declines, long lines, or accidents in the parks), or external to the business
(direct competition, poor weather, or bad economic conditions). But, the event has to be
reported to be counted. Twenty-one events were measured in this study. Those selected had
been identified from prior event approach studies, a review of the failure analysis academic
literature, a review of the existing sources on theme park failure, and a pilot study that reviewed
a select number of years of Amusement Business publications.
After the data had been collected, the frequency of each event occurrence (referred to as
event variables in this study) among the two samples was tabulated and compared using a chisquare test for independence to determine whether a significant difference exists among the
samples. The assumption was that tested event variables that occurred more frequently among
the failed/closed theme parks are likely to be causes, or at least contributors, of failure/closure
within the theme park industry.
Operational Definitions
This section explains the terms of the study, as used in this document.
Theme Parks – The units of analysis for this study, the “subjects.” Twenty-three failed
theme parks and 23 surviving theme parks made up the 46 units of analysis. “Theme park” is an
often-used term but one rarely defined. Most frequently, Disneyland’s opening in 1955 is
mentioned as the genesis of the industry (Price, 1999), but other authors believe that Disneyland
was just the continuation of a recreation development that began years earlier in Coney Island,
New York (Weinstein, 1992). Nonetheless, Walt Disney’s creation was explicitly intended to be
different from the traditional amusement parks that were more common at the time of its
establishment. Specifically, Disney wanted his park to stress cleanliness, to have a single point
12

of entry, and to contain numerous themed sections around which all attractions and activities
were coordinated. Much emphasis was placed on isolating the outside world from the fantasy
world presented in the parks and providing an environment where families could be entertained
together (Price, 1999). Additional attributes of theme parks frequently referred to in the
literature include the pay-one-price entrance fee; annual attendance in excess of one million;
corporate ownership; specific design traits such as elaborate landscaping; architecture that
entertains; and the inclusion of a variety of offerings, including large-scale rides, shopping, live
entertainment, and dining options (Adams, 1991; Carlson & Popelka, 1988; Gottdiener, 1997;
Kyriazi, 1976; Lyon, 1987; Williams, 1998). For this study, the operational definition of theme
park stressed size (the parks are large entities in terms of annual attendance), the timing of their
opening (all the parks opened after the opening of Disneyland in 1955), and their operation as
part of the more recognized theme park chain operators such as, Six Flags, SeaWorld, Cedar
Fair, etc. Traditional amusement parks, family entertainment centers, and large stand-alone
attractions are not part of this study.
Destination Theme Park – Parks with surrounding resort infrastructure (hotels,
recreational activities, attractions, and themed dining and merchandising hubs) that serve as
tourist destinations. The parks are characterized by elaborate theming, often incorporating
content from popular media franchises (movies, cartoons, television). Most are owned by large
corporations, with year-round operations. The majority of their guests (approximately 90%) are
tourists, originating from an area that is at least 50 miles from the park (Clave, 2007; Milman,
1993; Milman & Kaak, 2018). This study avoided including the largest destination theme parks
since there are no examples of failure/closure among these parks; mostly regional parks served as
the units of analysis.
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Regional Theme Park – Theme parks that attract the majority of their attendance from the
population located in the immediate, surrounding area; in most instances, 90% of their guests
reside within a three-hour drive of the park. They operate on a seasonal schedule, approximately
150-days per year. They are often dominated by their thrill rides and increasingly are operated
by chains (a corporation that owns and manages a number of theme park properties distributed
over a large geographic area) (Milman & Kaak, 2017).
Traditional Amusement Park – Typically, an arrangement of carnival and dark rides for
which a separate charge per ride is collected, often lacking a unifying theme. The origins of these
parks go back to the 19th century, when they operated as picnic groves or trolley parks; later,
rides were introduced. These parks reached their height in the 1920s. Coney Island, New York,
contained the most familiar examples. No traditional amusement parks were included in the
current study.
Amusement Park – A generic term applied to all types of parks that feature rides, games,
shows, and concessions. Both traditional and theme parks can be included in this category. This
term was avoided in the current study and the parks were always referred to as theme parks.
Failure – The closure of the park, the dissolution of the business entity that was the park,
and in many instances the physical destruction of the theme park facility. Business failure can be
defined in various degrees: from cumulative revenue declines over a number of financial quarters
or years, change of ownership, bankruptcy with the intent to reorganize, to the cessation of the
business entity. Failure implies involuntary closure of the firm. This study used the most
stringent definition of business failure as the definition of theme park failure. The failed or
closed theme parks that were included as half of the units of analysis in this study most definitely
failed: they ceased operations and closed.
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Closure – The ceasing of operations of a theme park. The closing of a theme park, as
opposed to failure, implies that a park ceased operations for voluntary reasons. This is an
unexpected reason for “failure” but is not uncommon. Firms close voluntarily due to the
retirement/death/illness of the owner, to prevent ultimate financial failure, and as an
acknowledgment that there is a more lucrative use of assets than the current business provides.
For theme parks, closure often results from the owners’ realization that there is a higher, better
use of the property than its continued promotion as a theme park.
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy – A chapter of Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. A
company that files for Chapter 7 ceases operation, and all of its assets are liquidated in order to
pay off its outstanding debts (Altman, 1983). Chapter 7 is the most stringent form of bankruptcy
under U.S. law.
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy – A form of filing that enables the firm to reorganize while the
bankrupt company continues to operate and maintain control of the business. Most major
businesses in the United States that petition for bankruptcy protection file under Chapter 11.
Management is given the opportunity to create a plan for reorganization, while the company
gains temporary relief from paying its debts. The reorganization plan submitted to the court
must show how the company will emerge after the reorganization with the ability to pay off its
creditors and then continue as a viable business (Summers, 1989).
Events Approach – A technique that uses an ex post facto (after the fact) research design
that does not claim the ability to predict bankruptcy but rather explores the categorizable events
that precede the bankruptcy process in firms. This method compares the external, financial, and
organizational events that occur within an industry between establishments that ended in
bankruptcy versus those that achieved financial stability, and then attempts to determine those
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events that were significantly more common to failed firms than to those that survived. Common
precursors to economic failure are net losses, management turnover, loan default, credit issues,
inefficient management, inadequate training, undercapitalization, debt restructuring, pending
lawsuits, etc. Typically, this approach complements the information obtained through financial
ratio analysis by seeking to determine the events that are unique to bankrupt firms (Giroux &
Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa & Parsa, 1990).
Theming – A storytelling process using buildings, rides, shows, landscaping, music,
merchandise products, and food to align the guest experience with the style or motif of a theme
park section (sometimes referred to as a “land”) (Milman, 1993). It is generally assumed that
theming adds at least 5% to the cost of building a themed property, while individual ride theming
frequently adds 20% to the ride’s off-the-shelf cost (Uttal, 1977).
Significance of the Study
Academic literature addresses the issue of general business failure; theories exist on what
types of businesses fail, when they most typically fail in their lifecycle, and how they fail. But
no existing study had addressed why 31% of all the theme parks opened within North America
have failed involuntarily or been closed for voluntary reasons. This study has sought to rectify
this gap.
The majority of business failure analysis studies concentrate on ratio analysis, seeking to
determine the aspects of a company’s financial statement that predict the probability of failure.
Such methods fail to consider the specific causes of the eventual failure. This study used an
events approach, which focuses on determining which economic, financial or organizational
occurrences are significantly more likely (based on the frequency of occurrence) to occur at a
failed or closed theme park versus a surviving theme park sample. The units of analysis of this
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study included 23 failed/closed theme parks and 23 surviving theme parks. The source of the
event variables was an extensive content analysis of Amusement Business, the trade journal of
the outdoor entertainment industry, spanning the years of the study, 1955 to 2009.
This study’s hypotheses postulate that the event variables will be significantly more
likely to occur among the failed/closed theme park sample than among the surviving theme park
sample. The hypotheses also predict that involuntary theme park failures would turn out to be
more common than voluntary closures. This may appear obvious; however, a considerable
number (35%) of theme parks have been voluntarily closed, in part, to redevelop the underlying
land into a venture that was considered to be more profitable in the long-term, or to realize a
short-term gain from the sell of the property.
This study includes findings obtained from operating theme parks, but it also considers
lessons learned from failed, closed, and non-surviving parks, a segment of the potential market
frequently neglected in studies. Identifying why theme parks fail or are voluntarily closed
provides current and future theme park managers with foreknowledge of specific issues that may
foretell impending troubles in their current operations. As the global theme park industry
expands, the lessons learned from the failed or closed theme parks of North America can be
applied to enhance business success.
Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature related to business failure analysis:
beginning with the process that leads to failure, to the typical causes of business failure, the
generic failure types, predictors of failure, the impacts that result from business failure, and
finally a review of prior business failure analysis within the hospitality business sector. Chapter
Three details the events approach methodology that was applied in this study: why this research
design strategy was selected, examples of prior events approach studies, the study’s hypotheses,
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the data collection methods, and the data analysis conducted. The collected and analyzed data
are presented as findings in Chapter Four, followed by a discussion of the significance and
implications of these findings in Chapter Five.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The current chapter reviews the theoretical foundations of the business failure analysis
field of study and seeks to identify the relevant research questions that have been utilized to
identify why businesses fail or survive. The literature review examines a number of areas from
definitions and rates of business failure, to the causes of business failure. Models that have been
crafted to explain business failure are reviewed, as are the seminal business failure analysis
studies and the efforts to date that have been made to explore business failure within the
hospitality industry.
The contents of this section are derived mostly from the general literature on business
failure analysis; this is crucial to provide a basis for a meaningful understanding of this field.
Additionally, a review of the hospitality and tourism industry is included, specifically for the
restaurant, lodging, and special events sectors. This review ties the wider business failure
analysis field to the hospitality industry but also highlights the paucity of research that has been
devoted to bankruptcy in the hospitality industry, and the complete lack of business failure
research completed within the theme park segment.
Explanation of the Theoretical Model
This study adapts the theoretical construct established by Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008).
The model seeks to categorize and organize the numerous failure attributes into five overarching
constructs for the purpose of clarifying failure causes. Other authors have also devised
frameworks to organize failure attributes (Parsa et al., 2005; Pretorius, 2008). Common among
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the categorization schemes is to distinguish between attributes external to an organization and
those internal to the organization (Boyle & Desai, 1991; Fredland & Morris, 1976; Parsa et al.,
2005; Pretorius, 2008). Internal failure attributes are frequently divided into subcategories that
focus on financial and accounting (Boyle & Desai, 1991; Getz, 2002; Parsa et al., 2005;
Pretorius, 2008; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), products, marketing and customers (Getz, 2002;
Miller, 1977; Parsa et al., 2005; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), leadership and management (Parsa et
al., 2005; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), and human/cultural (Boyle & Desai, 1991; Getz, 2002;
Miller, 1977; Parsa et al., 2005; Pretorius, 2008). Another frequently occurring organizational
category is to qualify failed firms by physical characteristics such as age, size, geographical
location and industry. In a field that lacks robust theories on failure causes (Aziz, Emanuel &
Lawson, 1988; Daily, 1994; Hamer, 1983; Keasey & Watson, 1991; Pretorius, 2008), such
categorization schemes have been proposed as a means to provide an initial organizational clarity
to ultimately identify relevant variables and build more accurate failure theories.
It is common within the business failure analysis literature to make claims that theories of
failure have not been adequately developed and have not been used when devising business
failure or bankruptcy studies. Hamer in 1983 noted that the majority of studies did not provide a
theoretical basis when selecting the financial ratios that were used to make failure predictions.
Five years later, Aziz et al. (1988, p. 419) lamented that the ratios input into the prediction
models were based on “ad hoc pragmatism” and not “sound theoretical work.” As a result,
researchers have resorted to inputting large sets of ratios into the models and have then used
statistical methods to winnow through this data (Keasey & Watson, 1991). This shortcoming
continues. Pretorius (2008) referred to business failure analysis as “ill-defined” and “messy.”
Then went on to propose a conceptual framework that was described as confirming the
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complexity of the field of study, “and the impossibility of generalizing about its variables” due to
unpredictable interpretations of the numerous variables and the overlapping of interpretations
among the variables.

Adapted Theoretical Framework
MACRO/INTERNAL EVIRONMENT

MACRO/EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

Customers / Suppliers
Competitors
Banks & Credit Institutions
Stockholders
Public Opinion

Economics
Technology
International
Politics
Social Factors
Environmental

EXTERNAL
INTERNAL

LEADERSHIP / EMPLOYEE CAPABILITIES

STRATEGIC / OPERATIONAL POLICIES

Leadership Characteristics
Employee Skills
Employee Motivation
Management Qualities

Strategy & Investments
Commercial
Operational / Human Resources
Finance & Administration
Corporate Governance

THE COMPANY’S
CHARATERISTICS
Age Maturity
(Start-Up; Mature; Contraction)
Size / Industry / Flexibility

INVOLUNTARY FAILURE

Or
VOLUNTARY CLOSURE
Owner Retires, Dies, is Injured or Ill
Business was for a One-Time Event
Superior Alternative Option Available

Source: Ooghe & Waeyaert (2004), as adopted by Ooghe & De Prijcker (2008)
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Failure Model of Possible Causes of Bankruptcy

Figure 1. Conceptual Failure Model of Possible Causes of Bankruptcy

Ooghe and De Prijcker’s (2008) theoretical framework provides categories into which
this study’s analysis of theme park failure attributes are easily contained. Even those closure
attributes that are considered unique to this industry can be aligned into these organizing
categories. Figure 1 “Conceptual Failure Model of Possible Causes of Bankruptcy” displays
Ooghe and De Prijcker’s model, modified to accommodate the hypotheses of this study.
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The most noticeable change to the model for the current study is the division of
failure/closure into two categories: involuntary failure and voluntary closure. Failure in the
models reviewed does not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary failure. However, the
research into the causes of theme park failure has revealed that closure is not always forced on
the business but can be the result of a choice to end the business for rational reasons.
Voluntary failure, or more appropriately voluntary closure, has been referred to as:
successful closure, voluntary liquidation, business discontinuance, business exits, business death,
voluntary harvest liquidation, or termination to avoid losses (Bates, 2005; Coad, 2014; Ulmer &
Nielsen, 1947). The term voluntary exit has been used to describe mergers, termination with
losses or to avoid losses, business exits among high performance firms that exit because their
investors have very high threshold expectations, the sale of the firm, owners departing because
they accepted employment with another firm, owner retirement, or the death or illness of the
owners (Theng & Boon, 1996; Thornhill & Amit, 2003; Watson & Everett, 1993, 1996). It has
been estimated that 29% to one-third of business owners have felt the operation was successful at
the time of its closure (Headd, 2003).
The Adapted Framework
This adapted theoretical framework segments the business failure attributes into those
external versus those internal to the operation of a firm. This is a common distinction within the
field of business failure analysis. External factors are accepted to be factors outside of the
control of the business. Businesses must adapt to these exogenous factors, but can do nothing to
influence them. In the framework these are referred to as the “macro” environment, divided into
the macro/internal environment and the macro/external environment. The macro/external
environment are factors truly beyond the control of the firm: macroeconomics, changing
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technology, international or global influences, local politics and regulations, societal
developments, and environmental influences. Event variables in this study related to this
construct include: the impacts of natural disasters or the environment on theme park failures; the
influence of the year or decade of opening (related to changing demographic factors) on theme
park survivability; and the impact of nearby residents and their potential objections on the
operation of the theme park.
The macro/internal environment refers to factors to which the organization plays a role
but cannot completely control. These are the firm’s relationships with customers and suppliers,
banks and credit institutions, stockholders (if relevant), and competitors. This is also the space
where public opinion has influence on the success or failure of the firm. Event variables in this
study related to this construct include the impacts of theme park concentration on success or
failure.
Internal factors are considered to be the more impactful influences on the success or
failure of a firm. Three constructs are included as internal: leadership/employee capabilities,
strategic/operational policies, and the acknowledgement of the company’s characteristics.
Beginning with the company’s characteristics, this refers to attributes of the firm: its age, its size,
and even its industry. Event variables in this study related to the company’s characteristics
include: theme parks that failed within the first five years of their existence; theme parks that
lacked space to accommodate the expansion of their operations; theme parks that were located in
destination markets versus regional markets; and theme parks located in geographically areas
that result in constrained operating season lengths due to environmental factors.
Other internal factors of business failure consider leadership/employee capabilities. Firm
attributes such as the characteristics or capabilities of senior management, and the skills and

23

motivations of employees are influential on the success or failure of firms. The
strategic/operational policies consider the day-to-day procedures of the firm, activities such as
the firm’s strategic investment decisions, commercial policies, human resource policies,
corporate governance plans, and financial and administrative decisions. Event variables in this
study related to strategic/operational policies are numerous. Within the category of strategy and
investments, event variables are related to pricing, ticketing and discounting strategies employed
by theme parks. Also, the frequently occurring mergers and acquisitions made within the
industry are part of overall strategy and investments decisions. Commercial activities relate to
theme park competitors, especially being overpriced relative to similar attractions. The many
operational components related to theme parks are measured through the event variables of
customer satisfaction, park capacity, and the inclusion of enough park attractions to keep patrons
fulfilled. Aligned with maintaining customer satisfaction is the measure of preventing
attendance declines year-to-year. Maintenance and/or the lack of reinvestment in the operation
expected by consumers is considered as an event variable related to this construct. And,
following from operational efficiency, a couple of event variables gauge the effects of notable
ride accidents and the number of lawsuits brought against the operation. Event variables aligned
to financial policies include the level of debt sustained by the operation and the instances of
declared bankruptcy as a reorganization attempt. Corporate governance is related to the event
variables concerned with the impacts of management corruption on the ultimate failure of theme
park enterprises.
Lastly, the adapted theoretical framework considers the end result. For Ooghe and De
Prijcker this was the singular “failure,” bankruptcy, closure, sell of the business. But failure or
closure can be considered to be more nuanced. For the adapted model, the construct of

24

“voluntary closure” augments “involuntary” failure. Voluntary closure recognizes that
businesses cease to be for reasons other than economic failure. Businesses can close due to an
owner’s injury, illness, death or retirement. Businesses may have been financially viable at the
time of such a closure but were closed at the discretion of the owner: because they were opened
only to exploit a one-time event, or because superior alternative options were available. In other
words, the time invested by the managers, or the resources utilized in the enterprise could return
a greater value if employed in another economic concern. An event variable in this study is that
theme parks have been closed because the investors believed that there was a higher best use of
the property than its continued operation as a theme park – even if that theme park was
economically viable at the time of its closing. Table 1 displays the theoretical model constructs
and their associated event variables.
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Table 1: Theoretical Model Constructs and Associated Event Variables
Macro / External Environment Construct
Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another Time, Changing Demographics
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents
Macro / Internal Environment Construct
Theme Park Market Concentration/ New Competitor in Immediate Market
The Company’s Characteristics Construct
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
Leadership / Employee Capabilities Construct
Strategic / Operational Policies Construct
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Sustained Attendance Declines
Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment
Notable Ride Accidents
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive Debt
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
Voluntary Closure Construct
Higher Best Use for the Property

Business failure analysis encompasses a variety of business scenarios, from declining
revenues, to turnaround strategies, and ultimately, to bankruptcy. Bankruptcy itself is nuanced,
ranging from business recovery/turnaround to business dissolution.
Definitions for Business Failure
Business failure has never been as simple to explain as might be expected; partly this is
due to the lack of a widely accepted definition of failure (Pretorius, 2008). Daily (1994, p. 265)
identified business failure as “organizational decline,” as a period of “decreasing internal
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resources,” which implies either financial declines or human capital declines, or both. Watson
and Everett (1993, 1996) proposed five categories of business failure: failing to achieve financial
goals; firm closure or change in ownership; closing to limit loses; filing for bankruptcy; or
ceasing to exist for any reason. These categories range from failure to achieve profits,
potentially a temporary condition, to the dissolution of the business enterprise; these categories
acknowledge business events such as a change of ownership, and recognize that businesses can
close for reasons not related to financial distress. This study will demonstrate that significant
business events at theme parks can result in their failure, yet some theme parks have closed due
to reasons other than financial distress.
The contemporary period of lenient bankruptcy was ushered in with the 1979 passage of
the U.S. Bankruptcy Reform Act. Prior to this law, the majority of business failure resulted in
the liquidation of businesses. Now the emphasis is on reorganization; this easing of restrictions
resulted in a doubling of the number of firms filing for bankruptcy protection (Daily, 1994).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act introduced two distinct types of formal business failure:
Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. Chapter 7 is the most legally stringent form of bankruptcy under U.S.
law and results in the cessation of business operations and the liquidation of all business assets to
pay off any outstanding debts (Altman, 1983). Chapter 11 is a petition for protection from
creditors that enables a firm to continue operations while it seeks to reorganize (Summers, 1989).
Temporary relief from paying debts is granted as long as the firm submits a reorganization plan
that details how the entity will emerge with the ability to pay off its creditors and then continue
as a viable business.
The numerous failure studies have used varied definitions of business failure. Beaver
(1966, p. 71) proposed failure as “the inability of a firm to pay its financial obligations as they
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mature.” Giroux and Wiggins (1984, p. 179) defined failure as “experiencing some degree of
financial distress.” Others applied a starker definition of what qualifies as failure: filing for
bankruptcy (Gu & Gao, 2000; Kwansa & Parsa, 1990; Ohlson, 1980). This study utilizes a most
drastic definition of failure – the closure of the business as an operating concern. Many theme
parks have experienced challenges in paying debts, challenges in achieving long-term
profitability, and have even filed for bankruptcy. However, if the theme park managed to
continue operating, it would not qualify as a business failure in this study. The “failed” parks in
this study have all closed their gates, but this does not always imply that they failed financially.
Many did, but others ceased operations due to a variety of business events (some unrelated to
financial hardships) that will be explored throughout this study.
Many studies consider the process of failure. It is easy to view business failure as a
definitive traumatic event; however, the reality is that failure rarely results from a single event
(Argenti, 1976; Pretorius, 2008), or one bad decision, but from the “accumulation” of business
decisions (Kanter, 2003); failure typically takes time and occurs by “degrees” (Weitzel &
Jonsson, 1989). Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) concluded that the sample of failed firms
included in their study exhibited “signs” of “financial weakness” (in comparison to the sample of
surviving firms) as many as ten years before failing. Daily (1994) claims that perceptive
individuals (internal leaders or external analysts) can perceive signs of impending failure five
years prior to the finale, with the last two years characterized as the very apparent “death
struggle.” Beaver (1966) concluded that the year prior to the ultimate failure is the most crucial
in determining whether the firm will fail of not. The literature supports the conclusion that
business failure takes time, which supports the validity of capturing the specific events that occur
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in the history of an organization prior to its eventual demise or continuing success. This is what
this study’s event approach will focus on.
One intent for studying business failure is to discover a path to recovery; “recovery is
really at the center of failure research” (Pretorius, 2008). To some extent business failure is
actually the failure to successfully execute a “turnaround.” Commonly accepted turnaround
strategies identify five steps to recovery: situation analysis; change in management; emergency
actions; restructuring actions; and a return to normality and profitability (Burbank, 2005). Firms
attempting a turnaround will focus on a few initiatives: revenue-generating activities; costcutting initiatives; and asset-reduction sales (Pretorius, 2008). Any of these steps or initiatives
involve business events that will be evaluated in this study as potentially significant in
determining whether a theme park fails or survives.
Before moving on from a summary of the definitions of business failure, it is worthy to
note that a study by Headd in 2003 revealed that 29% of “closed” businesses were considered to
be successful by their owners at the time of their closure. Business closure is not always due to
business failure. This is relevant to this study of theme park closures, where a hypothesis is that
a number of parks have been closed not due to the failure to make a profit but because the
owners believed that there was a higher, best use of the property; in other words, there was
greater revenue generating potential in developing the property as something other than a theme
park.
Business Failure Rates
What is the normative rate of business failure? Approximately one-third of all theme
parks opened in North America have failed; how does this rate compare to overall rates of
business failure? Statistics on failure rates vary and are somewhat contentious (Parsa et al.,
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2005). Knott and Posen (2005) suggest that nearly 10% of all U.S. firms fail each year, and
ultimately 80 to 90% of firms will fail. There is also the assumption that the risk of failure is the
highest in the first years after a business’ establishment and then decreases over time (Pretorius,
2008).
The Statistic Brain Research Institute (2014) claims that one out of four businesses fail
within their first year of operation. However, a number of business failure analysts contend that
many firms survive through the first year due to adequate initial financing, even without
managing to achieve revenue targets or much less profitability (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). After
the second year of operation, the rate of failure increases to 36% (see Table 2), and by year three
the failure tally is up to 44% (Static Brain Research Institute, 2014). In year four, the failure rate
crosses the halfway mark (Headd, 2003; Campbell, 2005). In the sixth year the failure rate is as
high as 63% (Williams, 1993) and by the tenth year, 71% of firms have closed (Static Brain
Research Institute, 2014).
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Table 2. Cumulative Business Failure Rates Among Firms
Failure rate among new
businesses (cumulative)
%

Year(s) of operation
1st year
2nd year
3rd year
4th year
5th year
6th year
10th year
Ultimately
Each year

25
24–36
44
53–56
40–67
60–63
71
80–90
~ 10

Source(s)
Statisticbrain, 2014
Headd, 2003; Statisticbrain, 2014
Statisticbrain, 2014
Headd, 2003; Campbell, 2005
Daily, 1994
Williams, 1993
Statisticbrain, 2014
Knott & Posen, 2005
Knott & Posen, 2005

Average Life Expectancy
Type of firm

Years

Source

All firms
“Fortune 500”–type firms

12.5
40–50

De Geus, 2002
De Geus, 2002

Industry Specific Business Failure Rates
Type of business

%

Source

Restaurants
Hotels
Festivals
Theme parks

30
19*
36*
31

Parsa, Self, Njite & King, 2005
Chen & Yeh, 2012
Getz, 2002
Kaak, 2015

* One study

One study claimed that average life expectancy of all firms, regardless of size, is 12.5
years, while the average lifespan of a multinational, “Fortune 500” -type corporation is 40 to 50
years (De Geus, 2002). Considering these figures, the rate of failure among theme parks is not
an exception from the norm, and the average lifespan of the parks aligns with the status quo of
larger business establishments.
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Rationale for Studying Failure
The pervasiveness of failure in business should be grounds enough for researchers and
business practitioners to devote effort to studying failure. American industrialist Henry Ford
went bankrupt five times before he found a way to profitably make cars: “I strongly believe that
there is often more to be learned from failure than there is from success if we but take the time to
do so,” quoted in Longenecker, Simonetti, and Sharkey (1999, p. 503).
Until the early 1980s, very little research was devoted to the study of business failure or
organizational decline; it is thought that failure was neglected due to the emphasis on the study
of organizational survival and business growth. This sentiment is mirrored in reality where the
overwhelming focus on growth by management has actually been shown to be a primary internal
cause of organizational decline (Daily, 1994). A challenging economy in the early 1980s led to
increases in the volume of research centered on business failure. The booming economy of the
later 1980s and through the 1990s resulted in a de-emphasis on failure studies. After the
Millennium, research again increased in the business failure arena, but it is far from flooding the
current research literature (Pretorius, 2008).
Compounding the lack of research is the lack of robust business failure theory. Hamer
(1983) concludes that limited business failure research has resulted in a lack of a theoretical basis
for selecting variables to include. This has resulted in each subsequent researcher selecting a
new batch of study variables, providing no continuity in the business failure literature, and
depriving researchers and practitioners the foreknowledge to avoid, manage and work to survive
through business failures (Daily, 1994). A study of restaurant owners who had failed (Camillo,
Connolly & Kim, 2008) revealed that the industry as a whole has not invested the warranted time
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or effort to learn from prior mistakes, and the individuals that had failed, when asked, could not
even pinpoint the reasons why their own businesses had failed.
Another rationale for analyzing business failure is due to the negative tangible impacts it
has in terms of costs to businesses, society and economies (Warner, 1977). The fallout from
business failures impact politicians interested in economic development, as well as the investors
and employees who are directly involved (Daily, 1994). So vast are the impacts of business
failure that the early impetus for developing failure prediction models was to attempt to
counteract the consequences of failure (Hamer, 1983). Business failures lead to disruptions in
the economy as well as disruptions to businesses, which then disrupts access to products,
services and jobs (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989). Business failures lead to financial losses for
affected creditors, stockholders and eventually governments through lost tax revenues due to lost
incomes (Gu & Gao, 2000). Business failures’ impacts are felt more so in smaller and local
economies (Youn & Gu, 2010); thus the early detection of problems and the opportunity to
reallocate resources can be a benefit to the social welfare (Hamer, 1983).
Impacts from business failure are also felt at the individual level; the grief associated with
failure contributes to the unwillingness to learn from the experience (Shephard, 2003; Sutton &
Callahan, 1987). Managers from failed firms are reluctant to speak with researchers and
showcase their failures, while leaders at failing firms will not take the time away from work to
meet with researchers; thus potential learnings are never shared (Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).
The biggest potential value that could come from studying business failure is to be able to
improve on the ability to predict and prevent failures in the future (Daily, 1994) and to prevent
firms and individuals from repeating the same errors made in the past (Longenecker et al., 1999;
Pretorius, 2008). Management’s job is to “monitor the probability of failure” (Hamer, 1983,
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p. 289), with the knowledge that the warning signs of business distress occur much earlier than
the actual failure (Gu & Gao, 2000; Youn & Gu, 2010). Rather than just building failure
prediction models, extended analysis of how and why firms fail can result in understanding
(Pretorius, 2008) and corrective actions to lower the likelihood of business failure.
It is often easier to pinpoint why or how a failure occurred than to explain why or how a
success happened; thus, failure analysis can be a powerful method for studying business
uncertainty (McGrath, 1999). The theme park events detailed in this study each represent an
opportunity to “pinpoint” where a potential failure or success originated.
A contribution that comes from the study of business collapse and bankruptcy is the
inclusion of cases and analysis from firms that failed to survive. Medical science often
progresses by studying not only healthy patients but also devoting effort to patients who did not
survive (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). In contrast, studies of business firms frequently neglect to
include non-survivors in the units of analysis; aside from neglecting to reveal insights from the
failure process, focusing exclusively on surviving firms can, potentially, bias the research
findings (Daily, 1994). Oversampling successes and under-sampling failures adversely impacts
the validity of generalizing from observations (McGrath, 1999). Potentially the greatest rationale
for this proposed study is to give a hearing to those theme parks that have failed, and take from
them a better understanding of the business failure process in this industry.
A last consideration of the rationale for studying failure is to acknowledge that there are
benefits that result from the bankruptcy and failure of businesses (Knott & Posen, 2005). In an
economy, high rates of business “founding and exiting” is a sign of economic vibrancy
(McGrath, 1999, p. 16). In highly concentrated industries, it is assumed that the healthy
competitors benefit from the struggles of the weaker players (Lang & Stulz, 1992).
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Causes of Failure
Much of the failure analysis literature is devoted to making predictions of when will a
struggling firm eventually fail. Generally, most of these prediction models are based on
evaluating financial symptoms of distress while neglecting more fundamental causes of failure
(Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). When the focus of analysis is directed on the causes of failure, the
assumption becomes that some variables are causing (or contributing) to the failure of some
firms while others survive. Thus, another segment of failure research has focused on identifying
and testing the many suspected causes of failure.
Before dissecting the various causes of failure, it is valid to consider if preconditions to
failure actually exist. Many researchers expect that these preconditions do exist but
acknowledge that they are not very apparent, especially during the early stages of decline
(Pretorius, 2008). Another issue for consideration is that firms do not fail due to a single cause
but due to multiple causes; a strong firm can survive one or two traditional failure factors, but the
addition of multiple failure causes ultimately will result in collapse (Headd, 2003; Miller, 1977).
Age, Specifically Youth or the Newness of the Firm
An often-identified cause of business failure has to do with the age of the business. More
specifically, the youth or newness of the business is a contributing cause of business failure.
Young firms have not yet built up external legitimacy or stable relationships with stakeholders
(Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008), outside individuals and organizations (Stinchcombe, 1965), or
customers (Thornhill & Amit, 2003).
A lack of resources, both financial and managerial, contribute to failure in the new firm.
Thornhill and Amit (2003, p. 500) refer to this as “the essence of the liability of newness;” young
firms often do not have sufficient resources to execute their strategy. Other financial traps that
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young firms succumb to include: product marketing failures; too great a reliance on one
customer; undercapitalization; and assuming too much debt too early (Pretorius, 2008). The
financial challenges of newness dogged several theme parks in this study (at least three parks
opened and closed within a six-month timeframe); also, numerous parks were challenged and
some eventually failed due to being undercapitalized and over-leveraged.
A lack of managerial resources is another contributor to failure. New businesses often
lack general management and financial management skills at the leadership level; additionally,
there is a lack of skills and organizational routines throughout the firm that results in ineffective
teams, a lack of understanding of specific roles among employees and departments in the new
firm, and conflicts and general inefficiencies (Pretorius, 2008; Thornhill & Amit, 2003).
In spite of all these challenges faced by young firms, failure among very new companies
is sometimes averted due to something known as the “honeymoon period;” in other words, the
initial funding raised before starting a new business is frequently sufficient to buffer the
organization through its first months of challenges and mistakes (Thornhill & Amit, 2003,
p. 498). As these startup resources are consumed, there tends to be an increase in the rate of
failure among what Pretorius (2008, p. 413) referred to as “adolescent firms.”
Smallness
The size of a firm is considered a factor in determining success or failure. From a
statistical standpoint, the larger of any two firms will have a lower likelihood of failure (Beaver,
1966). Small firms are more susceptible to failure due to their lack of financial resources or
access to financial lending or extensions of credit. Additionally, small firms are often
undercapitalized, are likely to have inadequate cash flows, have sub-par accounting and billing
systems, and do a poor job of optimally pricing products and services, and targeting potential
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markets. Small firms are also more prone to being impacted adversely by market contractions
(Kale & Arditi, 1998; Pretorius, 2008). Another competitive disadvantage faced by small firms
is that they tend to be run by less experienced managers with fewer business insights, who are
more rigid in their business approach, are more likely to engage in nepotism, do a poor job when
selecting employees, and tend to be unwilling to delegate authority. A final liability of smallness
is that the small company is unable to attract competent employees, and does not have the size
needed to deploy the concepts of a learning organization – where market and execution
challenges are responded to with improved processes (Kale & Arditi, 1998).
Most business failure analysis research (Daily, 1994) recognizes that newness and
smallness tend to go together: young firms are typically small. But of these two business traits,
newness is more of a liability than smallness (Kale & Arditi, 1998; Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008;
Pretorius, 2008).
Largeness
Large firms are less likely to fail than small firms (Pretorius, 2008) for a variety of
reasons. Large firms have greater access to loans and credit; large firms are more likely to
survive an exogenous crisis or managerial mistakes; large firms benefit from economies of scale;
thus they are often more efficient. Moreover, large firms tend to be better-managed (Fredland &
Morris, 1976). Failures at older, established firms tend to be due to external, environmental
factors and changing market factors (Pretorius, 2008).
Industry Affiliation
The industry sector of the enterprise has been shown to be a determining factor in failure
rates. Companies with similar financial profiles but in different industries have been shown to
have different probabilities of failure (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). Diversified companies fail
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for different reasons than do pure-play (industry-specific) companies (Miller, 1977). High
technology companies are challenged by different threats than are companies in what are
considered more stable industries. High among unstable industries, most prone to failures, are
enterprises in the food, beverage and accommodations sectors (Thornhill & Amit, 2003). Snyder
and Glueck (1982) devised a model to examine the environmental volatility within an industry –
in other words, which industries are inherently more volatile than others. Volatility was defined
as the average variation in sales in one industry divided by the average sales revenue in that
industry. The assumption is that a more volatile operating environment will result in a greater
percentage of business failures. Snyder and Glueck showed that electronic computing equipment
was more volatile than medical chemicals, which was more volatile than tires and inner tubes,
which was more volatile than confectionary products. DeNoble and Olsen (1986) applied this
framework to the food service industry and showed that it was more volatile than any of the
industry segments included in Snyder and Glueck’s study. No such analysis has been applied to
the theme park sector, but it could be illuminating.
Outside / External Causes
Broadly speaking, causes of business failure can be divided among factors external to the
company and factors from within (internal) to the company. Most businesses that fail do so as a
result of internal factors (Boyle & Desai, 1991; Fredland & Morris, 1976; Theng & Boon, 1996),
but the impacts of external factors is also an area of study. External or exogenous failure factors
can be grouped into two types: causes that affect all businesses in general (for example national
economic recessions, tight credit conditions or even regional economic declines (Fredland &
Morris, 1976; Pretorius, 2008), and causes unique to a specific firm or industry (for example, a
large competitor opens in close proximity to the firm)
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Keasey and Watson (1991) were able to show that a firm’s performance and overall rates
of failure are correlated with levels of macroeconomic activity. For the theme park sector and
this study, the influence of the macro economy impacts all theme parks equally; thus it is
unlikely to be shown that the economy was an “event” experienced more often by failed parks
than surviving parks. However, Knott and Posen (2005) analyzed firms founded during periods
of adverse environmental conditions and demonstrated that they exhibit high failure rates
initially, but those that survive this period of challenge then tend to survive at a rate greater than
similar firms founded in times of economic prosperity. For this study, a course of analysis can
be to determine if theme parks opened in a certain decade were more likely to fail or survive than
those founded at another period of time.
An external factor of concern for any business is carrying capacity – “the ability of the
environment [a market] to support a population of firms” (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Outside
of the destination theme park markets of Los Angeles and Orlando, no market (excepting the
greater Washington, D.C. area, and the tourist market of San Antonio, Texas) has managed to
support the long-term prosperity of two theme parks in one regional market. This could become
an “event” in this study: the proximity of competing theme parks as a factor contributing to
overall success or failure.
An outside factor of interest is the concept of contagion. Any bankruptcy in an industry
sector threatens all other firms in that same sector – any bankruptcy can signal to the market that
the overall industry is weak (Daily, 1994). A bankruptcy announcement of one company reveals
negative information about a sector’s cash flow and profitability. A bankruptcy announcement
of one company makes both customers and suppliers concerned about the financial health of
every other company in the industry (Bernanke, 1983; Lang & Stulz, 1992). Within the theme
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park industry, high impact failures appear to have limited the growth of the industry – the New
York City theme park failure (Freedomland) in 1964 potentially held back the full expansion of
the industry until the early 1970s; similarly, Hard Rock Park’s rapid failure in 2008 has cast
doubt that a new regional theme park development in North America can succeed.
One last external contributor to failure is related to the relative per capita income of an
area; failure among firms is more common within high per capita, rapidly growing areas. The
belief is that more firms are likely to enter markets in growing and high-income areas; thus more
are likely to fail in these areas (Fredland & Morris, 1976). Another potential for this study is to
consider if more theme parks have failed in high income markets versus more moribund
economic markets.
Internal Causes
To transition to the more common internal causes of business failure, it is worth noting
that business failure is often not solely due to the inability to adjust to external market
conditions, but is often due to the inability to adjust to external factors along with a combination
of limiting internal factors (Pretorius, 2008).
Commonly cited internal causes of failure hark back to the fundamentals of a lack of
capital, cash flow issues, eroding profit margins, lack of control over spending, and excessive
overhead (Longenecker et al., 1999; Pretorius, 2008). Cash flow issues are one of the most
frequently cited causes of business failure, but it has been argued that poor cash flow is a result
of other business failings rather than being the ultimate cause of failure (Ooghe & De Prijcker,
2008). Debt, that other most frequently cited failure cause, can be simply too much debt or the
inability to structure and manage it (Bollen, Mertens, Meuwissan, Van Roak & Schelleman,
2005; Scherrer, 2003). Other financial or marketing-related failure causes include having an
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inappropriate marketing strategy or engaging in a failed market expansion (Longenecker et al.,
1999; Pretorius, 2008). Again quite fundamentally, failure to satisfy customers is an internal
contributor to failure, for example: failure to understand the demands of customers; or not
knowing customers or the competition that is attempting to appeal to established customers.
And, an inability to differentiate the product line and the failure to develop new products or
expand into new markets are other internal causes of failure (Longenecker et al., 1999).
Many of the common internal factors that are attributed to failure revolve around issues
of internal leadership and organizational culture. Poor executive leadership is a cause, as is poor
management at the next level down in the organization. Dominant CEOs, high turnover among
top management, low expertise in marketing, sales, operations, and research and development
(Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992), and the failure to create a clear vision for the organization are oftcited senior management contributors to failure. Self-deception among executives – not
recognizing challenges and failures and taking appropriate actions to correct them – can put the
organization on the path to failure. Such sustained leadership failures lead to a loss of leadership
credibility (Longenecker et al, 1999).
Among the cultural issues involving the employees within an organization that contribute
to failure are a variety of topics: a lack of skills and needed behaviors; short-sighted views of the
future; lack of creativity and innovation; a lack of knowledge of the company’s products; low
morale; hierarchical and cultural rigidity; resistance to change; blaming leadership; and
excessive turnover of competent staff (Longenecker et al., 1999; Pretorius, 2008).
Other internal failure factors can be categorized as structural to the organization. Failure
can come from ineffective management information systems, ineffective operating processes,
unclear performance standards, lack of continuous improvement practices, increased

41

centralization, lack of long-term planning, or curtailed innovation (Longenecker et al., 1999;
Pretorius, 2008). Among failed firms, the CEO is frequently more likely to serve as the
chairman of the board than at successful firms (Daily, 1994). Bankrupt firms tend to be less
diversified than surviving firms (Sheppard, 1993). Lastly, failed firms are more likely to engage
in improperly (overly optimistic) planned expansions, and the resulting delays in the openings of
new facilities or the release of new products (Camillo et al., 2008). Failed firms have been
shown to engage in the manipulation of financial statements and graft in general (Keasey &
Watson, 1991). A couple of theme park failures have been scrutinized due to allegations of
financial impropriety and such instances will be considered to be “events” in the current study.
Strategies Used to Avoid Bankruptcy
Common among firms that are failing is to seek out a company to merge with (Hamer,
1983). Shrieves and Stevens (1979) and Peel and Wilson (1989) showed that 15 to 17% of firms
that had merged exhibited signs of financial distress in the year before their merger, versus less
than 5% among all firms. Mergers are endemic within the theme park industry, and mergers will
be an “event” tracked in this study.
Other traits exhibited by businesses that are actively avoiding bankruptcy include
observing industry trends, a willingness to adapt to market changes, being self-financed, having
external investors, possession of detailed knowledge of their industry, and having well-defined
business and marketing plans (Camillo et al., 2008). Headd (2003) focused on traits of surviving
firms and noted that they were more likely not to be home based, the owners had previous
ownership experience, there were multiple owners of the business, the owners were older, and
the owners started the business for personal reasons, which gives them more motivation to keep
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the business going. A study by Cooper, Dunkelberg and Woo (1989) indicated that surviving
businesses are more likely to be founded by older, non-minority, males with college educations.
Failure Analysis Models
Within the business failure analysis literature, a number of theories on why companies
fail have been developed and tested. At the most condensed level, four thoughts as to why
businesses decline and fail have been identified: failure at the top (deficiencies in senior
management); customer (often product) and marketing failures; financial management failures;
and system and structural failures (Longenecker et al., 1999). Some of the common failure
theories can be considered to apply to large organizations versus smaller organizations
(Richardson, Nwankwo & Richardson, 1994), while other authors (Miller, 1977) have made note
of the universal applicability of the failure theories. In Miller’s study of 40 failed companies,
80% were able to be categorized into one of the four failure theory types proposed.
Boiled Frog Theory
The boiled frog theory is also known as the “stagnant bureaucracy” theory (Miller, 1977);
an established and formerly successful organization becomes complacent and begins to ignore
customers, competitors and technology innovations, while demand for its products begins to
diminish and environmental scanning and market analysis is ignored (Richardson et al., 1994).
The organization is often dominated by a “power-hoarding” chief executive who is averse to
change, explains decreasing profits on temporary influences (Oogghe & De Prijcker, 2008) and
is blind to different and emerging businesses. Management focuses on day-to-day business
operations while the competition steals away market share (Richardson et al., 1994).
Traits of the boiled frog company include increasing bureaucracy, a “meetings culture,” a
focus on organizational growth rather than growth in production or profits, low motivation
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among employees with benefits awarded without increases to productivity, and a culture that
seeks consensus and compromise (Richardson et al., 1994). These types of firms ultimately fail
quickly and dramatically. The first performance stumble is often overlooked due to the
reputation of the company and its established product lines. This period of often-unnoticed
decline lasts two to ten years then it quickly plunges into failure (Argenti, 1976), while its culture
of hierarchical control and diluted responsibility contributes to its inability to reorganize (Ooghe
& De Prijcker, 2008).
Drowned Frog Theory
In keeping with the amphibian analogies, a second common failure theory is that of the
drowned frog, also known as the dazzled growth company (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008), the
impulsive syndrome or running blind (Miller, 1977). Typically this is a young company that has
experienced impressive growth. It is led by a domineering CEO who is an expert in the industry,
who is a gifted salesman, autocratic, charismatic, and brimming with ideas, ambition and
“hyperactivity.” In a small company, this person is the ambitious entrepreneur, at a large
company this person is the “conglomerate kingmaker” (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008; Richardson
et al., 1994;).
In the drowned frog company, based on its initial business success, management becomes
overly optimistic and pursues aggressive growth through product diversification and rapid
expansion into new markets. The pace of the growth “overtaxes” both the financial and
managerial resources of the organization (Miller, 1977; Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008).
Companies exhibiting drowned frog traits often expand too fast without introducing the
professional management systems needed to support the growth. They begin to lose control of
strategic planning, they overestimate sales, and they have high expenses, resulting in
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overwhelming debt. As performance slows, the company’s reaction is to expand and diversify
its product lines to the point of absurdity (Richardson et al., 1994). Ultimately, the failure is
even more spectacular than the rise: insufficient profits, cash flow issues, and finally liquidity
and solvency issues result in business collapse (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). The drowned frog
syndrome is potentially manifest in a number of theme park failures to be considered.
Failed Startup Theory
A failed startup is defined as a company that fails within five years of its founding, it fails
to ever become a proper business; or the failed startup can be the big project at a large
organization that becomes such an expensive failure that it manages to bring the entire
corporation down. Again, in keeping with the frog metaphor, this failure type is sometimes
referred to as “tadpoles” (Richardson et al., 1994; Pretorius, 2008). Failed startups are
characterized by a lack of managerial or industry-related experience, heavy capital expenditures,
insufficient control mechanisms, operational inefficiencies, underestimated expenses, no
strategic advantage (relative to competitors), limited growth, low sales levels, low profitability,
low cash flow, and liquidity problems. In some cases, management realizes that there is a need
to restructure, but the company finds that it is a struggle to obtain additional capital and fails in
its bid to restructure (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008). Several theme parks fit this characterization
as failed startups.
Failed Turnaround Theory
The failed turnaround is the established company that is faced with an overwhelming
need to completely restructure in order to survive. This theory is sometimes referred to as
swimming upstream (which a frog might have to do at times). A typical failed turnaround
situation involves a new CEO who has been appointed to carry out the turnaround. The CEO
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surrounds himself with a group of new employees he brought with him. The new leadership
distrusts the old management team and finds it difficult to gain the support or cooperation of the
staff that is needed to achieve the turnaround. The new CEO pushes the organization a bit too
much and tries to do too many things at once, ultimately leading to failure (Miller, 1977).
Theme parks, often characterized by frequent changes in management and ownership, have been
subjected to turnarounds, successful and not. From the perspective of the events approach,
changes in ownership will be tracked as “events” relevant to turnaround theory.
Lack of Leadership Theory
A last theory of failure analysis is known as “the headless firm” or lack of leadership
theory. This type of failure often occurs at large, diversified companies operating in markets that
have experienced recent, dramatic change. An ineffective company leader creates a leadership
vacuum and an organization lacking a defined strategy. Product/service innovation is low,
resulting in loss of market share, loss of profits and the ultimate demise (Miller, 1977).
Seminal Failure Analysis Studies
Although businesses have always failed, the formal study of why firms failed did not
begin until the 1960s. Beaver (1966) utilized a simple univariate model to predict bankruptcy
(Kim & Gu, 2006). Beaver’s study explored what financial ratios might be predictors of the
ultimate demise of a firm. The study used 79 failed subject firms operating in 38 different
industries. Thirty financial ratios were tested for their ability to predict the failure of a firm five
years in the future. Of the 30 ratios tested, five were determined best at predicting subsequent
failure: cash flow to total debt; net income to assets; total debt to total assets; working capital to
total assets; and current ratio.
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Edward Altman is considered the leader in the field of bankruptcy studies/business failure
prediction studies (Altman, 1968; 1983). He was the first to use a multivariate model. His initial
study made a comparison of 33 failed manufacturing firms to 33 surviving firms. Twenty-two
variables (ratios) were considered and five ratios were determined to be significant in the
prediction of financial failure: working capital to total assets; market value of equity to par value
of debt; sales to total assets; retained earnings to total assets; and earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) to total assets. The predictive ability of Altman’s model was 79% one year prior to
failure, and 95% three years prior to the failure.
Many of the significant authors after Altman used their studies to refine his work.
Deakin in 1972 improved on Altman’s results by using 14 financial ratios. Blum in 1974
achieved a one-year prediction rate of 94%. Thornhill and Amit (2003) veered from just
attempting to improve on the results of earlier studies and examined the differences among firms
that failed early in their existence versus those that survived through their “adolescence.”
Failure Analysis Studies in the Hospitality Industry
The hospitality industry is prone to business failures but few studies attempt to analyze
this phenomenon (Gu & Gao, 2000; Kim & Gu, 2006). Adams in 1995 tested Altman’s model
on United Kingdom leisure and hotel companies and concluded that more research was needed.
In 2000, Gu and Gao initiated a study to identify the “financial features” of hospitality firms that
are prone to failure. They used 14 financial ratios to create a multivariate discriminant (logistic
regression) model that achieved a 93% accuracy rate of assigning sample firms into bankrupt and
non-bankrupt categories. Their findings suggest that within the U.S. hospitality industry, the
firms most likely to go bankrupt are those that are unprofitable and with debt, especially shortterm liabilities. Other attributes among the subject firms that lead to business failure were rapid
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expansions and, counterintuitively, fast sales growth. Successful firms were profitable, had
manageable debt, slow but steady sales growth, and again somewhat counterintuitively, high
long-term debt.
Kim and Gu in 2006 also completed a logistic regression study with 13 independent
variables tested on 16 failed and 16 surviving hospitality firms (restaurants, hotels and casinos).
This model’s accuracy was able to correctly predict a forthcoming bankruptcy 91% of the time
one year out from the failure event, and 84% of the time two years out (a rate similar to the
results achieved in comparable studies conducted within other industries). In the end, operating
cash flows to total liabilities was the only significant predicting variable. The findings suggest
that a hospitality firm is most likely to go bankrupt if it has low operating cash flows and high
total liabilities. Kim and Gu’s recommendations are that hospitality firms should pursue
conservative sales growth strategies, avoid debt-financing, and maintain control over operating
expenses, especially labor costs.
Restaurant Failure Analysis
Within the hospitality industry, the most robust failure analysis literature is devoted to
restaurant failures. Restaurant failures have been shown to result more from factors internal to
the business than external factors (Parsa et al., 2005), specifically, restaurant failures result from
an “under-estimation of the difficulty of the business environment,” a lack of industry
specialized knowledge, management incompetence, loss of motivation among management,
unwillingness of management to give the business sufficient attention, and a general
misunderstanding of a business owner’s lifestyle (Camillo et al., 2008, p. 366). Regardless of
what are the causes of the failure, researchers in the field of restaurant failure are faced with a
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lack of sufficient data – a lack of data to predict failure but also to determine the characteristics
of the process of restaurant failure (Gu & Gao, 2000; Camillo et al., 2008).
The rate of failure among restaurants is 30% – with 25% of restaurant failures occurring
within the first year of operation. By the third year of operation, 60% of restaurant operations
have failed (Parsa et al., 2005). The low entry barriers to the restaurant business ultimately
contribute to the high failure rates among smaller firms. Within the sector, larger is better; larger
restaurants utilize more financial and human resources, resulting in higher survival rates (Parsa,
Self, Sydnor-Busso, & Yeon, 2011).
Attributes of failed restaurant businesses include: the lack of a feasibility study, no
advertising plan, inexperienced operators, and a lack of needed cost accounting. Other attributes
associated with restaurant failures include: management turnover, revenue losses, loan defaults
and royalty defaults. Failure attributes specific to restaurants include the failure to adequately
promote the restaurant concept, and the failure to cost out the recipes (Kwansa & Parsa, 1990;
Camillo et al., 2008). Restaurants that do manage to succeed successfully differentiate
themselves from their competition (Parsa et al., 2005). And, being a chain restaurant results in a
greater likelihood of surviving than being an independent restaurant – independent restaurants in
Parsa and colleagues’ study (2011) had a mean survival time of five years, eight months, versus
nine years for chain restaurants.
Hotel Failure Analysis
The lodging sector of the hospitality industry is well analyzed, but literature devoted to
failure analysis in this area is critically lacking. Compared to restaurants, hotels tend to represent
more substantial investments and are characterized by inflexible supply constraints (it takes time
to construct properties when the demand warrants) and volatile market demand over time (Chen
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& Yeh, 2012). Demand for lodging properties in the U.S. is linked with gross domestic product
fluctuations (Romeo, 1997; Wheaton & Rossoff, 1998). Attributes that have been shown to play
a part in hotel survival or failure include, profitability, room rates, average operating revenue per
employee, chain affiliation (international hotel chain affiliation reduces the risk of failure), and
market concentration – a higher concentration of hotels in a geographic area decreases the risk of
failure (Chen & Yeh, 2012). Chen and Yeh’s (2012) study of 72 international hotels showed that
19% of the subject hotels ultimately failed. Among the fourteen failed firms, 29% (four) failed
due to natural disasters. Like hotels, theme parks represent large investments; thus it would be
fruitful to consider the causes of hotel failures when hypothesizing the potential failure causes of
theme parks, but like theme parks, hotel failure analysis is scant. Nonetheless, the lodging
industry concept of market concentration and its influence on success or failure might also be
applicable to theme parks – do theme parks flourish when multiple enterprises enter a market or
is this a contributor to failures? And, what is the incidence of theme park failure due to natural
disasters?
Event Failure Analysis
Within the hospitality industry is the fair, festival or special event sector. Limited
research has been directed at why events fail, but an exploratory study on the causes of festival
failure was conducted by Getz in 2002. Getz sought to reveal the frequency and causes of event
failures. One hundred members of the International Festivals and Events Association were
surveyed, 39 responses were received. Seventy-nine percent of respondents were aware of an
event failure, mentioning 29 distinct festival failures. Thirty-six percent of the respondents were
not just aware of festival failures but had been personally involved with one. Festival failure was
attributed to: a lack of resources; a lack of volunteers; complaints from disgruntled merchants;
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community opposition; poor weather; riots; a lack of vision; a lack of management; funding
being cutoff; fiscal mismanagement; inadequate sponsorship; inadequate marketing and
planning; inattention to the program; poor service quality; competition from similar events in the
area; over-reliance on one source of funding; internal divisions; and such practical considerations
as the local government banning beer sales at the festival venue.
Of course the next entry in this review of failure analysis in the hospitality industry
should be devoted to the literature on business failures and closures in the attractions and theme
park sector. There are most definitively failures and closures in this sector but the
documentation is non-existent. This study aims to explore the causes of failure and closure in
this segment of the hospitality industry.
To study failure analysis in a new industry sector, a first step is to identify the most
appropriate statistical method to use.
Failure Analysis—Statistical Methods Employed
To analyze or predict failure, most authors have focused on financial information as the
potential cause (Dimitras, Zanakis, & Zopounidis, 1996; Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008; Pretorius,
2008). And, the most commonly used financial method to predict failure is ratio analysis (Daily,
1994; Ohlson, 1980; Pretorius, 2008). The assumption is that the probability of a firm ending up
bankrupt can be predicted up to five years prior to the failure event based on the data reported in
a company’s publicly-available financial statements (Daily, 1994; Gu & Gao, 2000) – ratio
analysis determines if a firm’s financial profile aligns with the financial profile of failed firms
(Keasey & Watson, 1991). At an aggregated level, those ratios that have been proven to predict
subsequent failures are related to the size of the company, measures of a company’s financial
structure, measures of its performance, and measures of its current liquidity (Ohlson, 1980).
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Although ratio analysis is commonly used, it has its limitations. Despite the vast number
of ratio studies that have been performed, there is no overall agreement on which ratios, factors,
or independent variables are “crucial” to the prediction of failure. To some extent this is due to
the varying timeframes of the studies, the varying geographic areas covered in the studies, and
the wide range of industries that were the focus of these studies (Pretorius, 2008). In the
majority of these studies, the theoretical connection between the independent variables and the
dependent variable is missing; without a theory, it is difficult to employ statistical analysis of the
ratios and expect a sustained correlation that leads to a generalization (Aziz et al., 1988). Also,
this approach does not enable the significance of individual independent variables to be
determined (Keasey & Watson, 1991). Structurally there are other limitations to the use of ratio
analysis: it requires several years of data, which will be unavailable to new companies; and
financial data is not available for non-publically traded companies (Hamer, 1983). Lastly,
financial ratios are merely the symptoms of business failure – on their own, they have no ability
to provide significant insights into the actual cause of failure at a firm (Argenti, 1976; Keasey &
Watson, 1991).
Ratio analysis has been employed by Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Deakin (1972),
Blum (1974), and Dambolena and Khoury (1980). To conduct a ratio analysis utilizing multiple
regression requires a normal distribution among the ratios used as the independent variables, and
requires a random sampling of the bankrupt and surviving firms (Kim & Gu, 2006; Pretorius,
2008).
Multiple discriminant analysis (multiple regression) models have achieved success in
utilizing financial ratios to predict the probability of business failure, also frequently used are
logistic regression models. Logistic models are considered to be slightly superior to the multiple
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regression models in terms of their predictive ability (Aziz et al., 1988). To some extent, these
logit analysis models avoid many of the limitations associated with the multiple discriminant
analyses (Ohlson, 1980) and have fewer of the demanding assumptions of other methods
(Keasey & Watson, 1991). Logistic regression attempts to construct a model that best describes
group membership (failed firms or surviving firms) by maximizing the joint probability of failure
among failed firms and the joint probability of success among the surviving firms; logistic
regression also provides the ability to determine the significance of individual variables included
in the models (Keasey & Watson, 1991; Youn & Gu, 2010). Notable approaches using logistic
regression include Ohlson (1980), Zavgren (1985), Lennox (1999), and Darayseh, Waples and
Tsoukalas (2003). Ohlson’s model (1980) incorporated nine independent variables and achieved
92% accuracy in predicting bankruptcy two years out from the event. Similarly, Zavgren (1985)
used a logistic regression model to predict bankruptcy one to five years in advance and achieved
lower error rates than comparable multiple regression models. Darayseh, Waples and Tsoukalas
(2003) included a number of macroeconomic variables in their model in addition to the more
common use of only financial ratios.
A number of authors have conducted studies intended to compare the various regression
models used to predict failure: Press and Wilson (1978); Collens and Green (1982); Hamer
(1983); Lo (1986); Theodossiou (1991); and Lennox (1999). The consensus is that results are
mixed (Kim & Gu, 2006). Hamer (1983) used the same variables with both linear and logistic
regression and concluded the models performed comparably. Similarly, Lo (1986) compared
multiple regression and logistic regression and achieved consistent results. Theodossiou (1991)
showed that logistic regression outperformed linear regression. Lennox (1999) showed that a
logistic regression model outperformed a similar multiple regression model.
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Contemporary approaches to failure analysis have been more receptive to the inclusion of
qualitative data or non-financial measures in the models. Authors have recognized that failure
is “multi-dimensional.” Non-financial variables are part of the “signs” of eventual failure and
the use of non-financial prediction variables can improve failure prediction (Keasey & Watson,
1987). Neglecting qualitative data constrains the usefulness of business failure models – nonfinancial data is not evaluated in a vacuum by investors and Wall Street analysts, but is seen as a
complement to the perceived rigor of the traditional financial data (Tennyson, Ingram & Dugan,
1990).
Non-financial measures that have been used productively in analytical studies have
included share price movement, bond ratings, interest rates (Keasey & Watson, 1991), recordkeeping, industry experience, management experience, the use of professional advisors, levels of
education among management, staffing levels (Lussier, 1995), management character, payment
disturbances, group membership among managers, and firm traits such as size and productivity
efficiency (Back, 2005). The Lussier study (1995) showed that successful firms were more
likely to make use of formal professional advice (consultants) and went through the effort to
develop more specific business plans, while failed firms were more likely to be headed by less
educated managers and struggled to acquire quality staff. Back’s study (2005) showed that the
use of these qualitative variables in conjunction with financial ratios results in greater accuracy
of failure prediction.
In line with the use of non-financial ratios to improve failure prediction is the adoption of
the case study approach. Case studies are useful when analyzing “the evolution of a
phenomenon or when more than just measurable data are analyzed” (Ooghe & De Prijcker,
2008, p. 226). Case studies can flesh out the understanding of an individual firm’s process of

54

failure; new understandings of failure can be gained from this “fine-grained” approach to a
company’s demise (Daily, 1994). Another approach to enhance the case study method is to
incorporate inputs from human experts into the analysis. Expert feedback increases the range
and variety of informational inputs to the failure prediction and analysis (Keasey & Watson,
1991).
This study of theme park failures does not formally adopt the methods of the case study
approach, but the constrained sample size and the events approach methodology encourages a
receptiveness to this type of approach. Kwortnik (2003) stressed that a suitable sample size for
achieving an understanding of a phenomenon through the use of qualitative research is a
minimum of twelve. The sample size among the failed theme parks in this study is at least twice
the number recommended by Kwortnik.
For this study, ratio analysis would have simplified the study design, but for theme parks
the balance sheet-specific ratio data is not typically available. Many theme parks in the past
were privately owned, thus they were not required to disclose the types of financial figures
needed to carry out this analysis. Other theme park ventures are operated by publicly traded
corporations that disclose financial data, but the operations of the individual theme parks are
either reported at a consolidated level (in other words the results of a number of theme parks are
combined in the financial reporting) or are reported as a part of a greater business segment so
that the results reflect more than just the theme park operations. (For example, Walt Disney
Attractions’ financial results include theme park financials but also financials on the Company’s
cruise line interests, the numerous resorts, time-share sales and even its guided tour operations.)
A case study of the failed theme parks could have sufficed to complete a study, but it
would have failed to make the comparison with the theme parks that have survived over time.
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Thus, the events approach was selected as the ideal approach to incorporate park-specific
financial ratios and financial data along with non-financial and qualitative event data to draw
comparison and insights into both failure and survival in the theme park industry.
Findings
Throughout this chapter, prior business failure analysis studies have been scoured to
identify research questions that can be transformed into relevant hypotheses in this study. These
will be summarized in this conclusion and the working hypotheses of this study will be
elaborated on in the subsequent chapter.
Prior bankruptcy studies have used a diverse array of definitions for failure. This study
uses a most stringent definition, “the closure of the business as an operating concern.” The
average life expectancy of all firms is 12.5 years while the average lifespan of larger
multinational corporations is 40 to 50 years; the oldest theme park is just over 60 years, while the
mean age of all the theme parks included in this study is 25.9 years.
Much of the research in this field probes into the specific causes of failure; for example,
the newness of the firm – are theme parks more likely to fail in the early years of their operation?
The size of an organization is often listed as a cause – are theme parks backed by large
corporations more likely to survive than independently-owned parks? Does industry affiliation
factor into the rate of failure of a firm – are theme parks more susceptible to failure than firms in
other more stable industries? Do external causes, such as the economy, competition, social
movements or political events, impact rates of failure? Or, are internal factors, such as cash
flow, debt levels, poor management, or bad marketing, more likely contributors to failure? Do
external or internal factors or a combination of both lead to theme park failures?
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Methods to avoid bankruptcy are focused on by many authors. Merger activity is often
seen as a means to circumvent impending failure – mergers have been common events in the
theme park industry; are theme parks that have merged with or been acquired by other theme
park operators more likely to fail or survive?
Models that have been devised to describe the process of business failure represent a
healthy segment of the business failure analysis literature. Do theme park failures fit within any
of these models and what insights can this provide into the process of theme park failure?
Seminal failure analysis studies have employed multiple regression and logistic
regression analysis. Unfortunately, the theme park industry does not lend itself to such an
analysis due to the lack of publicly available financial ratio data. Therefore, this initial study of
business failure analysis in the North American theme park industry will utilize an events
approach to the causes of theme park failure.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Introduction
This study performed an events approach methodology to determine if specific events
(economic, financial or organizational) in the lifespan of theme parks play a contributing role in
their failure and/or eventual closure. The complete population of the 23 failed North American
theme parks, compared with an equal and comparable number of surviving theme parks served
as the units of analysis for the study.
The study’s hypotheses asked if certain events are more likely to occur among those
parks that ultimately close than at the parks that have survived, and then explored for
relationships among the failed/closed theme parks to determine what were the most common
contributors to failure/closure among the event variables. To statistically test the hypothesis that
considered event variables between failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks, the
chi-square test of statistical significance was utilized. To statistically test the hypotheses that
compared the relative contribution of event variables to park closure among the failed/closed
theme park sample, z-tests for differences of proportions were performed.
Failure, defined in this study as the closure (voluntarily or involuntarily) of a once
operating theme park entity, has occurred at a rate of 31%; in other words, of the approximately
75 theme parks that have opened in North America since 1955, almost one in three have failed
and closed (Kaak, 2010). The first step to prevent such failures in the future is to have the ability
to identify what factors precede such closures. As the industry expands into the developing
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regions of Asia and Latin America, such heightened knowledge of the industry could lead to
more successful and efficient operations and could have an impact on investment decisions.
Within the mature and highly competitive North American theme park sector, these findings may
enhance current operations and contribute to improving profits.
The data collection for this study was derived from publicly-available, published, media
sources spanning the entire history of the theme park industry. Events that have been identified
as potential contributors to business failure from prior events approach studies and the business
failure / bankruptcy literature reviewed in Chapter Two were also considered in the analysis.
Research Design Strategy
This study made use of the “events approach” research design. The events approach
method has been applied on only a limited basis; a more common research design is the “event
study,” which will be detailed prior to explaining the events approach.
Event Study Overview
The events study can be considered as the methodological precursor to the events
approach. The event study methodological approach developed from the accounting discipline
as a way to measure how events – both financial and non-financial – can have a short-term
influence on a company’s stock price. Initially, the method was applied exclusively within the
disciplines of investing and accounting but was later extended to the fields of corporate finance,
economics (Binder, 1998), and eventually to the social sciences, including hospitality (Chen
2012; Gift & Gift, 2011; Jayanti & Jayanti, 2011; Kim, Kim & Hancer, 2009; Lertwachara &
Cochran, 2007).
The event study approach was developed by Sorter (1969). Event studies fall within two
categories: market efficiency studies that examine how fast and how correctly the market reacts
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to new information released about a publicly traded company through fluctuations in its stock
price; and information usefulness studies that examine the degree (percent upward or downward)
of the reaction of a company’s share price to a specific news release (Henderson, 1990). An
example of a market efficiency study would be an investigation of how quickly and correctly the
stock market reacts to the announcement of a company’s stock split (Fama, Fisher, Jensen &
Roll, 1969). An information usefulness study would assess the value of the information provided
in a company’s annual earnings announcements (Ball & Brown, 1968).
The procedural steps in an event study consist of defining the exact date on which the
market would have received the news of the event, determining what would have been the
expected returns of the companies under study in the absence of this news (based on historic
trends of the rates of return), then measuring the difference between the returns after the news
event and the anticipated returns had there been no event. Finally, a statistical test is performed
to determine if there is a significant difference between the reaction to the news and the
anticipated normalized returns (Henderson, 1990).
Within the tourism and hospitality fields, event studies have been conducted to analyze a
number of contemporary topics. In 2007, Lertwachara and Cochran used an event study method
to determine what impact the relocation of an existing franchise or the expansion of a new
franchise of a U.S. professional sports team (baseball, football, basketball or hockey) had on the
economy of the home city. The results showed that this “event” corresponded to a decline in the
overall growth rate of per capita income for the city.
The effects of information technology (IT) investment announcements on the market
value of casino, hotel and restaurant firms indicated a slight positive relationship between IT
investment announcements and stock prices (Kim, Kim, & Hancer, 2009). On several occasions
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at the beginning of his administration, President Barack Obama made disparaging remarks about
visiting and spending money gambling in Las Vegas. Gift and Gift (2011) used an event study
methodology to determine the impact these comments had on U.S.-based casino-related
businesses. The results suggested that these comments had a significant negative result (a 2 to
7% reduction) on the market capitalizations of large casino firms associated with the convention,
trade show and tourism sector (for example, in addition to casino operations they also control
hotel and attractions), but had a significant positive (1 to 6% increase) on the market
capitalizations of casino firms with a local or regional focus.
In 2011, an event study was utilized to determine the effects of bankruptcy and
shutdowns by major airline carriers on their competitors (Jayanti & Jayanti, 2011). Not
surprisingly, bankruptcies and shutdowns resulted in “abnormal” positive returns for competitor
carriers, while the eventual emergence from bankruptcy had a negative impact on rival firms’
share prices. Chen (2012) used an event study to examine how the stocks of various hospitality
firms reacted to public announcements from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
regarding the federal funds target rate. The airline, gaming, hotel and travel companies included
within the study experienced significant fluctuations to “surprise” (unexpected) announcements
by the FOMC. Interestingly, the stocks of restaurant companies in the study did not react
significantly to the same announcements; it was speculated that this was due to restaurants being
less capital-intensive than the other industry sectors and thus are less dependent on finance costs.
Events Approach Overview
The events approach builds on the events study method. The events approach analyzes
events that may or may not occur over a predetermined time period among a number of subject
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companies and then determines which events may or may not contribute to differing outcomes:
firm bankruptcy or closure, or firm survival.
The procedural steps in an event approach study begin with establishing a definition of
failure or closure. The definition of failure in previous event studies have ranged from a
sustained, deterioration of revenues (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984) to reorganization under Chapter
11 bankruptcy (Kwansa & Parsa, 1990). For this study, the most stringent form of “failure” was
adopted: closure of the theme park operation, recognizing that closure can be due to involuntary
financial complications or for voluntary reasons. The next step is to compile the units of analysis
for the study. Study “subjects” can include companies from a variety of industries (Giroux &
Wiggins, 1984) or can include companies from a particular industry segment (Kwansa & Parsa,
1990; Tavlin et al., 1989). This study will include only North American theme parks as the unit
of analysis, more specifically, only those theme parks with annual attendance of less than five
million per year. Whatever is the composition of the unit of analysis, the companies included in
the study should be divided approximately evenly among failed and surviving firms. A
timeframe of analysis must be established. A determination of what “events” will be considered
in the analysis must be made; typically, the events to be considered in the study are based on a
literature review of factors that have contributed to business failure in other companies. The next
step is to inventory the occurrences of events among each set of businesses, both the survivors
and the failed firms. Once this data has been assembled, a statistical test for each event must be
performed to determine if a significant difference exists between the frequency of event
occurrences among the two groups. The final step in the events approach is to report on which
events are significantly more common among the failed companies/firms. The metrics that are

62

reported include: the percentage and frequency of failed firms experiencing the event, and the
percentage and frequency of surviving firms experiencing the event.
Although not a broadly used method, the events approach has been previously applied in
the field of hospitality as a means to investigate business failure. It has been recognized as a
procedure for identifying specific causes or specific characteristics of bankrupt firms in contrast
to the other bankruptcy study approaches that focus on predicting the likelihood of bankruptcy
(Kwansa & Parsa, 1990). Used properly, the events approach can reveal information on the
failure process that complements the information that can be obtained from financial ratio
analysis by enabling the researcher to identify specific actions or events that lead to the failures
(Tavlin et al., 1989).
Financial ratio analysis has been the predominate approach to empirically study
bankruptcies (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984) but suitable financial data cannot always be obtained on
firms that are small and/or not required to disclose publicly available financial data. Another
shortcoming of the ratio analysis approach is that it can neglect to consider other significant
events that contribute to business failures, such as debt accommodations or loan defaults. In
contrast, the events approach can be used to identify the series of events that result in business
failure (Kwansa & Parsa, 1990) or it can identify the order of events—what events precede other
events —that ultimately lead to failure (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984).
An events approach can be used to scientifically contrast non-bankrupt firms from
bankrupt firms. This research method can demonstrate that specific economic, financial or
organizational events are unique to bankrupt firms (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa & Parsa,
1990). Once identified, these unique events can be used as warning signs of impending financial
challenges. Thus, the events approach can be used as a diagnostic tool for current businesses—
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identifying potential financial pitfalls (pre-failure events) early enough so that they can be
reacted to (Tavlin et al., 1989) in an attempt to divert future business failures. This sequence of
pre-failure events that ultimately result in business failure implies that this is a process, a series
of actions that occur over time (Kwansa & Parsa, 1990). Recognizing the emergence of such
processes may be the first step a company takes to prevent its eventual decline.
Despite the potential benefits that can result from the events approach methodology, it
has been used infrequently in academic studies. To explain how the approach will be used in the
current study, the most prominent, prior events approach studies are described below.
Giroux and Wiggins
Giroux and Wiggins (1984) made use of the event approach to contrast and enrich the
results that could be obtained from the mainstream financial ratio analysis of bankruptcy studies.
They sought to build toward the creation of a model of business failure based on the events that
occur at firms prior to their descent into bankruptcy. In addition, they sought to determine if
certain events are associated with the eventual failure at firms. Their intention was to devise a
quantitative tool to enable bankers to assess the likelihood of a firm to go bankrupt if it
experienced such events.
For their study, Giroux and Wiggins (1984) defined failure as “experiencing some degree
of financial distress” (pg. 179). Their sample consisted of industrial firms, 22 of which were
bankrupt and 26 that were survivors. The timeframe of the study was for ten years (1970 to
1980). To determine if the difference among the occurrences of events was statistically
significant between the bankrupt and surviving firms, a chi-square test was performed. The
authors were able to identify three events that appear to be closely associated with bankruptcy:
net losses (all of the bankrupt firms experienced this event), debt accommodation (70% of the
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bankrupt firms experienced this), and loan default (50% of the bankrupt firms experienced this
event).
Tavlin, Moncarz, and Dumont
Tavlin and colleagues (1989) utilized a case study approach of twelve restaurant and
lodging hospitality firms that were in varying degrees of financial failure. Their intent was to
reveal what factors contributed to failure in order to inform the industry of the warning signs and
provide suggestions of what can be done to avoid such mistakes in the future.
The authors identified a number of “common themes” that contributed to business failure
and were common to all the firms in the case studies:


lack of responsiveness to change



inadequate management/employee training



undercapitalization and/or over-expansion of operation



poor upkeep of existing facilities or a lack of renovations



failure to upgrade



failure to properly execute the company’s product or marketing concept



abandonment of a successful product or marketing concept



reliance on a gimmick or a theme that went stale



ego of the founder/entrepreneur, which prevents the company from adapting to changes
in their markets



inadequate internal controls
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Kwansa and Parsa
Kwansa and Parsa (1990) focused on the “pre-failure life” of failed restaurant firms.
Their aim was to consider the process of failure among twelve restaurant companies that failed
while also considering the events that were experienced by twelve restaurant companies that
survived over the 19-year study timeframe (1970 to 1998). Failure in their study was defined as
filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Kwansa and Parsa distinguished their approach as
not attempting to predict bankruptcy but striving to determine the characteristics of the failure
process. Throughout the course to bankruptcy, opportunities exist for firms to make corrections
to avoid failure. The identification of events that ultimately result in failure as well as the
identification of events that lead to recovery was the rationale of the study.
Kwansa and Parsa (1990) identified seven failure events that, in their opinion, were
unique to the restaurant companies in the study: net losses over consecutive quarters of
operation; management turnover; loan default; royalty default; credit accommodation; decline in
unit sales; and renegotiation of franchise contracts.
The observed failure events (one or more of the seven listed above) always occurred
within the two-years preceding the bankruptcy filing. Debt accommodation, discontinued
operations and the downgrading of bonds usually occurred the year preceding the bankruptcy
filing. Among the failed firms, almost all experienced combinations of net losses, debt
accommodation and loan default.
A Summary and Comparison of the Prior Events Approach Studies
Giroux and Wiggins (1984) sought to enhance the traditional financial ratio analysis
approach to bankruptcy studies. Tavlin and colleagues (1989) intended to reveal the factors that
precede failure among firms in the hospitality industry. Kwansa and Parsa (1990) focused their
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study on the “pre-failure life” of failed restaurant firms. This study acknowledges all of these
factors in its design. The events approach will be best able to diagnose the factors that precede
failure among theme parks and seek to discover the specific events that lead to it.
Giroux and Wiggins (1984) used a sample of 22 bankrupt industrial firms and 26
surviving industrial firms. Firm selection was based on the availability of adequate data to
complete the study. The Tavlin et al. (1989) case study included twelve hospitality firms.
Kwansa and Parsa’s study (1990) included twelve failed and twelve surviving restaurant firms as
the units of analysis, all of which were publicly-traded. This study will incorporate a sample size
comparable to these prior studies, 23 failed theme parks and 23 surviving theme parks. This
study will be the first published analysis of failure within the theme park industry sector.
Failure in the Giroux and Wiggins (1984) study was defined as experiencing a degree of
financial distress. Tavlin et al. (1989) included firms in varying degrees of financial failure in
their study. Kwansa and Parsa (1990) used filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as the
definition of failure in their study. This study will utilize a more extreme definition of failure,
the closure of the park, the dissolution of the business entity that was the park, and in many
instances the physical redevelopment of the theme park site. The failed theme parks that serve as
half of the units of analysis in this study most definitely failed; they did not benefit from new
owners or new investors, or pursue a reorganization scheme under Chapter 11 bankruptcy. They
ceased operation and closed.
Giroux and Wiggins (1984) and Kwansa and Parsa (1990) both made use of chi-square
analysis to determine if there was a statistically significant difference between the frequency of
events among the failed and surviving sample firms. This study will also utilize the chi-square
technique.
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Summary of the Study’s Research Question and Purpose Statement
Research Question
As stated in Chapter One, a research question is the representation of the central issue to
be addressed in the study. It aligns with the theory that serves as the basis of the study and is
typically posed in a manner that is too general to be studied directly; the subsequently developed
research hypotheses operationalize the research question into an approach that can be proven or
disproved. This study is couched within the theory of business failure and specifically focuses
on business failure analysis within the North American theme park industry. The study’s
research question is: what have been the financial, environmental and internal events that have
contributed to the business failure and closure of approximately one-third of all North American
theme parks opened between the years 1955 and 2009?
Purpose Statement
The “purpose of the study” displays the intent of the study, what will be accomplished by
the completion of the study and what is the justification of the effort in economic or business
terms. This study’s purpose is to introduce a theory as to why theme parks fail so frequently – a
topic never before addressed in the academic literature. Insights gleaned from the analysis could
serve to inform current theme park operations of what potential pitfalls exist, thereby enabling
them to react and adjust to events that have preceded failure at prior theme park operations.
Additionally, this study will identify attributes that contribute to failure within the theme park
industry. These results will supplement the collective knowledge of the business failure
academic literature.
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Research Hypotheses
This research study compares categories of events that occurred throughout the lifespans
of the subject theme park firms – those that failed, closed or survived. These categories of event
variables are based on a theoretical model proposed by Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) and seek
to define the complete operating environment within which business firms conduct their
lifecycles. Constructs detail external categories of event variables (events beyond the control of
business managers) and internal categories of event variables (events shaped by the actions of
business managers). Within the external and internal categories of event variables are subcategories that further organize and clarify the event variables of the study. Comparisons among
these categories of event variables serve as the hypotheses of this study.
The study question asked is: are failed/closed parks more prevalent among one of the
constructs versus another construct? Such a finding implies that in the analysis of the factors that
contribute to theme park failure, one construct is more impactful than the other.
Individual event variables are compared for frequency between surviving theme parks
and failed or closed theme parks. In other words, is a specific event variable significantly more
likely to occur among the sample of failed theme parks versus the sample of surviving theme
parks? Once tabulated, each construct of categories of event variables becomes dominated by
either failed/closed parks or surviving parks. Then the categories of event variables were
compared to determine which ones play the greatest role in determining theme park failure.
Five hypotheses are used in this study to fully reveal these relationships. H1 explored the
relationship between the frequency of event variable occurrences among the failed/closed theme
park sample versus the surviving theme park sample. H2 explored the relationship among
failed/closed theme parks and event variables external to the operation of the subject firms versus
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event variables internal to the operation of the subject firms. H3 explored the relationship
between theme parks that failed/closed involuntarily versus those that closed voluntarily. H4
explored the relationship among failed/closed theme parks between the constructs of company
characteristics and leadership/employee capabilities and the construct of strategic/operational
policies. Similarly, H5 examined the relationship within failed/closed theme parks between the
construct of company characteristics and all external event variables:
H1 – The total number of event variable occurrences is greater among the failed/closed
theme parks than among the surviving theme parks
H2 – The number of event variable occurrences is greater for the internal constructs than
for the external constructs among the failed/closed theme parks
H3 – The number of involuntary closures is greater than the number of voluntary closures
among the failed/closed theme parks
H4 – There is a significant difference in the number of event variable occurrences due to
leadership/ employee capabilities or strategic/operational policy event variables, than the number
of event variable occurrences due to company characteristic associated event variables among
the failed/closed theme parks
H5 – There is a significant difference in the number of event variable occurrences due to
external event variables, than the number of event variable occurrences due to company
characteristic associated event variables among the failed/closed theme parks
Event Variables
The selection of event variables (the measures used within the hypotheses) for this study
came from two sources: an identification of the significant events that contribute to failure based
on the review of the business failure and bankruptcy literature detailed in Chapter Two, and the
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identification of events that are unique to the theme park industry that might also contribute to
failure. These later event variables were compiled based on knowledge of the industry and then
were verified by conducting a pilot study (see Table 3, “Potential Business Failure Factors
Specific to the Theme Park Industry”).

Table 3. Potential Business Failure Factors Specific to the Theme Park Industry
Theme Park–Specific Failure Factors
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ill-conceived Concept / Concept not Embraced or Recognized by the Audience
Short Season due to Geographic Location (Too cold in the shoulder seasons to operate)
Inadequate Number of Attractions / Inadequate Capacity (Not enough to do)
Lack of Branded Content Utilized within the Theming
Lack of Space for Expansion
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Inefficient Crowd Control/Crowd Flow Procedures
The Presence of Multiple Theme Parks in a Single Regional Market
Notable Attendance Declines over a Number of Seasons / Years of Operation
Lack of Capital Reinvestment
Inadequate Marketing Initiatives
Lack of Adequate Upkeep / Maintenance in Comparison to Industry Standards
Excessive Maintenance Costs due to Adverse Environmental Factors
Planned Closing on One or More Days a Week – Versus an Anticipated Seven-Day
Operation
Notable Ride Accidents
Loss of Existing Advertisers / Loss of Existing Sponsors over Time
Complaints from Adjoining Residents: Noise, Lights, Traffic
Development Pressures following the Opening – Another Higher Best Use for the Land
Corruption / Financial Maleficence on the Part of Management and/or Major Investors
Intentional Vandalism / Damage or Sabotage from a Suspected Internal Source

The pilot study followed the same methodology used in this study. The source data,
Amusement Business weekly, was reviewed for the years 1961 to 1966, and 1989 to 1992, with
selective issues reviewed for the years between 1966 and 1989. This selective review of the
source data represented 22% of the complete study timeframe proposed for this study. (A
detailed description of Amusement Business is provided in the “Data Collection” section below.)
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For each issue of Amusement Business, the pages were thumbed through and all headlines were
scanned. Articles with headlines that referred to the overall theme park industry or to a specific
park included in the study were read, and notes were taken to document potential events and
record the date and the park(s) impacted by the event. From this pilot research, the “business
event variables” were documented and then categorized to arrive at a list of the more common
occurrences of event variables impacting the greater theme park industry during the years of
analysis. As further research is completed, it is expected that additional event variables might be
identified.
Below are the failure event variables with brief descriptions of what they mean, an
indication of how they were measured in the analysis phase, and a listing of the hypotheses each
was included in.
Opening in a Specific Period versus Another Time/Decade—Changing Demographics
The rationale for this hypothesis is that timing matters. Opening in one decade versus
another might provide a competitive advantage due to a lack of competitors at a certain time
versus another. Or, an increase in industry expertise over time might increase the likelihood of
survival in later decades than earlier ones. Or, a negative economy in one time period might
have adversely affected the survivability of new parks or all parks versus survivability during a
time of economic expansion. Or, variations in economic, social, or political trends might
contribute to overall theme park survivability in one period versus another.
Knott and Posen (2005) determined that firms established in times of economic challenge
failed at high rates; however, if these firms managed to survive through the trying times they
tended to survive at a rate higher than the overall survival rate. This event variable is
incorporated in H1, H2, and H5.
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Acts of God / Natural Disasters / Excessive Maintenance Costs Due to a Harsh Physical
Environment
Acts of God, natural disasters can be defined as any natural phenomenon that adversely
impacts the operation of a theme park at a single point in time or for a sustained time or on a
recurring basis. Natural disasters can be tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, fires, etc.
The adverse impact can be physical damage to the facility or reputational damage to the
business. A natural disaster can disrupt operations for a period of time, after which the park
reopens and flourishes, or the park opens immediately following the event but continues to
struggle from the impacts of the event. Similarly, natural disasters or natural phenomenon can
be sustained over time with the results that operations are compromised or maintenance expenses
are excessive; for example, seasonal flooding cycles, cold climates that shorten operating
seasons, impacts from salt spray at ocean side facilities, etc.
As a point of comparison, Chen and Yeh’s 2012 study of 72 international hotels found
that 29% failed due to impacts from natural disasters. This event variable is incorporated in H1,
H2, and H5.
Complaints from Adjoining Residents: Noise, Lighting, Traffic
Complaints from residential areas adjoining or in close proximity to theme parks tend to
be in regards to noise, lighting and traffic. This measure examines whether these reported
complaints lead to a significant operating challenges or remediation expenses at certain parks. In
other words, can complaints about the operation of a park be a meaningful contributor to
eventual failure at some parks while other parks avoid this operational complication? This event
variable is incorporated in H1, H2, and H5.
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Market Saturation / Concentration: More than One Park in a Regional Market
This hypothesis requires a clear definition of what is meant by direct competition. In
regional theme park markets (metropolitan areas outside of major tourist areas such as Southern
California and Central Florida), any theme park operation competes with all other leisure time
activities to attract attendance from a finite population. The introduction of a second theme park
operation into one of these constrained markets puts the two parks in direct competition with
each other and is likely to be a contributor to failure.
Hannan and Freeman (1977) showed that the ability of a market to support a population
of firms (a concept referred to as “carrying capacity”) is a contributor to failure; in other words,
many firms concentrated in a market results in higher instances of business failure. This event
variable is incorporated in : H1, H2, and H5.
Youthfulness / Being a New Business (Young)—Failing in Five Years or Less
Obviously, no park intends to close within the first year of operation. Such a situation
must represent a colossal failure, implying massive cost overruns in the construction phase and a
lack of adequate funding to see the operation through to achieving a positive cash flow.
Nonetheless, there are a handful of known theme parks that have failed in their inaugural year.
Young organizations, by virtue of their youth, inexperience and lack of established
contacts, suffer failure at rates higher than their more established competitors (Ooghe & De
Prijcker, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1965; Thornhill & Amit, 2003). This event variable is
incorporated in: H1, H2, H4, and H5.
Rates of Failure among Theme Parks Located in Destination Markets versus Regional Markets
This measure considers the effects of direct competition and the impacts of clustering
among theme parks. If the rate of failure is highest in the regional markets (markets with at most
74

two theme parks sharing the same geographic area), this implies that competitive factors may
have led to the failures or that issues of market saturation drove out all but one theme park
competitor. If the rate of theme park failure is lower in the destination markets (geographic areas
with multiple theme parks, where competition is high), this implies that there are benefits to
clustering multiple theme park attractions in a market with concentrated theme parks visitors.
This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, H4, and H5.
Constrained Operating Season—The Inability to Operate 365 Days a Year / Too Cold to Operate
in the Shoulder Seasons
Outside of the destination theme park markets of Southern California and Central Florida,
North America’s theme parks operate on seasonal schedules – open every day in the summer
months with weekend-only operations in the spring and fall. How early operations can
commence in the spring and how long they can extend into the fall is related to local climatic
conditions. This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, H4, and H5.
Lack of Space for Expansion
A frequently occurring event in the lifespan of theme parks is running out of room. Parks
originally developed on the outskirts of urban areas, over time find themselves surrounded by
urban developments, sometimes compounded by their past decisions to sell adjoining properties
to outside interests. Parks with a lack of room for expansion have to endure the cost of removing
an existing attraction to attain the needed area just to add a new attraction. Similarly, adjoining
developments encroach on the available space used for park parking. This event variable is
incorporated in: H1, H2, H4, and H5.
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Pricing / Ticketing / Discounting Strategies
Throughout the data collection process, instances of discounting will be recorded as
events occurring at the theme parks in this study. Discounting can be defined as reduced rates or
special offers such as two-for-one, free child’s admission with the purchase of an adult’s ticket,
special incentives for annual pass sales, etc. From time-to-time, most parks engage in
discounting to drive attendance in a slow period (for example, non-summer months or a certain
day of the week) or to overcome temporary challenges (for example offering discounted
admission to offset high gasoline prices). However, in some cases discounts move from being a
temporary strategy to overcome a specific challenge, to become a desperate policy aimed at
reversing a long-standing decline in attendance figures. This event variable is incorporated in:
H1, H2, and H4.
Overpriced Relative to Similar Theme Parks, Attractions, or Competing Commercial Recreation
Activities
Being overpriced relative to the direct competition or other recreational, leisure pursuits
is similar to the other event variables addressing having enough to do, but this measure is
directly related to the cost incurred by the consumer. In other words, a park is charging an
admission price comparable to its competition but delivering less than its competitors, or is
charging more for a product/experience comparable to more moderately priced competitors.
This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Construction Cost Overruns / Delayed Openings
The cost and magnitude of constructing a theme park can quickly outrun the expectations
of the developers. Parks plagued with cost overruns and opening dates pushed beyond the
scheduled opening date project a negative perception of the new enterprise. Not an uncommon
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occurrence in the property development industry, but still one that can spoil the reputation of the
development among investors and potential customers. Stories of ballooning costs and changed
opening dates qualify as occurrences of this event concept for this study. This event variable is
incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do / Inadequate Number of Attractions / Capacity
Issues
Common criticisms directed towards theme parks are long lines and crowding, a
symptom of not having enough for guests to do and poor crowd management skills. All theme
parks experience these events on especially busy days, but for parks that experience crowding
issues on a weekly basis, this becomes a negative event that could be a contributor to eventual
failure. This event variable considers those parks that became known for these negative traits,
especially in the years leading up to their failure. Common widely publicized negative events
that qualify as contributors to low customer satisfaction include news stories about crowding,
long-lines, not enough to do at the park, dirty conditions, and acts of violence in or surrounding
the park. This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Declining Attendance—Sustained Over a Number of Years
Throughout the data collection process, annual attendance figures at the subject parks
were collected to determine if evidence of sustained year-over-year attendance declines can be
attributed to any theme park from either the failed sample or the surviving sample. This event
variable concept is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
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Lack of Maintenance / A Failure to Reinvest
An event variable indicating a lack of upkeep to the theme park’s physical facilities
includes any suggestions that the park has failed to provide adequate maintenance to the grounds,
structures or rides. The other half of this measure focuses on instances of failing to reinvest in
new attractions in the parks at a rate comparable to the competition or in alignment with industry
standards. This event concept is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Notable Ride Accidents
All theme parks experience ride accidents (vehicle malfunctions, operator errors resulting
in injuries or death, riders overcoming safety restraints resulting in injuries or death, etc.) and inpark injuries. But some “accidents” achieve greater notoriety than others. Highly publicized
accidents can change the perception of the park and deter guests from visiting. This event
variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive numbers of and/or high profile lawsuits directed at a park imply poor overall
management and operating procedures, and a susceptibility to attacks on a park’s reputation.
Lawsuits, whether warranted or frivolous could have the cumulative effect of dissuading future
guests from visiting. This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Excessive Debt / Inability to Make Debt Payments / Undercapitalization
Due to the inability to obtain financial data on the operation of most theme parks, it will
be difficult to document such a condition at the parks. But, when the review of the literature
resulted in reports of high debt loads and a lack of the needed resources to reinvest in the
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operation, these instances were tagged as high debt / undercapitalization event variables in the
study. This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy
Bankruptcy events will refer to Chapter 11 bankruptcies, where the theme park declaring
bankruptcy has the opportunity to attempt a reorganization and a second chance at success.
Parks declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcy can go on to fail or survive. This event variable is
incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Instances of Mergers / Acquisitions
A change of ownership implies that a park is sold from one party to another. This can be
the sale of a park from one individual to another, or the sale of a park from one individual to a
corporation, or the sale of a park from one corporation to another. Again, this is a common
business practice and a frequent occurrence within the theme park industry. But, a change of
ownership does not imply that a park is susceptible to failure, in fact it could be the first step in a
recovery.
Similarly, a merger can be considered to occur when a theme park owner, especially a
theme park chain, acquires an independent theme park owner, or when a theme park chain
actually does merge with another theme park group. Just as with changes in ownership, merger
events do not imply impending failure as the ultimate outcome but could be that first step toward
recovery and subsequent success.
Nonetheless, changes in ownership and mergers are pivotal events in the lifespan of an
organization. Hamer (1983) noted that failing firms commonly seek out companies to merge
with, while Peel and Wilson (1989) and Shrieves and Stevens (1979) demonstrated that 15 to
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17% of firms that had merged exhibited signs of financial distress in the year before their
merger, versus 5% of firms overall. This event variable is incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Management Corruption / Graft and Intentional Internal Vandalism / Damage / Sabotage
Publicized instances of management corruption of any kind (financial malfeasance,
failure to follow operating standards, or the breaking of laws) at a theme park will make guests
question other operating policies at the facility that deal with satisfaction and safety. Charges of
financial corruption can limit a park’s ability to obtain financing and develop business
partnerships. And, if large amounts of capital are absconded with, the park’s ability to meet cash
flow obligations can be compromised and less funds are available for capital acquisitions and
general operations.
Intentional acts of vandalism or sabotage also fits within this category. Although this
might be considered as implausible, such events have happened; for example, a number of failing
or closed theme parks have experienced a “mystery fire.” Proving that management is the culprit
will be near to impossible. Of course, it can be acknowledged that such incidents should not
happen at successful parks; so instances of internal vandalism would be indicators of an already
failing park, not an event that leads to subsequent failure.
Keasey and Watson (1991) demonstrated that failed firms have been shown to be more
likely to engage in the manipulations of financial statements and graft. This event variable is
incorporated in: H1, H2, and H4.
Higher Best Use of the Property / Pressure to Develop the Theme Park Property into a More
Profitable Use
Theme parks require large plots of land to accommodate the park, guest parking and
support facilities. As a result, most parks have been developed outside of developed areas where
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land is plentiful and inexpensive. Over time, supporting areas are developed (gas stations,
restaurants, hotels, etc.) and inevitably, urban growth expands nearer to the theme park
development. Owners come to consider alternatives to the theme park that are more lucrative
real estate development options for the site. For instance, theme parks are frequently open for
only part of the year, thus limiting their income-generating capacity versus a mall or hotel, which
have the potential to produce revenue every day of the year. At some point the owners must
consider the highest, best use of the property versus its existing use as a theme park. These parks
close, not because they are failing financially, but because their owners believed more revenues
could be produced by developing the land into an alternative more profitable usage.
The traditional amusement park industry succumbed to a number of challenges, but for
many of the remaining amusement parks that had been developed before World War II, suburban
expansion in the post-war period and the ensuing development pressures led to their closure – as
exhibited by the conversion of many of these properties into housing developments. Today,
theme parks developed on the outskirts of cities in the 1960s and 1970s are pressured by these
same issues of the higher best use of the land.
This implies that in some instances, theme parks fail not because they are experiencing
financial distress or a lack of popularity, but because there are more lucrative alternatives than a
theme park development. Headd (2003) discovered that 29% of the closed businesses studied
were considered successful at the time of their closing. This event variable is incorporated in:
H1, H2, and H3.
A graphical representation of which event variables are used in each study hypothesis is
shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Research Hypotheses and Associated Event Variables
Hypothesis / Event Variables
H1 Failed/Closed Theme Parks vs. Surviving Theme Parks
Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another Time, Changing Demographics
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents
Theme Park Market Concentration/ New Competitor in Immediate Market
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Sustained Attendance Declines
Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment
Notable Ride Accidents
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive Debt
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
Higher Best Use for the Property
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Hypothesis / Event Variables
H2 External Event Variables vs. Internal Event Variables
External Event Variables
Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another Time, Changing Demographics
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents
Theme Park Market Concentration/ New Competitor in Immediate Market
Internal Event Variables
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Sustained Attendance Declines
Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment
Notable Ride Accidents
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive Debt
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
Higher Best Use for the Property
H3 Involuntary Failure vs. Voluntary Closure
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Hypothesis / Event Variables
H4 Company Characteristics Event Variables vs. Leadership/Employee & Strategic/Operational
Policies Construct Event Variables
Company Characteristics Event Variables
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
Leadership/Employee Capabilities & Strategic/Operational Policies Event variables
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Sustained Attendance Declines
Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment
Notable Ride Accidents
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive Debt
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
H5 Company Characteristics Event Variables vs. External Event Variables
Company Characteristics Event Variables
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
External Event Variables
Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another Time, Changing Demographics
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents
Theme Park Market Concentration/ New Competitor in Immediate Market

Data Collection
The data collection consisted of a literature review of the theme park industry to
determine what events have occurred at which parks and when. Any reputable source of data
was used in the effort but the vast majority came from Amusement Business – the publication
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considered the weekly journal of the outdoor entertainment industry. Published from 1961 to
2006, Amusement Business contained a dedicated section on parks and attractions news and
served as the day-to-day record of events in the development of the theme park industry; as such,
it served as the primary source of events for much of this study. The consistent use of this
periodical to collect the study’s data contributes to the reliability of event documentation – it is
unlikely that any event will be missed, and actual “events” (for example, initial announcements,
the detailed story, and references to the event in hindsight) are reported numerous times,
resulting in more consistent details over time. Additional sources of information will be
collected, as needed, from major publications of record within the U.S. media; for example, The
New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, and The Wall Street Journal, as well as geographically
local (local to the specific theme park of study) newspapers when required. National news and
business periodicals (Time Magazine, Life, U.S. News & World Report, Business Week, National
Geographic, etc.) were used when suitable content is presented. Additionally, industry
associated journals were relied on for content when needed: Funworld (the monthly publication
of the International Association of Amusement Parks and Attractions), and Amusement Today,
which focuses on the current amusement park industry.
A review of the academic databases devoted to the hospitality and tourism industry
(Hospitality & Tourism Complete and Leisure Tourism Abstracts (CABI)) and general business
peer-reviewed journals revealed a limited number of publications (approximately 155) concerned
with the subject of the theme park industry. The journal articles included topics ranging from
regional economic analyses to customer satisfaction studies to pricing experiments, but
practically none presented findings on business failure analysis.

85

Subject Selection Criteria
The goal of this study was to determine the causes of theme park failures. To do this,
every failed theme park in North America was included in the analysis. In number terms, this
equated to 23 parks, from the failure of Denver’s Magic Mountain in 1960 to the closures of
Hard Rock Park, Kentucky Kingdom, and Cypress Gardens in 2009 (see Table 5). In percentage
terms all, or 100%, of closed North American theme parks were considered as subjects in this
study.

Table 5. Units of Analysis: Failed Theme Parks and Surviving Theme Parks
Failed theme parks
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

Years in
operation
1959–1960
1960–1964
1958–1967
1959–1969
1971–1973
1972–1976
1974–1976
1976–1976
1975–1980
1974–1986
1984–1986
1986–1988
1987–1990
1968–1993
1972–1997
1993–2000
2000–2005
1968–2005
1976–2005
1970–2007
2008–2009
1987–2009
1983–2009

Surviving theme parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

Year
opened
1961
1962
1967
1967
1968
1968
1971
1971
1971
1972
1972
1973
1973
1974
1974
1975
1976
1976
1981
1984
1988
1992
1999

To contrast the failed parks, a corresponding sample of 23 surviving theme parks was
included in the study, representing 45% of the total number of surviving theme parks. As best as
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was possible, the surviving theme parks were selected for inclusion in the study based on their
significance to the industry (for example, the park was the first regional park in a specific
geographic market, or the park was the first park opened by a specific firm that would go on to
play an instrumental role in the industry), or to provide geographic diversity (for example, parks
were selected from every geographic region within the North American market), or the surviving
parks were selected to correspond chronologically, as much as possible, with the years in which
the failed parks included in the study opened.
Initially, major destination parks were included in the sample of surviving parks, parks
such as Disneyland, the Magic Kingdom or Epcot at Walt Disney World, and the Universal
Studios theme parks in California and Florida. However, upon consideration it was noted that no
such parks had ever failed and closed; so it would not be a valid one-to-one comparison to
associate such parks with the failed parks sample. A criteria for inclusion in the study was that
the park would have sustained, year-over-year, attendance of less than five million a year.
SeaWorld parks include destination parks in the San Diego, California, and Orlando, Florida,
markets with attendance levels in excess of five million a year, but also operates regional parks
in its San Antonio, Texas, and Virginia markets. Therefore, the San Diego and Orlando
SeaWorlds will be excluded from the analysis but the other SeaWorld properties will be
considered; in fact, the SeaWorld park in Aurora, Ohio, is included as one of the failed theme
parks in the analysis.
Among the 23 surviving theme parks included in the study, six (26%) opened in the
1960s, twelve (52%) opened in the 1970s, three (13%) opened in the 1980s, and two (9%)
opened in the 1990s. Among the 23 failed parks, three (13%) opened in the 1950s, three (13%)
opened in the 1960s, nine (39%) opened in the 1970s, four (17%) opened in the 1980s, two (9%)
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opened in the 1990s, and two (9%) have opened since 2000. The failed parks had a rather
consistent periodicity of failure: four (17%) closed in the 1960s; four (17%) closed in the 1970s;
four (17%) closed in the 1980s; three (13%) closed in the 1990s; and eight (35%) closed since
the year 2000. For the surviving parks included in the study, the mean length of the number of
years in operation is 43, with a range between 57 years of operation (Six Flags Over Texas) and
19 years of operation (LEGOLAND California). Among the failed parks, the mean length of the
number of years they were open was just over eleven years, and ranged from a low of just 90
days of operation at Hard Rock Park in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina to 38 annual seasons of
operation before the closure for both Astroworld in Houston, Texas and SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga
Lake, near Aurora, Ohio. The mode, or most frequently occurring, number of years of operation
prior to closure was three, which occurred at four separate parks: Busch Gardens Houston,
Marco Polo Park in Central Florida, Six Flags Autoworld in Flint, Michigan, and Boyertown in
Pennsylvania.
Overall, the study sample subjects include 61% of the total number of all North American
theme parks opened between the years 1955 (Disneyland) and 2011 (Legoland Florida). This
study’s sample size of 23 failed parks and 23 surviving parks compares favorably with the
sample sizes from the prior events approach studies. Giroux and Wiggins (1984) used a sample
size of 22 bankrupt firms and 26 non-bankrupt firms in their study. Tavlin et al. (1989) included
twelve case studies in their analysis. Kwansa and Parsa (1990) included twelve bankrupt and
twelve surviving restaurant companies in their sample.
Table 5 displays the units of analysis for this study. The 23 failed parks are listed, along
with an indication of the year each opened and the year each closed. The failed parks are
ordered according to the year each closed; in other words, the first park listed was the first park
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to close chronologically. The 23 surviving theme parks are listed, along with the year they
opened in chronological order from oldest to most recent.
Data Analysis
As the review of the Amusement Business journals progressed, it was expected that events
would be identified for all of the units of analysis, both failed theme parks and surviving theme
parks. It was hoped that the relevant events among the theme park cases would be uncovered
organically; that is, as the literature was read, events would be discovered naturally and recorded
for later analysis. However, other studies using an events approach have identified the events
prior to conducting the content analysis on the subjects. Kwansa and Parsa (1990) looked for
previously identified failure events from earlier studies when examining their restaurant firm
subjects. Tavlin et al. (1989) formulated twelve cases of hospitality firms that had experienced
various forms of financial distress. This study too, includes events identified from prior studies,
as well as new events identified through the data analysis.
Identification of the Independent Variables or “Events”
This study incorporated multiple strategies to identify potential causes or events that
precede business failure. A review of the literature on business failure theory led to the
identification of a substantial number of failure attributes exhibited by companies in varying
stages of financial decline (see Chapter Two: Review of the Literature). These failure attributes
were considered “events” that have preceded decline, bankruptcy or firm closure in a number of
documented business failure scenarios. Such attributes served as potential events to look for as
the literature was reviewed. Not all of these failure attributes were relevant to the theme park
industry, but they do represent the bulk of the findings from previous business failure studies.
Some of these failure factors were especially relevant to the theme park industry and the current
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study and were woven into the hypotheses of this study. Examples of the failure factors
identified from the literature review include: acts of God; an overconcentration of competitors;
market share loss to competitors; poor site selection or an unsuitable physical location;
undercapitalization; lack of a concept; management reorganizations; failure to execute a
turnaround; bad reputation; low customer satisfaction; acquisitions; mergers; excessive capital
expenditures; lack of upkeep or failure to renovate; management corruption; allegations of
accounting manipulation or a negative auditor’s opinion; pending lawsuits; slowing sales; low
cash flow; net losses; being highly leveraged or having a heavy debt burden; seeking debt
restructuring or loan accommodation; defaulting on loans; declaring bankruptcy; and closing
subsidiaries or discontinuing certain operations.
In addition to the business failure factors from the business failure/bankruptcy literature,
there are a number of factors unique to the theme park industry that played a role as a failure
event in the current study. Table 3 “Potential Business Failure Factors Specific to the Theme
Park Industry,” lists 20 additional failure factors that, based on an awareness of the history of the
theme park industry and the research conducted in support of the pilot study, were considered to
be failure events in the current study.
As a means of explanation of the failure factors unique to the theme park industry, there
are, potentially, theme parks with ill-conceived concepts that appealed to only limited audiences.
Early on in the history of the industry, parks were located in climates with very short shoulder
seasons. Parks that opened with not enough attractions to accommodate the attendance numbers
often suffered from negative publicity. Parks that did not have well-known branded content to
utilize in their themeing might have been at a competitive disadvantage. Theme parks that ran
out of room to expand were forced to spend development monies to remove existing attractions
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to make space for improvements. The competition of two regional parks in a single geographic
market could result in marketing and capital expansion wars. The failure to fully market a theme
park and provide frequent reinvestment is likely to have resulted in declines in attendance. Ride
accidents could have dissuaded guests from visiting the parks. And, like all real estate
investments, if the returns on a theme park operation can be outdone by another development,
the park will become susceptible to closure. Lastly, parks can be undermined by instances of
internal corruption.
Events Approach Methodology
After the events for both the failed and surviving theme parks were tabulated from the
literature, the analysis commenced. All of the events were listed along with an indication of the
number of times each occurred among the study subjects. At this point, a refinement was
conducted among the events to determine which would actually be included in the study.
Specific events that occurred among the study subjects less than five times (an assumption of the
chi-square test is that the minimum number of frequencies should be five for each event (Field,
2009)) were considered for elimination from the formal analysis; however, these non-used event
variables are reported in Chapter Five for consideration in future studies.
Reporting of the Findings
The reporting of the study findings showcased the number of instances or frequencies of
event “x” among the failed theme park subjects, contrasted with the number of instances or
frequencies of event “x” among the surviving theme park subjects. The assumption is that
certain events are more likely to occur among those theme parks that failed and thereby may be
considered a contributor to ultimate failure. In order to be able to isolate an event as being more
likely to be associated with the failed theme parks versus the surviving theme parks, a form of
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statistical analysis will need to be performed. For this study, a chi-square analysis was carried
out to determine if there is a statistically significant difference among the instances of occurrence
of events among the failed and surviving theme parks. Most of the comparisons among the
model constructs were tested using z-score tests of two proportions.
Chi-Square Test for Independence
Chi-square is a non-parametric test, meaning it does not rely on any assumptions about
the shape or variance of the associated population distribution (Gall, Gall & Borg, 2003), which
is useful in situations with small sample sizes (Pallant, 2005). Chi-square is used to examine the
relationship between two discrete, categorical, variables. The chi-square test for independence
compares the observed frequency of cases (in this study the observed number of events) that
occur in each of two categories (in this study the two categories of failed/closed and surviving
theme parks) with the values that would be expected if there was no association between the two
variables being measured. The chi-square answers the question, does the frequency of an event
variable occurrence differ due to group (failed/closed theme parks or surviving theme parks)
membership; in other words is there a relationship between the two theme park groups and any
of the event variables. More than this, the direction of the relationship can be reported; for
example, the chi-square test result enables the reporting of a statement such as: failed/closed
theme parks are more likely to have certain event variable occurrences than surviving theme
parks (Fredland & Morris, 1976; Spatz, 2011; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007).
The Yates’ correction for continuity was considered and reported in the analysis. The
Yates’ Correction compensates for the overestimate of the chi-square when each variable
measured has only two categories. To achieve significance, the value of the Yates’ Continuity
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Correction needs to be .05 or less (Pallant, 2010). This requirement was adhered to throughout
this study.
The chi-square test can demonstrate that two variables are related, but it is unable to tell
the degree of the relationship. To estimate this effect size, the phi coefficient was considered—a
correlation coefficient that provides an effect size index ranging between zero and one, with
higher values indicating a stronger association among the two variables: phi = 0.10 is a small
effect; phi = 0.30 is a medium effect; and phi = 0.50 is a large effect (Spatz, 2011).
The degrees of freedom is determined as: d.f. = k – 1, where k = the number of cells
associated with column or row data. In this study there are two cells for each sample; thus 2 - 1
= 1 degree of freedom. The chi-square value is then compared to the critical chi-square values
associated with the .05 probability level with 1 degree of freedom. This is achieved by referring
to a Chi-Square Distribution Table, and reveals a critical chi-square value of 3.84. If the
calculated chi-square value is larger than 3.84, it can be assumed that there is a significant
difference between the two samples for that particular event (Zikmund, 2003).
The chi-square test for independence was utilized to measure differences in the frequency
of event variable occurrences among the two theme park samples (the results among the 21 event
variables measured in this manner as part of hypothesis one are reported in Chapter Four). When
comparisons were made among the frequency of event variable occurrences among the
theoretical contructs, a test of proportions had to be made. Proportions rather than frequencies
were used to control for the uneven distribution of event variables among the constructs; for
example, the external event constructs are comprised of four event variables while the internal
event constructs are comprised of 17 event variables. A number-to-number comparison would
skew the results to the larger internal construct; so the proportion of potential event variable
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occurrences for each construct were the focus of analysis for the study hypotheses. The z-score
test for two population proportions was the method utilized to complete these analyses.
Z-Score Test of Proportions
The z-score test for two population proportions is used when you want to know whether
two populations or two groups differ significantly on some single (i.e. categorical) characteristic.
This test enables a researcher to determine if a difference between two samples occurred due to
something more than chance alone. In this case, the proportions of two populations serve as the
measure (Field, 2009 & Zikmund, 2003). The two assumptions associated with z-scores are that
the two samples compared are independent, and the sample size is greater than 30 (Zikmund,
2003). Both of the assumptions were adhered to in this study.
The formula for calculating a z-score is straight-forward, requiring only the proportion of
group one (

) and the proportion of group two (

), along with the population sizes for group

one (n1) and group two (n2), and the calculation of the population proportion ( ), which is the
sample size of group one (x1) plus the sample size of group two (x2) divided by the population
size for group one (n1) plus the population size for group two (n2):
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Method of Verification
Assumptions of the Study
Although the occurrence of a study event at a theme park and the subsequent business
failure of that theme park does not establish that a causal relationship exists, an assumption of
the study is that certain events do precede other events and some of these events contribute to the
ultimate business failure of certain theme parks. This study was not able to meet all the criteria
of causality, notably the ability to eliminate “plausible alternative explanations (Trochim,
2001),” but it will assume that events and failures can unfold in a linear fashion over time.
Delimitations of the Study
This study was limited geographically to the North American market, mainly theme parks
located within Canada and the United States. This market is the oldest, most established theme
park market and achieves the highest market penetration (number of visits) per capita
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). There is a vibrant theme park industry in Europe and Asia,
and a burgeoning theme park industry in Latin America, but these parks are not included in this
study.
This study’s timeframe encompasses the years 1955 to 2009, which includes the entire
lifespan of the theme park industry, excepting the most recent nine years in which no theme
parks have opened or closed in the North American geographic market.
This study includes only theme parks as subjects; traditional amusement parks, water
parks, family entertainment centers, or stand-alone attractions of any type are not included within
this study. The ultimate findings from this study might be applicable to these other sectors of the
attractions industry, but this analysis only includes theme parks.
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Theme parks included in this study excluded any parks with sustained annual attendance
levels of more than five million per year. Parks operating on such a scale have yet to fail, and
are of a scope of operations in excess of the subject business units included in this study.
Financial ratios, the most common measures in the field of bankruptcy analysis (Youn &
Gu, 2010), were not used in this study. This was due to the paucity of such information within
the theme park industry segment. Many theme parks were operated as non-public companies
and the associated financial reporting was never made available for analysis. For those parks
that were operated by publicly traded companies, the financial reporting was typically done at a
consolidated level, whereby financial data on specific parks is unable to be separated from the
combined numbers reported.
Reliability in this Study
Reliability, or demonstrating that the study could be repeated and achieve the same
results (Yin, 1994) consistently with no mistakes during transcription (Creswell, 2009), was
achieved in this study through the inclusion of every failed theme park rather than the use of only
a survey of the failed theme parks. The formulaic documentation procedures and the extensive
literature review completed on each subject ensured that all potential events were documented
and considered in the analysis and could be replicated should a researcher choose to complete
this same research process.
Validity in this Study
Validity, in general terms, is a measure of the “extent” to which the information collected
and used in the study actually reflects what is being studied (Veal, 2006). Validity in this study
was achieved through an in-depth documentation of the study events. Numerous potential events
were identified before the data collection and data analysis had been completed. These specific
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events were searched for throughout the literature review and were meticulously and
systematically documented as to the source, year of occurrence, numbers of years between the
event occurrence and the theme park’s failure (when applicable), and the details surrounding the
event.
To enhance the quality of a research design, researchers consider multiple types of
validity: construct validity, internal validity and external validity.
Construct validity is an assessment of how well the study’s constructs relate back to the
theory underlying the study (Trochim, 2001). To enhance a study’s construct validity, multiple
sources of evidence (Yin, 1994) should be utilized and, measures used in similar, prior studies
should be retested in the current study. This study began with a review of prior studies that have
utilized the event approach and the “events” identified from these prior studies were considered
as possible events in this study; however, this study was not limited to considering only events
used in prior studies.
Internal validity is focused on the study’s ability to establish causal relationships; in other
words, certain conditions lead to other conditions (Yin, 1994). To establish a causal relationship
in this study would be ideal: specific events cause business failure. However, this study could
not achieve all of the specified requirements of causality.
External validity assesses the degree to which the conclusions from one study could be
generalized in a similar context in other geographical settings and at other times (Trochim,
2001). To achieve external validity, most researchers strive to improve the sample. For this
study, the sample of failed theme parks is exhaustive (it includes every failed theme park from
the study population) and it includes 45% of the potential surviving theme parks. Whether the
findings from this study could be applied to the theme park industry in other geographical areas
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(Europe, Asian, Latin America) or could be applied to other areas of the attractions industry
(water parks, attractions, family entertainment centers, etc.) or could be applied throughout the
greater hospitality industry (lodging, restaurants, etc.) or even could be applied to business in
general remains to be seen. Similar studies should be completed for the European theme park
market and the Asian theme park market to determine if similar events revealed through this
study lead to similar failures in these markets. It is expected that the lessons learned from this
study could be applied in similar business settings and, thereby, this study will obtain some
degree of external validity.
Weaknesses of this Approach
Although the event approach utilizes a chi-square analysis to evaluate the statistical
significance of the findings, the analytical complexity of the events approach may be considered
lacking in comparison to other methodological approaches.
The identification of events that precede business failure at a statistically significant rate
does not meet the criteria of causality. Although the study’s conclusions are able to state that
specific events are significantly more likely to occur at theme parks that ultimately failed/closed
than at a comparable population of theme parks that have survived, the study is not able to
determine that other factors outside of the study variables also contributed to the failure of
certain theme parks.
There is no universally agreed on set of attributes that lead to the failure of business
entities. This study has reviewed the current literature on business failure analysis, and the
attributes identified by earlier researchers were considered in the context of this study. But there
can never be the claim that these attributes are exhaustive or that these attributes are directly the
causes of business failure.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
This study seeks to identify the causes and susceptibilities of theme parks to involuntary
business failure and/or voluntary business closure. Approximately 31% of all theme parks that
have opened in North America since 1955 have failed/closed and, to date, no business failure
analysis studies have been conducted within this industry. This study employs an events
approach methodology comparing, financial, environmental or organizational events within the
lifespan of 23 failed/closed theme parks and a comparable sample of 23 still operating, surviving
theme parks to assess if there is a significant difference in the frequency of events among one
sample versus the other – thereby implying that the significant events are contributors to
failure/closure.
Data were collected via an extensive historical review of the industry trade journal
Amusement Business; the categorical results were analyzed using z-tests for proportions and chisquare tests for independence. An adapted theoretical model was used to devise five hypotheses
to measure the relative contribution of various constructs to business failure/closure. This
chapter briefly outlines the study’s data collection and data preparation procedures, and provides
descriptive statistics on the units of analysis. The hypothesis testing revealed that seven of the
21 event variables indicated a significant difference between failed/closed theme parks and
surviving theme parks, and two of the five hypotheses were supported.
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Data Collection
Data collection for this study involved an in-depth historical review of the theme park
industry in order to determine what events have occurred at which parks and when. The vast
majority came from Amusement Business – the publication considered the weekly journal of the
outdoor entertainment industry. Published from 1961 to 2006, Amusement Business contained a
dedicated section on theme parks and attractions news and served as the day-to-day record of
events in the development of the theme park industry. The consistent use of this periodical to
collect the data contributes to the reliability of event documentation – it is unlikely that any event
will be missed, and actual “events” (e.g., initial announcements, the detailed story, then
references to that event in hindsight) are reported numerous times, resulting in more consistent
details over time. Additional sources of information were collected from major publications of
record within the U.S. media and industry associated journals. Ultimately, 952 issues of
Amusement Business, spanning the years between 1961 to 2006 were reviewed to collect the
event variables for this study. This resulted in the identification of 616 distinct events.
Data Preparation
Among the total 616 events, only events that occurred among the 46 failed/closed and
surviving theme parks were considered for this study, resulting in a total of 392 events among
the 46 subject parks. Of these 392 events, multiple reports of an event in a single event category
were not included in the study, which reduced the total number of “unique events” considered in
the study to 243. Table 6 shows the total frequency of event occurrences among the 46 theme
parks. Most notable is the higher frequency of event variable occurrences among the
failed/closed theme parks (to be analyzed further in hypothesis one).
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Table 6. Frequency of Event Variable Occurrences Among the Failed/Closed Theme Parks and
the Surviving Theme Parks
Failed/Closed theme parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Total

Event variable frequency
8
14
11
6
6
7
11
8
7
3
4
8
7
8
8
6
6
7
5
6
6
4
4

6
1
2
6
3
6
6
1
8
3
3
4
3
7
3
2
3
5
3
0
3
4
1

160

83

Surviving theme parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

Table 7 lists the 21 event variable occurrences included in the study and then reports the
frequency of each among the failed/closed theme parks and among the surviving theme parks.
The most common event variable occurrences among the failed/closed theme parks were
instances of declaring bankruptcy or instances of undergoing a temporary closure. Bankruptcy
laws in the United States seek to enable a struggling company to achieve temporary financial
relieve and reorganize to survive into the future. Nonetheless, any declaration of bankruptcy
appears to be a red flag of eventual business failure/closure. The most common event variable
occurrences among the surviving theme parks were instances of year-over-year attendance
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declines, and instances of mergers, acquisitions or changes of ownership. The frequency of
attendance declines is likely a measure of the theme park’s age and sustainability; over time, it is
likely that there will be attendance declines. The successful theme parks work through the
declines and reverse the trend. Merging with another company has also been shown to be a
survival tactic – struggling firms often seek to be acquired by a successful company as a strategy
of avoiding bankruptcy (Hamer, 1983; Peel & Wilson, 1989; Shrieves & Stevens, 1979).

Table 7. Frequency of Event Occurrences Among the Event Variables

Event variables
Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another, Changing Demographics
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents
Theme Park Market Concentration/ Competitors in Immediate Market
Failing in Five Years or Less
Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional
Constrained Operating Season/Length
Lack of Space for Expansion
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies/Price Reductions
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
Construction Cost Overruns/Delays/Not Complete at Opening
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Sustained Attendance Declines/YOY Declines
Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment
Notable Ride Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Excessive Debt/Debt Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues/Unprofitable
Instances of Declared Bankruptcy/Temporary Closure
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions/Change of Ownership
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Sabotage
Higher Best Use for the Property
Total

Failed/Closed
theme parks
frequency

Surviving
theme parks
frequence

n/a
8
2
11
12
6
3
7
3
2
9
9
12
2
3
7
16
20
16
4
8

n/a
6
0
5
0
0
0
0
1
0
5
1
19
0
10
2
7
8
19
0
0

160

83

All data in the study were analyzed in SPSS version 20.0 for chi-square tests of independence
and z-tests for proportions between two samples.
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Descriptive Statistics
Every failed theme parks in North America was included in the analysis. In number
terms, this equated to 23 parks, in percentage terms 100% of closed North American theme parks
were considered as subjects in this study. Overall, the study sample of 46 theme parks represent
61% of the total number of all North American theme parks opened between the years 1955 and
2011.
To contrast the failed parks in the study, a corresponding sample of 23 surviving theme
parks were included, representing 45% of the total number of current surviving theme parks.
The surviving theme parks were selected for inclusion in the study according to their relative
impact on the industry (e.g. the first park in a geographic market, or the first park opened by a
major chain operator, etc.), or to provide geographic diversity (e.g. parks were included from
every geographic region within North America), or the surviving parks were selected to
correspond chronologically, as much as possible, with the years in which the failed/closed parks
included in the study opened.
Major destination parks were not included in the sample. Parks such as Disneyland, the
four parks at Walt Disney World, and the Universal Studios theme parks in California and
Florida have never failed or closed; so, it would not be a valid one-to-one comparison to
associate such parks with the failed parks sample. A criterion for inclusion in the study was that
the park would have sustained, year-over-year, attendance of less than five million a year
throughout the timeframe of the study—1955 to 2009.
Among the 23 surviving theme parks included in the study, six (26%) opened in the
1960s, twelve (52%) opened in the 1970s, three (13%) opened in the 1980s, and two (9%)
opened in the 1990s. Among the 23 failed parks, three (13%) opened in the 1950s, three (13%)
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opened in the 1960s, nine (39%) opened in the 1970s, four (17%) opened in the 1980s, two (9%)
opened in the 1990s, and two (9%) have opened since 2000.
The failed parks had a rather consistent periodicity of failure: four (17%) closed in the
1960s; four (17%) closed in the 1970s; four (17%) closed in the 1980s; three (13%) closed in the
1990s; and eight (35%) closed since the year 2000. For the surviving parks included in the
study, the mean length of the number of years in operation is 40.4, ranging between 18 and 56
years of operation. Among the failed parks, the mean length of the number of years they were
open was just over eleven years, ranging from just 90 days of operation to 38 years of operation.
The mode number of years of operation prior to closure was three, which occurred at four
separate parks.
This study’s sample size of 23 failed parks and 23 surviving parks compares favorably
with the sample sizes from the prior events approach studies: Giroux and Wiggins (1984) utilized
a sample of 22 bankrupt and 26 surviving industrial firms; the Tavlin et al. (1989) case study
included twelve hospitality firms; and the Kwansa and Parsa (1990) study of restaurant firms
analyzed twelve failed and twelve surviving.
Research Hypotheses Testing
Of the five hypotheses tested, two were supported and three were not supported. One of
the three non-supported hypotheses illuminated a finding contrary to expectations exhibited in
the literature review section of this study.
Of the two supported hypotheses, hypothesis one demonstrated a significant difference
among the 23 failed/closed theme parks and the 23 surviving theme parks: the number of event
variable occurrences was significantly greater among the failed/closed theme parks than among
the surviving theme park sample. Hypothesis three demonstrated a significant difference within
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the 23 failed/closed theme parks: failed/closed theme parks are significantly more likely to fail
due to involuntary event variables (unprofitability, decreasing attendance numbers) than due to
voluntary event variables (ownership retirement, a higher best use of the property).
Of the three non-supported hypotheses, hypothesis two did not demonstrate a significant
difference within the 23 failed/closed theme parks. Prior studies have demonstrated that event
occurrences categorized as internal to the firm (management capability, marketing efforts,
financial management) were more significant contributors to failure than those event occurrences
external to the firm (macro-economic conditions, level of competition, political stability). This
study was unable to confirm this relationship. Given the peculiarities of the theme park industry,
further studies should examine the relationship of external events (the weather, global conflicts,
gas prices, threats to travel) that play a more significant role in the success of the outdoor
entertainment industry than in business in general.
The two other non-supported hypotheses were exploratory in nature. Both sought to
identify a relationship among the company characteristics construct (its age, its location in a
regional geographic market versus a tourism destination market, physical constraints such as lack
of land for expansion, and adverse weather conditions) and the construct of internal management
capabilities/strategic direction, and the construct of external conditions. No relationship was
supported among either of these hypotheses. Table 8 lists the five hypotheses and resulting zscores and significance level. A detailed analysis of the individual hypotheses follows the table.
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Table 8. Summary of the Five Research Hypotheses
Supported

Z-Test
Value

Significance
(p)

H1 – The total number of event variable occurrences is
greater among the failed/closed theme parks than
among the surviving theme parks

Yes

Z = 5.710

p < .001

H2 – The number of event variable occurrences is
greater for the internal constructs than for the external
constructs among the failed/closed theme parks

No

Z = -0.823

p = 0.412

H3 – The number of involuntary closures is greater
than the number of voluntary closures among the
failed/closed theme parks

Yes

Z = 2.064

p = 0.039

H4 – There is a significant difference in the number of
event variable occurrences due to leadership/
employee capabilities or strategic/operational policy
event variables, than the number of event variable
occurrences due to company characteristic associated
event variables among the failed/closed theme parks

No

Z = 1.194

p = 0.234

H5 – There is a significant difference in the number of
event variable occurrences due to external event
variables, than the number of event variable
occurrences due to company characteristic associated
event variables among the failed/closed theme parks

No

Z = 0.000

p = 1.000

Hypothesis

Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis one is related to the relationship between the 23 failed/closed theme parks in
the study to the 23 surviving theme parks, specifically the relationship of the number of event
variable occurrences among these two groups. It was hypothesized that the 21 event variables
would be more likely to occur at the failed/closed parks in the study: H1- the total number of
event variable occurrences is greater among the failed/closed theme parks than among the
surviving theme parks. Of the potential 483 event occurrences (23 theme parks in each
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comparison group multiplied by 21 event variables) 160 event variable occurrences were
recorded among failed/closed theme parks (33%) and 83 event variable occurrences were
recorded among surviving theme parks (17%).
To test this relationship, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed to determine
that there was a significant difference in the proportion of event variable occurrences at
failed/closed theme parks and surviving theme parks, z = 5.710, p < 0.000. It can be concluded
that hypothesis one is supported by the data: event variable occurrences are more frequent among
the failed/closed theme parks than among the surviving theme parks.
Among the failed/closed theme parks, the mean number of event variable occurrences
was 7.0, with a range from three (at Circus World, Florida) to fourteen occurrences (at
Freedomland, U.S.A., New York); the mean number of event variable occurrences among
surviving theme parks was 3.6, with a range between no occurrences (at Holiday World &
Splashin’ Safari, Indiana) to eight occurrences (at Magic Mountain, California). A full display
of the descriptive statistics for H1 is in Table 9.

Table 9. H1 Event Variable Occurrences Among Failed/Closed Theme Parks and Surviving
Theme Parks

All theme parks in study (46)
Failed/Closed theme parks (23)
Surviving theme parks (23)

Frequency of event variable
occurrences (total)

Mean

Range

SD

243
160
83

5.28
6.96
3.61

0–14
3–14
0–8

2.85
2.51
2.10

Analysis of hypothesis one also includes the comparison of the 21 event variables among
the two samples. Chi-square tests for independence and two-sample z-tests for proportions were
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conducted to assess if the occurrences between the two groups were significantly different from
one another. These 21 event variables were identified through a review of the business failure
analysis literature, a review of the theme park industry literature, and from a pilot test of the
research from the Amusement Business periodical/industry trade magazine for a select number of
years.
Of the 21 event variables tested, seven resulted in a significant difference in the
frequency of events between the failed/closed theme parks versus the surviving theme parks.
Two of the seven significant differences were found to be greater among the surviving sample of
theme parks (a surprising finding to be discussed below). Thirteen event variables identified no
significant difference between the two samples. One event variable resulted in an insufficient
sample size, preventing further analysis. A summary of the results is presented in Table 10.
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Table 10. Frequency of Event Variables Among Failed/Closed Theme Parks and Surviving Theme Parks

Event variable

Percent
(frequency)
Failed/Closed

Failure Rates: Destination vs. Regional (% dest. fails v. % regional fails)
Lack of Space for Expansion

26 (6/23)
30 (7)

Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity

39 (9)

Notable Ride Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM

13 (3)

Excessive Debt/Debt Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues/Unprofitable

70 (16)

Instances of Declared Bankruptcy/Temporary Closure

87 (20)

Higher Best Use for the Property

35 (8)

Opening in a Specific Period vs. Another Time, Changing Demographics

15–75 (2 - 9)

Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
Complaints from Adjoining Residents

Percent
(frequency)
Surviving
74 (17/23)
0 (0)
4 (1)
43 (10)
30 (7)
35 (8)
0 (0)

X2 Value
Z-Test Value

Sig.
p

Z = -3.2437
X2 (1, n=46) = 6.07

.001
.01

X2 (1, n=46) = 6.26

.01

2

.05

2

.02

2

.001

2

.01

X (1, n=46) = 3.86
X (1, n=46) = 5.57
X (1, n=46) = 11.04
X (1, n=46) = 7.41

32 (24)

Z = -.38 to 1.79

35 (8)

26 (6)

X2 (1, n=46) = .10

9 (2)

0 (0)

.07– .70
.75

Insufficient sample size
2

Market Concentration/New Competitor in Immediate Market

48 (11)

22 (5)

X (1, n=46) = 2.4

.12

Failing in Five Years or Less (% failed <5 yrs. v. % overall failed)

52 (12/23)

30 (23/76)

Z = 1.9258

.05

Constrained Operating Season/Length

13 (3)

Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies/Price Reductions

13 (3)

Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions

9 (2)

Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings/Not Complete at Opening

39 (9)

Sustained Attendance Declines/YOY Declines

52 (12)

Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment

9 (2)

Excessive Number of Lawsuits

30 (7)

Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions, Change of Ownerships
Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage

70 (16)
17 (4)

0 (0)
4 (1)
0 (0)
22 (5)
83 (19)
0 (0)
9 (2)
83 (19)
0 (0)

2

.23

2

.60

2

.47

2

.34

2

.06

2

.47

2

.14

2

.49
.12

X (1, n=46) = 1.43
X (1, n=46) = .27
X (1, n=46) = .52
X (1, n=46) = .92
X (1, n=46) = 3.56
X (1, n=46) = .52
X (1, n=46) = 2.21
X (1, n=46) = .48
X2 (1, n=46) = 2.46

X2, Z-tests, and significance level are presented for the chi-square test for independence, and the two-sample Z-test for proportions. Bold items are at p < .05
significance level.
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H1 – Significant Event Variables
Destination versus Regional Theme Park Failure/Closure
The first event variable that resulted in a significant difference measured differences
within the 23 failed/closed theme parks, to determine if the units of analysis were more likely to
have failed in a theme park destination geographical market (limited to Southern California and
Central Florida) or in regional markets dispersed throughout the United States. Six of the 23
failed/closed theme parks (26%) were positioned in theme park destination markets, while 17 of
the 23 failed/closed theme parks (74%) were located in a regional market.
To test for a significant difference, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed,
which determined that there was a significant difference among the two proportions, z = -3.2437,
p < 0.001. It can be concluded that the rate of failure/closure is higher among failed/closed
regional theme parks than those theme parks in destination markets. As this measure was
developed, it was considered that excessive competition in destination markets would enhance
business failure/closure, yet these findings suggest that the concentration of business entities may
enhance survival – multiple similar businesses concentrated in a single market attract more
customers/guests leading to higher likelihood for survival. This is sometimes referred to as
“economies of agglomeration,” in management studies (Benmelech, Bergman & Milanez, 2014).
Lack of Space for Expansion
Theme parks in the study demonstrated significant differences between the failed/closed
sample and the surviving sample in the reported lack of physical space to accommodate park
expansions or the addition of new rides/attractions without removing existing attractions. Seven
of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (30%) reported such operational challenges versus no reports
of similar difficulties among the surviving theme park sample.
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To test for a significant difference, a chi-square test for independence (with Yates
Continuity Correction) was performed, which determined that there was a significant difference
among the two groups, x2 (1, n = 46) = 6.07, p = .01, phi = .42, a medium effect. It can be
concluded that the lack of space for expansion is significantly more common among
failed/closed theme parks than among surviving theme parks. This may suggest that when a
theme park runs out of room for expansion, thoughts of how best to achieve financial returns on
the property enter into the owners’ consideration for future plans.
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/ Inadequate Capacity
A significant difference was observed between the number of event occurrences related
to low customer satisfaction between the failed/closed theme parks and the surviving theme
parks. Nine of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (39%) demonstrated instances of this variable
versus only one instance (4%) of the surviving theme parks.
To test for a significant difference among these two samples, a chi-square test for
independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) was performed and confirmed that there was a
significant difference among the two groups, x2 (1, n = 46) = 6.26, p = .01, phi = .42, a medium
effect. It can be concluded that low customer satisfaction, not having enough for guests to do,
and long lines and other instances of inadequate capacity are significantly more common among
the failed/closed theme parks than among surviving theme parks in this study.
Notable Ride Accidents / Violence in the Parks / Bad Word of Mouth
Interestingly (as evidenced by extensive reporting of such incidents in the industry press),
ride accidents or occurrences of violence in the parks or general bad word of mouth for the
theme park was a significantly more common occurrence among the surviving theme parks than
among the failed/closed theme parks in the study. This does not make logical sense; the
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assumption would be that such negative events would ultimately contribute to theme park failure.
The reality is that these events do happen; from time to time there is a ride accident, a crime
committed within the park, or some other event that results in negative publicity for the theme
park. Three of the failed/closed theme parks (13%) reported a ride accident, in-park violence, or
other bad word of mouth event, while ten of the 23 surviving theme parks (43%) experienced
such an event.
The chi-square test for independence (with Yates Continuity Correction) showed that
there was a significant difference between failed/closed theme parks and surviving theme parks,
x2 (1, n = 46) = 3.86, p = .05, phi = -.34, a small effect. The suspected reason why this is a
significantly more common occurrence among the surviving theme parks in the study is due to
the longer lifespan of the surviving theme parks. Given more years in operation, the more likely
it is that an event of this type will occur. Managed well, and barring an event of this type that
receives unwarranted publicity, the theme parks can survive its impact. Overall, surviving parks
demonstrated longer lifespans than the failed/closed theme parks; this could have been controlled
for by limiting the study’s timeframe to a specific period. However, the overall finite number of
theme parks included in the study results in small sample sizes. So, the attempt was made to
include every theme park possible, for as long as possible. This is a limitation of the study, but
one that was made to include the maximum number of events possible.
Excessive Debt / Refinancing / Cash Flow Issues / Unprofitability
As previous event approach studies have demonstrated (Giroux & Wiggins, 1984;
Kwansa & Parsa, 1990) theme parks in the study showed significant differences among the
failed/closed sample and the surviving sample in the frequency of the occurrences of events
related to debt, financing, cash flow challenges, and general unprofitability. Sixteen of the 23
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failed/closed theme parks (70%) reported these types of issues versus seven of the 23 surviving
theme parks (30%).
To test for a significant difference, a chi-square test for independence (with Yates
Continuity Correction) was performed, determining that there was a significant difference, x2 (1,
n = 46) = 5.57, p = .02, phi = .39, a medium effect. It can be concluded that financial difficulties
are significantly more common among failed/closed theme parks than among surviving theme
parks. Theme parks are businesses with financial expectations. As with all businesses, profits
are the reason for being; debt, poor cash flow, and lack of profits are the beginning of any
business failure.
Declared Bankruptcy / Temporary Closure
A significant difference was revealed between the failed/closed theme park sample and
the surviving theme park sample in the frequency of occurrences of bankruptcy (Chapter 11,
reorganization, bankruptcy filings) and/or temporary suspensions of operations.
Overwhelmingly, 20 of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (87%) had declared bankruptcy and/or
closed temporarily, versus eight of the 23 surviving theme parks (35%).
To test for a significant difference, a chi-square test for independence (with Yates
Continuity Correction) was performed, which determined there was a significant difference, x2
(1, n = 46) = 11.04, p = .001, phi = .54, a large effect. It can be concluded that declarations of
bankruptcy and temporary suspensions of operation are significantly more common among
failed/closed theme parks than among surviving theme parks. Maybe this seems obvious; parks
that have declared bankruptcy once are likely to ultimately close and declare it again. But, it
must be noted that slightly more than a third of the surviving theme parks also declared
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bankruptcy, bankruptcy being a tool that can signal a reorganization and potentially a successful
transformation into a viable operating entity.
A Higher Best Use for the Property
Maybe the greatest existential threat to the survival of a theme park is that the operation
does not produce as much revenue as it could if it were developed in an alternative manner. In
fact, theme parks in the study demonstrated significant differences between the failed/closed
sample and the surviving sample in the number of reported events associated with the reporting
of a higher best use for the property. Eight of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (35%) reported
this event variable, while none of the surviving theme parks reported this threat.
To test for a significant difference, a chi-square test for independence (with Yates
Continuity Correction) was performed, which determined that there was a significant difference
among the two groups, x2 (1, n = 46) = 7.41, p = .01, phi = .46, a medium effect. It can be
concluded that pressure to develop a theme park operation as an alternative business is
significantly more common among failed/closed theme parks than among surviving theme parks.
The failure to make profits, the failure to cover operational costs, the failure to pay off debts
associated with the development are typically considered as contributors to failure. However,
failure, or more appropriately termed “closure,” can be voluntary: owners close a business due to
the desire to retire or to develop the property/site as a more profitable venture. This sentiment
has been expressed throughout the development of the theme park industry and has been the
motivation for the closure of a number of theme parks, despite the fact that they were profitable
(and often beloved) at the time of their closure.
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H1 – Non-Significant Event Variables
The remaining fourteen event variables did not demonstrate a significant difference
between the two sample groups (one did not result in a sufficient sample size to complete a chisquare significance test): failed/closed theme parks and surviving theme parks. Nonetheless, it
was expected that these fourteen event variables might have a significant influence on the
ultimate failure of theme parks. The fact that these variables were not significant in this study
can be considered a finding, and a contribution to the understanding of the factors of success in
the theme park industry.
Thirteen of the event variables analyzed in the study did not result in a significant
difference between the failed/closed theme parks and the surviving theme parks. These variables
will be discussed in order to contribute to the operational understanding of the theme park
industry.
Opening in One Decade vs. Another / Changing Demographics
There was no significant association between the overall rate of failure within the theme
park industry and the rate of theme park failure in any single decade in the study: 1950s (75%
failure rate); 1960s (23% failure rate); 1970s (36% failure rate); 1980s (39% failure rate); 1990s
(15% failure rate); 2000s (25% failure rate).
To test for a significant difference, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed
between the overall theme park industry failure rate and the failure rate for each decade
encompassed by the study. None of these tests resulted in a significant difference among the two
proportions: 1950s (z = 1.79, p = 0.07); 1960s (z = 0.62, p = 0.54); 1970s (z = 0.41, p = 0.68);
1980s (z = 0.49, p = 0.62); 1990s (z = -1.19, p = 0.23); 2000s (z = -0.38, p = 0.70). It can be
concluded that the rate of failure is no different between the overall theme park failure rate and
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the failure rate for any decade between the 1950s and the 2000s. This is an unexpected finding,
but contributes to a pattern of analysis that considers business failure/closure to be a consistent
process that is a part of the business that remains stable over time: the norm is that approximately
three out of every ten theme parks will eventually fail/close.
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and occurrences of acts of nature, natural
disasters, and excessive maintenance costs due to environmental conditions: x2 (1, n = 46) = .10,
p = .75, phi = .09. Eight of the 23 failed/closed theme parks experienced this event variable, and
six of the 23 surviving theme parks experienced this event variable. Over the lifetime of any
theme park, which operate within the outdoor entertainment industry, a natural disaster of some
sort is bound to befall the business. Typically, the parks recover, but at least one park – Six
Flags New Orleans attributes it ultimate demise to the impact, and later flooding from Hurricane
Katrina (LaRose, 2009). Contrast this to Adventureland theme park in Iowa, whose main street
was partially destroyed by a tornado during its first year of operation, but persevered and later
opened a wooden rollercoaster named “The Tornado” to commemorate this act of nature (Baltes,
2006).
Theme Park Market Concentration/New Competitor in Market
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and instances of new and/or multiple
theme park competitors in a single regional geographic market: x2 (1, n = 46) = 2.40, p = .12, phi
= .27. Although eleven of the 23 (48%) failed/closed parks had a competing theme park within
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its regional market, and only five of the 23 (22%) of the surviving parks had similar competition,
this event variable’s results did not result in a significant difference between these two groups.
Failing in Five Years or Less
There was no significant association between the overall rate of failure among all the
theme parks included within the study (23 failed/closed theme parks out of 76 total theme parks,
30%) and the 12 theme parks out of 23 failed/closed theme parks (52%) that failed/closed within
five years or less of opening. To test for this significant difference, a two-sample z-test for
proportions was performed between these two proportions, z = 1.9258, p = 0.0536. It can be
concluded that the occurrence of a theme park in the study failing in less than five years after
opening is not significantly different from the overall rate of failure/closure among theme parks
in the study. This is a surprising finding considering that a vast quantity of research
demonstrates that businesses are most susceptible to failure in the first years of their operation.
Among theme parks, the majority of the 23 failed/closed theme parks did fail within their first
five years of operation, but this finding did not result in statistical significance.
Constrained Operating Season/Length
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and reported occurrences of a
constrained operating season length due to the encroachment of cold weather: x2 (1, n = 46) =
1.43, p = .23, phi = .26. Three of the 23 closed/failed theme parks (13%) experienced this event
variable, and none of the surviving theme parks experienced this event variable. All of the three
failed/closed theme parks that experienced this event were definitely in the northern half of the
continental United States (New York State, Massachusetts, and Ohio). Surviving parks still
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successfully operate in this geographic area, which contributes to the explanation that this event
variable did not achieve significance.
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting Strategies or Price Reductions
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and occurrences of ill-conceived pricing,
ticketing, discounting strategies or implementations of admission cost price reductions: x2 (1, n =
46) = .27, p = .60, phi = .15. Three of the failed/closed theme parks (13%) had such an
experience, while only one of the surviving theme parks (4%) recorded such an event. Such
events represent a strategy to improve attendance and/or profitability at the theme park by
management. Thus, it might be more illuminating that only three of the failed/closed theme
parks implemented these strategies: any park implementing a pricing strategy is attempting to
survive; so not implementing such a strategy might be an actual contributor to failure.
Event Variable – Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and instances of pricing the theme park
admission notably higher than competing attractions: x2 (1, n = 46) = .52, p = .47, phi = .21.
Only two of the failed/closed theme parks (9%) priced themselves this way, and none of the
surviving theme parks did. The two failed/closed theme parks that were considered overpriced
(World of Sid & Marty Krofft and MGM Grand Adventures) were both short-lived; this may be
a business strategy best avoided in the theme park industry.
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Event Variable – Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings/Not Complete at Opening
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks for this event variable. Occurrences
were common among both samples, nine of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (39%) experienced
cost overruns and delayed openings, and five of the surviving theme parks (22%) had this event
occurrence: x2 (1, n = 46) = .92, p = .34, phi = .19. It is suspected that cost overruns and missed
opening dates are very common throughout the commercial construction industry; so, a number
of major projects (such as theme parks) are bound to experience this type of event. Whether this
event ultimately contributes to a theme park failure cannot be discerned from the findings of this
study.
Event Variable—Sustained Attendance Declines, Year-over-Year
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and occurrences of year-over-year
attendance declines. In fact, this was another event variable in which the event was more
common among the surviving theme parks than among the failed/closed theme parks: twelve of
the 23 failed/closed theme parks (52%) and 19 of the 23 surviving theme parks (83%) at some
point over their lifespans experienced multiple, contiguous years of attendance declines:
x2 (1, n = 46) = 3.56, p = .06, phi = -.33. The occurrence of this event must be considered a
normal part of sustained theme park operation – some years attendance will decline due to
external events or even the lack of growth that follows years of growth or the draught after the
initial excitement generated by the addition of major new attractions.
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Event Variable—Lack of Maintenance or Reinvestment
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and reported incidences of poor
maintenance or lack of reinvestment into the continuing park operation: x2 (1, n = 46) = .52,
p = .47, phi = .21. Only two of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (9%) and none of the surviving
theme parks had reports of such neglect. This was a surprising result. In the mature North
American theme park industry, park operators appear to have internalized the need to keep up
with maintenance at the park properties. But it was expected that a failure to reinvest in new
facilities and attractions would be found to be a contributor to theme park failure/closure.
Event Variable—Excessive Number of Lawsuits
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and the number of reported lawsuits
among the two samples: x2 (1, n = 46) = 2.21, p = .14, phi = .27. Seven of the 23 failed/closed
theme parks (30%) had reports of lawsuits, and only two (9%) of the surviving theme parks has
similar reports. Lawsuits of note may imply poor management or operational procedures, but
this study’s results imply that lawsuits are just a fact of life in the operation of theme parks and
are not necessarily contributors to failure or closure.
Event Variable—Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions or Change of Ownership
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and instances of merger/acquisition
activity or the occurrence of a change of ownership: x2 (1, n = 46) = .48, p = .49, phi = .15. This
was the most commonly occurring event variable in the study, 16 of the 23 failed/closed theme
parks (70%) and 19 of the 23 surviving theme parks (83%) experienced a merger or change of
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ownership. This event variable is a common occurrence in the theme park industry. Other
studies have noted that distressed firms are more likely to be acquired as an attempt to stave off
failure/closure. It appears that this happens in the theme park industry as well, with successful
results.
Event Variable—Management Corruption/Graft, Vandalism/Sabotage
A chi-square test for independence indicated no significant association between
failed/closed theme parks versus surviving theme parks and the number of reports of
management corruption, graft, vandalism or internal sabotage among the two sampled groups: x2
(1, n = 46) = 2.46, p = .12, phi = .31. Four of the 23 failed/closed theme parks (17%) had events
involving corruption, graft, vandalism, or sabotage; none of the surviving theme parks had a
management corruption type of event. Two of these corruption events occurred among the
earliest theme parks in this study (Magic Mountain, Colorado and Pacific Ocean Park,
California) and two of these events involved arson. However, even among the failed/closed
theme parks these events are rare.
The remaining four hypotheses only examine event variable occurrence among the 23
failed/closed theme parks in the study. These hypotheses seek to determine which constructs
contribute the most to failure/closure. Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of hypotheses
two through five in relation to the theoretical framework; this figure shows which of the model
constructs are being tested in comparison to one another to determine the relative contribution of
construct event variables to theme park failure/closure.
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Adapted Theoretical Framework
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Or
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Business was for a One-Time Event
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Source: Ooghe & Waeyaert (2004), as adopted by Ooghe & De Prijcker (2008)
Figure 2.1: Conceptual Failure Model of Possible Causes of Bankruptcy

Figure 2. Theoretical Framework Constructs Tested in Hypotheses Two Through Five

Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis two examines the relationship between the four event variables categorized as
external to the theme park operation and the 19 event variables categorized as internal to the
theme park operation. It was hypothesized that among the failed/closed theme parks, more event
variable occurrences would be recorded among the internal constructs than among the external
constructs: H2 – among the failed/closed theme parks, the number of event variable occurrences
is greater for the internal constructs than for the external constructs. Of the potential event
occurrences, 139 out of a potential 391 were recorded for internal event variables (36%) and 21
out of a potential 69 were recorded for external event variables (30%).
To test this relationship, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed to determine
that there was no significant difference in the proportion of event variable occurrences among
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internal constructs versus the proportion of event variable occurrences among external
constructs, z = -0.823, p = 0.412. It can be concluded that hypothesis two is not supported, there
are no significant difference among internal event variable occurrences and external event
variable occurrences.
This is a surprising result, and may characterize the theme park industry. In prior
business studies (Boyle & Desai, 1991; Fredland & Morris, 1976; Theng & Boon, 1996) internal
events have been identified as being more significant contributors to business failure than
external events. It is common for businesses to ascribe external conditions (the economy, the
weather, competitors, etc.) as the reason for their demise (Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008), but indepth studies show that internal causes (financial issues, poor leadership, bad
marketing/customer service) are more typical contributors to failure. However, in this study of
the theme park industry this normative finding does not hold. This in itself is a finding. This
gives credence to all the theme park operators who claim that weather, or gas prices, or the
proliferation of cable television, etc. are the sources of their failed product. As an outdoor
entertainment product, external factors might be more impactful on the success or failure of a
theme park, enough so to prevent the finding of a significant difference between external and
internal event variables.
Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis three measures the frequency among failed/closed theme parks between those
that closed involuntarily versus the frequency of those that closed voluntarily. Involuntary
closure is the most expected due to the following events: a firm does not make a profit, revenue
declines, and the entity slips into bankruptcy. Voluntary closure may be explained by: an owner
retires, dies, becomes injured or ill, or the business is closed to pursue a superior alternative
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financial option (Bates, 2005; Coad, 2014; Ulmer & Nielsen, 1947). It was hypothesized that
involuntary failure would be more common than voluntary failure: H3 – among the failed/closed
theme parks, the number of involuntary closures is greater than the number of voluntary closures.
Of the 23 failed/closed theme parks, 15 (65%) were involuntary closures, and eight (35%) were
voluntary closures. Headd (2003) observed that 29 to 34% of closed business owners considered
their companies successful at the time of closure – a result mirrored by the percent of theme park
voluntary closures in this study.
To test this relationship, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed to determine
that there was a significant difference in the proportion of involuntarily closed theme parks
versus the proportion of voluntarily closed theme parks, z = 2.064, p = 0.039. It can be
concluded that hypothesis three is supported; involuntary theme park business failure is more
common than voluntary theme park business closure.
Nonetheless, it is notable that eight theme parks in the study were closed due to a rational
decision by owners to close the operation and redevelop the property as a different, and
anticipated, better, higher, more profitable use for the site/property. Three of these voluntarily
closed theme parks were, or are proposed to be, redeveloped as housing developments, one was
redeveloped as a retail mall, and one became an office park. The other three were subsumed into
the surrounding property uses: hotel, beach property, fairgrounds. The prevalence of such events
was not expected at the onset of this study.
Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis four seeks to determine the relationship, or lack of, among the twelve event
variables associated with the theoretical model constructs of leadership/employee capabilities
and strategic/operational policies, and the four event variables associated with the theoretical
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model construct measuring the company’s characteristics. This hypothesis addresses whether
among failed/closed theme parks in the study, event variables related to the
management/leadership skills and company policies were more common, or were event variables
related to a failed/closed theme parks’ company characteristics (its age, geographic location,
available room for expansion) were more prevalent. It was hypothesized that there would be a
significant difference among these two internal constructs; it was unknown which construct
would dominate: H4 – among the failed/closed theme parks, there is a significant difference in
the number of event variable occurrences due to leadership/employee capabilities or
strategic/operational policy event variables, versus the number of event variable occurrences due
to company characteristic associated event variables. Of the event occurrences, 103 out of a
potential 276 were recorded for leadership/employee capabilities or strategic/operational policy
event variables (37%) and 28 out of a potential 92 were recorded for company characteristic
associated event variables (30%).
To test this relationship a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed to determine
that there was no significant difference in the proportion of event variable occurrences among
broad-level company strategies/skills constructs versus the proportion of event variables among
company characteristic constructs, z = 1.194, p = 0.234. It can be concluded that hypothesis four
is not supported, there are no significant differences in the number of event variable occurrences
between leadership/employee capabilities event variables or strategic/operational policy event
variables and company characteristic associated event variables.
Several studies have looked at these two constructs independently and have noted that
these variables are contributors to business failure, but determining if one construct was a greater
contributor to failure than the other is something new considered in this study. In prior studies,
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among the two “company characteristic” construct business traits of smallness of the business
and newness of the business, newness has been shown to contribute more to business failure than
smallness (Kale & Arditi, 1998; Ooghe & De Prijcker, 2008; Pretorius, 2008). But, comparisons
of the net contribution to business failure of capabilities such as “leadership competency” versus
company characteristics such as the “size of the establishment” have yet to be completed.
Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis five examines the relationship between the four event variables related to the
company characteristics event construct and the four event variables related to the external
construct. It was hypothesized that among the failed/closed theme parks, there would be a
significant difference among these two constructs: H5 – among the failed/closed theme parks,
there is a significant difference in the number of event variable occurrences due to external event
variables, than the number of event variable occurrences due to company characteristic
associated event variables. Of the event occurrences, 21 out of a potential 69 were recorded for
external event variables (30%) and 28 out of 92 were recorded for company characteristic event
variables (30%).
To test this relationship, a two-sample z-test for proportions was performed to determine
that there was no significant difference in the proportion of event variables occurrences among
external constructs versus the proportion of event variable occurrences among the company
characteristic construct, z = 0.000, p = 1.000. It can be concluded that hypothesis five is not
supported, there are no significant event variable occurrences between external event variables
and company characteristic event variables.
The proportion between these two constructs was almost identical, assuring that there
would not be a significant difference. Again, this was an exploratory hypothesis aimed at
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determining if there could be a difference in the impact of external event occurrences versus
those event occurrences that are due to the characteristics of the firm. In this study, external
variables such as competition were compared to company characteristics such as lack of space
for expansion. A more focused study addressing these specific variables in a more deliberate
manner may provide insights that were not achieved in this study.
Summary
Five hypotheses were tested in this chapter. Hypothesis one and hypothesis three were
supported. Hypothesis one indicated that failed/closed theme parks have significantly more
occurrences of the event variables than the comparable sample of surviving theme parks.
Among the 21 event variables analyzed, seven resulted in a significant difference between the
failed/closed theme park and the surviving theme parks. Failure/closure was significantly more
common among parks located in regional geographic areas than theme parks located in
destination markets like Southern California or Central Florida.
Theme parks that reported that they were constrained by a lack of space for expansion of
their facilities were significantly more likely to fail/close. Theme parks reporting low customer
satisfaction or low capacity/not enough to do were significantly more common among the
failed/closed theme parks than among the surviving theme parks. Theme parks plagued with
excessive debt, difficulties refinancing, cash flow issues or that were habitually unprofitable
were significantly more likely to be among the failed/closed sample than among the survivors.
Theme parks that declared bankruptcy and/or had a temporary suspension of operations were
significantly more likely to be among the failed/closed theme park sample. And, theme parks in
the study whose owners mentioned that there was a higher best use of the property than that of a
theme park were significantly more a part of the failed/closed theme park sample.
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Hypothesis three showed that among the 23 failed/closed theme parks in this study,
significantly more failed involuntarily, due to business failure (the inability to turn a profit), than
those that were closed voluntarily; in other words, the parks were closed to pursue a higher best
use of the property as a venture different than a theme park development.
Also of note, was that no significant difference was found between the proportion of
event variable occurrences among failed/closed theme parks for event variables considered to be
external to the business (macroeconomic conditions, competitive threats, and political stability)
versus the proportion of event variable occurrences considered to be internal to the business
(leadership abilities, financial conditions, and strategies or marketing initiatives pursued). In
most business failure analysis studies, internal events are shown to be the more likely contributor
to business failure. In this study, that relationship was not borne out, which may imply that
something is different within the theme park industry – external factors may be greater
contributors to failure in this industry than in other industries that have been the focus of
business failure analysis studies in the past. Further analysis is required to prove such a
relationship, but this may be an implied finding in this study.
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The last chapter presents a discussion of the study and its findings. The chapter begins
with a hypothesis-by-hypothesis examination of the implications, citing real-world examples of
the event variables as revealed through the research. A brief consideration of the study’s impact
on the original purpose statement, research questions and the theoretical model is made, followed
with a review of the managerial implications of the study to current and future practitioners. An
assessment of the study’s input to tourism/hospitality literature is given, followed by a
presentation of the study’s limitations (assumptions, bias, and delimitations) and suggestions for
further research. The chapter ends with a short summary.
Findings and Interpretations
This section mirrors the outline structure presented in the prior chapter. While Chapter
Four reported the statistical findings of the hypotheses, in Chapter Five the significance or
potential implications of the hypothesis results are discussed. When the findings veered from
what was anticipated, explanations for this divergence is provided.
Hypothesis 1
H1 – The total number of event variable occurrences is greater among the failed/closed theme
parks than among the surviving theme parks
This study identified suspected theme park failure causes and then confirmed some of
them. It was expected that event variable occurrences would be more common among the
failed/closed theme parks than among the surviving theme parks, and this, in fact, was
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demonstrated by the results. Assuming that each of the 46 theme parks in the study could exhibit
any of the 21 event variables, 33 percent of the total event variable occurrences (160 of a
potential 483) were experienced among the failed/closed theme parks in the sample, while only
17 percent (83 of a potential 483) of the total event variable occurrences were recorded among
the surviving park sample. Considering only actual instances of event occurrences, the
failed/closed theme parks represented 66 percent of the total, while the number of event
occurrences among the surviving theme parks represented 34 percent overall.
For the failed/closed theme parks, the average number of events experienced was seven,
while the number of events among the surviving parks was 3.4. Although not measured in this
study, evidence points to the conclusion that not one, single event leads to failure/closure
(Kwansa & Parsa, 1990), but a combination of events compound business challenges, leading to
the failure/closure. The fewer the number of adverse events, the less likely is a firm to fail. This
proposition is borne out by this study’s results. A summary of the results for hypothesis one are
reported in Table 11.

Table 11. Summary of the Results From Hypothesis One

Number of event occurrences
Percent of total possible event occurrences
Percent of actual event occurrences
Average number of event occurrences recorded per park
Range of event occurrences recorded per park
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Failed/Closed
theme parks

Surviving
theme parks

160
33
66
7.0
3–14

83
17
34
3.4
0–8

In the aggregate, event variable occurrences were significantly more common for the
failed/closed theme parks; however, this study also measured each of the 21 event variables oneby-one among the two sample groups. Six event variables were shown to be significantly more
likely to occur among the failed/closed park sample than the surviving park sample, a favorable
number in comparison to prior event approach studies. Giroux and Wiggins (1984) found three
of their seven study events to be significant, while Kwansa and Parsa (1990) found three out of
eight of their event measures achieved significance.
The 14 event variables for which a statistically significant difference was not found
should not be completely discounted. Although not statistically different, the frequency of event
variable occurrences was still higher among the failed/closed theme parks than among the
survivors for all but two event variables (sustained year-over-year attendance declines, and
instances of mergers/acquisitions/changes in ownership).
While there were event variable occurrences among the failed/closed sample for every
event variable, among the surviving theme park sample, no occurrences were recorded for seven
of the event variables: lack of space for expansion, a higher best use for the property, complaints
from surrounding residents, constrained operating season length, overpriced relative to similar
attractions, lack of maintenance/reinvestment, and management corruption/sabotage. These nonoccurrences among the surviving theme parks can be interpreted as the seven “deadly sins” that
no successful theme park operators ever engages in.
Below is a more in-depth analysis of each event variable, along with suggestions of the
possible implications of each.
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H1 – Significant Event Variables
Destination versus Regional Theme Park Failure/Closure
Seventy-four percent of failed/closed parks were located in regional markets. Theme
parks that were located in the theme park destination markets of Southern California and Central
Florida were significantly less likely to fail than parks located within a regional geographic
market.
This implies that there might be truth in the concept of strength in numbers; just as
certain businesses benefit from being concentrated together (e.g. clothing stores, restaurants,
etc.), theme parks seem to benefit by operating in zones of concentrated tourist activity, such as
destination markets (Benmelech et al., 2014). It was expected that the enhanced competition of
these destination markets would force out underperforming parks, and to some extent they do.
No Disney, Universal Studios, or SeaWorld park in a destination market has ever failed/closed.
However, smaller, and more regionally-oriented players, have failed when they attempted to
operate in these destination markets: Busch Gardens Los Angeles and Pacific Ocean Park in
California, and Marco Polo Park, Circus World, Boardwalk & Baseball, and Cypress Gardens in
Florida.
Aside from the theme park failures/closures in the destination markets of Southern
California and Central Florida, none of the other failed/closed regional parks included in the
study were located in California or Florida, and quite a few were outside of what is traditionally
considered the U.S. Sun Belt States (states in the southern half of the U.S. mainland, known for
moderate winter temperatures), some a long way out; e.g. Magic Mountain in Colorado,
Freedomland USA in New York, Pleasure Island in Massachusetts, Old Chicago in Illinois,
SeaWorld in Ohio, Autoworld in Michigan, and Boyertown in Pennsylvania.
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Poor weather in the shoulder seasons, resulting in shorter operating seasons, is a more
likely occurrence in the regional markets. Ultimately, such challenges may have led owners to
consider alternative uses of the underlying property. Both the failed regional theme parks
Freedomland USA in New York and Pleasure Island in Massachusetts recorded the weatherrelated event variable of a constrained operating season/length and the event variable of a higher
best use of the property (“Freedomland,” 1962; “Freedomland Out,” 1965; McLaughlin, 2014;
“Off-Season,” 1966) – a relationship worth exploration in subsequent studies.
This study is the first to note that theme parks are more susceptible to failure if they
operate in regional geographic markets than if they operate in destination markets of Southern
California and Central Florida. This may be due to vulnerabilities in these regional markets or it
could be that the markets of Southern California and Central Florida are the most conducive to
theme park success.
Lack of Space for Expansion
Unlike the surviving parks, about a third of all failed/closed theme parks reported a lack
of space for expansion. Theme parks, especially those located in regional markets that draw
from the same feeder markets year-after-year, need to constantly refresh their product offering; it
becomes a market expectation that every other year a new ride or show will be added to the
roster of attractions (Price, 1999). When a park has run out of room to accommodate these
additions, current rides and attractions must be removed to make way for the new. This results
in an additional expense for the park, which detracts from overall profitability.
Successful parks have had to address this limitation as well: Disneyland had to expand
into its former parking lot space to add a second park to the resort (O’Brien, “Pressler cites,”
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2001), and Universal Studios Orlando had to remove the relatively popular Jaws attraction to
make way for the more popular Diagon Alley addition (Bevil, 2011).
Nonetheless, such a lack of foresight to plan for the dedication of land to expand into has
contributed to failure/closure at parks as diverse as Pacific Ocean Park in California (“At the Fun
Parks: Pacific Ocean Park,” 1965), which was mostly located on a pier extending into the Pacific
Ocean, to the two closed Busch Gardens (in Houston, Texas, and Los Angeles, California) that
were built on land adjacent to their brewery operations, where no large parcels remained to
accommodate park expansions (“Busch Converts Houston Gardens,” 1973; “Busch Gardens now
Busch bird sanctuary,” 1977). Even more constricting, The World of Sid & Marty Krofft in
Atlanta, Georgia was located indoors, surrounded by an attached hotel, leaving no space for
growth (“Krofft Park to reopen?” 1977). Similarly, MGM Grand Adventures in Las Vegas was
surrounded by a successful hotel/gambling development that constrained the viability of its
expansion (Strow, 2001).
Low Customer Satisfaction / Not Enough to Do / Inadequate Park Capacity
Theme parks that survive are not known for low customer satisfaction or an inadequate
number of attractions to absorb crowd volumes – only one report of this event variable was
reported among a surviving theme park, while nine instances of this event variable were reported
among the failed/closed theme park sample. Of these nine failed/closed theme parks, all were
closed after only brief operating tenures of ten years or less, but the majority of these (six of the
nine) closed in less than five years, which highlights how crucial customer satisfaction is to longterm theme park survival. A core competency of any theme park is to provide patrons with
enough to do to justify the price of admission (Price, 1999). To not do so is to invite guest
complaints, leading to low customer satisfaction, and, frequently, a resulting business failure.
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Accidents / Violence / Bad Word of Mouth about the Parks
This event variable was found to be significant between the two samples, but the higher
frequency of events was reported among the surviving theme park sample. An unanticipated
result that can be attributed to the longer tenures (total years of operation) exhibited by the
surviving theme parks included in the study. Over time, all theme parks, regardless of if they
failed or closed or survived, will experience such events: there are ride accidents, acts of
violence, and other negative events that may occur inside theme parks, all of which result in
(temporary) negative “word of mouth” publicity. Successful parks overcome these events and
continue to survive.
One example of an in-park accident that had been cited as a direct contributor to a park’s
closure happened in 2007 at Kentucky Kingdom. A teenaged guest had both feet severed on a
drop ride, which was then permanently shut down (Ahles, 2007). Yet even with all the
surrounding negative publicity, the park still completed its 2007 and 2008 seasons before
announcing its permanent closure (Hendric, 2010). Other accidents have occurred at other parks
that managed to overcome the bad publicity and prosper in subsequent years. The actual “event”
that matters is the ability to manage through the negative publicity and rely on the goodwill that
has been engendered from past operational competence and delivered customer safety and,
consequently, satisfaction.
Excessive Debt / Refinancing / Cash Flow Issues / Unprofitability
The existing business failure analysis literature confirms that being over-leveraged, overextended, experiencing greater cash outflows than inflows, and general instances of
unprofitability are overwhelmingly cited as precursors to failure/closure (Bollen et al., 2005;
Longenecker et al., 1999; Pretorius, 2008; Scherrer, 2003). This also holds true within the theme
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park industry: 16 of the 23 failed/closed theme parks reported this type of financial issue, while
only seven of 23 surviving theme parks did. Theme parks are magical spaces, where reality can
be suspended (Adams, 1991; Lawson & Baud-Bovy, 1977; Lyon, 1987; Pikkemaat & Schuckert,
2007); nonetheless, they are businesses, with the need to return profits to investors and owners;
without such financial results there can be no expectation of survival over time.
Declared Bankruptcy / Temporary Closure
The most frequently occurring event variable among the failed/closed theme park sample
was instances of declared bankruptcy or temporary closure; 20 of the 23 failed/closed theme
parks reported such an event. To declare bankruptcy without closing indicates that the business
is seeking temporary protection from creditors while declaring a plan for recovery that details a
business scenario in which the operation can achieve profitability and pay off its creditors. Such
an event is a glaring warning questioning future success; nonetheless, it can also be a first step
toward recovery. However, as shown by these results, 87 percent of failed/closed theme parks
declared bankruptcy or closed temporarily and still ultimately closed for good. Consequently, a
recovery after this type of event is difficult. Among the surviving theme parks, eight declared
bankruptcy yet managed to overcome this setback. Interestingly every one of them is operated
by the Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, which successfully emerged from its 2009
declaration of Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2010 (Robinson-Jacobs, 2010).
Higher Best Use for the Property
None of the surviving theme parks in the study reported that their owners believed that
the park property could be more profitably developed as an alternative business. However, this
event occurred eight times among the failed/closed theme park sample. These voluntary closures
imply that the parks were not operating at the level of financial success that was originally
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envisioned by their owners and the opportunity existed to develop the property as an alternative
use that would return greater profits to investors.
It is demoralizing to think that theme parks beloved by their patrons are more valuable to
their owners when developed as something else. Nonetheless such events have occurred
numerous times; for example, Freedomland USA in New York City and Marco Polo Park in
Florida were both redeveloped as residential ventures (“Freedomland Out,” 1965; “New
Management,” 1975). Astroworld in Houston, Texas was closed with the intention of
repurposing the property as a mixed-use retail-residential project (“Six Flags Selling,” 2005);
however, the financial downturn of 2008 curtailed this plan and, to date, the former park site
remains undeveloped. Likewise, Opryland in Nashville, Tennessee was transitioned to become
an outlet mall, capable of operating every day of the year versus its prior use as an outdoor
entertainment venue, operable only at times when outdoor temperatures were accommodating
(Burnside, 2005). Pleasure Island in the Boston area became an office park (McLaughlin, 2014),
and MGM Grand Adventures in Las Vegas was absorbed into the surrounding resort/casino
development (Strow, 2001).
H1 – Non-Significant Event Variables
Fourteen of the 21 event variables in the study did not exhibit a significant difference in
frequency among the two sample groups. This is notable because these events were selected for
inclusion in the study based on the expectation that they were likely contributors to theme park
business failure, as revealed by a review of the literature on the theme park industry. As such,
these non-significant event variables should not be eliminated from subsequent research into
failure/closure in this industry. At a minimum, this study has managed to catalogue the
frequency of these events among the 46 theme parks included in this study.
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Opening in One Decade versus Another / Changing Demographics
It was expected that failures/closures of theme parks would be more frequent earlier in
the advent of the industry; in other words, there was the anticipation that the rate of theme park
failure/closure would be higher in the 1950s and 1960s than in later decades, as early theme
parks were untested. Managers/operators had not yet learned the trends, the guest expectations,
and strategies to exploit opportunities to increase revenues. In addition, the earliest theme park
failures had no “white knight” to turn to as potential saviors. At this time no existing theme park
chains had developed that might be interested in acquiring a struggling theme park at a
discounted price. Starting in the mid-1970s, Six Flags Corporation began systematically making
acquisitions of distressed theme parks, applying the Six Flags operational and marketing
expertise, and extending the “Six Flags” brand onto the struggling operations. Later in this same
decade, CedarFair also took on this role of acquiring stressed theme parks (e.g. Valley Fair in
1978) whose only other alternative in an earlier time would have been closure (Milman & Kaak,
2018). Such a relationship between the rate of failure/closure and the decade of opening was not
borne out by the results. The small samples for these discreet timeframes might have made it
difficult for this trend to emerge, but these findings do reinforce the observation that
failure/closure is a normal part of the theme park industry lifecycle that tends to remain
consistent over time.
Acts of Nature / Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
A total of 14 theme parks in the study (30 percent) reported some type of adverse act of
nature or natural disaster. Environmental events are not uncommon occurrences for operations
within the outdoor entertainment industry. The Six Flags Jazzland park in New Orleans,
Louisiana was never able to physically recover or reopen after the devastation/extended flooding
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from Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Koranteng, 2006). This is the only direct instance of a natural
disaster definitively resulting in the closure of a theme park. But, a series of three hurricane
strikes in 2004 on the Cypress Gardens theme park in Central Florida (“Digest,” 2004)
contributed to several temporary closures, culminating in the park’s eventual shutdown in 2009.
Well managed theme parks should have contingency plans for such events that include
methods for physically recovering from the devastation, and for communicating publicly that the
park will return to normal as soon as it is determined that all operations are safe. Among the
surviving theme park sample, Adventureland in Iowa was directly hit by a tornado in 1974, its
first year of operation. The storm destroyed several the structures in the park’s entry plaza, but
the park persevered, and even opened a rollercoaster several years later named the Tornado to
commemorate this event (Baltes, 2006).
Complaints from Surrounding Residents
Only two instances were recorded for this event variable, too few to perform any
statistical tests on the results. Such events are likely to happen prior to the eventual development
and opening of the park. In other words, if there are recorded complaints against the proposed
development of a theme park, it is likely that the park never is opened. Probably the most
renowned instance of such an event involves the protests organized against the proposed
development of Disney’s America in the Virginia suburbs of Washington, D.C. in the mid-1990s
(Turner, 1994).
Theme Park Market Concentration / New Competitors in Market
Regional theme parks that have opened in a market with an incumbent theme park
operator have mostly resulted in the closure of one of the two competitors. In the past, theme
park operators have explicitly attributed local competitors as a reason for their closure. For
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example, Busch Gardens in Houston could not establish success against crosstown competitor
Astroworld (“Busch Converts,” 1973); Busch Gardens Los Angeles could not withstand the
competition of other parks in the Los Angeles area (“Busch Bird Sanctuary,” 1977); Old Chicago
closed after Marriott’s Great America opened in Illinois; The World of Sid & Marty Krofft was
not able to effectively compete with Six Flags Over Georgia (“Krofft Park,” 1977); even
Freedomland USA called it quits rather than compete for another season with the temporary New
York World’s Fair (“Freedomland Out,” 1965).
Yet, enough other regional markets have managed to sustain the successful operation of
two parks to prevent this variable from being significant, notably: Northern California (Six Flags
Discovery Kingdom and Great America); Suburban Washington D.C. (Kings Dominion and
Busch Gardens, Williamsburg); and San Antonio, Texas (SeaWorld and Six Flags Fiesta Texas).
Failing in Five Years or Less
Again, this event variable did not achieve a significant difference between the two
samples. An unexpected outcome given that multiple prior studies have demonstrated that
businesses in general are more susceptible to failure in the first years of their operation (Ooghe &
De Prijcker, 2008; Pretorius, 2008; Stinchcombe, 1965; Thornhill & Amit, 2003), and in fact, the
majority (52%) of failed/closed theme parks in this study did fail within the first five years of
their operation. Nevertheless, this proportion was not significantly different from the overall
theme park failure rate of 30%. If anything, this can be attributed to the scale of theme park
operations, which imply a level of business expertise and financial stability that might enable the
parks to survive for a longer time than in comparison to averages for failed businesses overall.
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Constrained Operating Season / Length
Only three parks in the study explicitly reported this event variable as a contributing
factor to failure/closure. It is notable that the three parks were all located in northern U.S.
geographic markets: New York, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Nonetheless, theme parks do manage
to successfully operate in northern markets such as Ohio, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, New
Jersey, and even two in Canada, thereby explaining why this event variable did not achieve
significance.
Pricing / Ticketing / Discounting Strategies or Price Reductions
This event variable was intended to gauge whether discounting strategies implemented by
theme parks were indicators of financial distress or hyper-competition that might precede a
business failure/closure. Overall, this event turned out to be rather rare; only three failed/closed
theme parks recorded this event variable and only one of the surviving theme parks succumbed
to this type of strategy. Discounting is a questionable strategy; there is the concern that if a
business discounts, even once, customers will begin to expect discounts as a norm and resist
paying the non-discounted price (Walden, 2009). As an example, throughout the 2008 economic
crisis, Walt Disney World did not discount admission prices to its parks but did offer discounted
hotel rooms and dining packages to entice hesitant consumers (Clarke & Garcia, 2011).
Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions in the Same Geographic Market
This was a rarely observed event variable; only two theme parks (both of which
ultimately did fail and close) priced themselves higher than the immediate competition (The
World of Sid and Marty Krofft in Atlanta, and MGM Grand Adventures in Las Vegas) and in the
case of the Atlanta park, it was not that the admission price was higher than its in-market
competitor (Six Flags Over Georgia), but the perceived value of the park product as measured by
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the reasonable length of stay and the comparable number of attractions, was lacking in
comparison to the established park (“World of Sid,” 1977).
Construction Cost Overruns / Delayed Openings / Not Complete at Opening
Occurrences of this event variable were evenly distributed between the two samples.
Construction cost overruns are common in commercial construction and have occurred among a
number of theme parks that have failed/closed: Freedomland USA (“Prescription,” 1961); the
two indoor theme parks, The World of Sid & Marty Krofft and Old Chicago (Mitchell, 1976;
Powell, 1977), and others.
Theme parks that have survived also encountered such challenges: Magic Mountain in
California (“Magic Mountain Jammed,” 1971); and Six Flags Over Mid-America in St. Louis,
whose cost overruns so concerned the Six Flags Corporation that management vowed never to
construct a theme park from scratch again, and from then on pursued a corporate policy of
buying struggling theme parks and injecting them with management and marketing expertise as a
growth strategy (Price, 1999). Famously, the cost of constructing Epcot in 1982 ballooned from
the original estimate of $400 million to $1.2 billion. The park was successful, but the resulting
financial burden on Walt Disney Productions led to Wall Street takeover attempts on the
company and ultimately a major management change in 1984 (Taylor, 1987).
Delayed openings among the theme park sample are less common than the occurrence of
construction cost overruns but have the potential to be more damaging. Delayed openings result
in adverse publicity, loss of expected revenue, and added carrying costs as construction
continues beyond the deadline, interest payments continue to be payed, and admission revenue is
not realized.
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Great Adventure in New Jersey, a surviving park sampled in the study, missed its spring
1974 planned opening, eventually opening in the summer season (Lander, 1975). It has survived
but has experienced a number of ownership changes over time. One of the earliest theme parks,
Magic Mountain in Denver, experienced numerous delayed openings and once it finally opened,
it was never a viable operation and soon closed (“Judge Sets,” 1961). More recently, Disney’s
Shanghai Disneyland park was pushed back from a planned 2015 opening to an eventual opening
in 2016 (Fritz & Areddy, 2015). A surprise coming from the most experienced of theme park
operators.
Sustained Attendance Declines, Year-over-Year
This is a most common event within the theme park industry. Of the 46 theme parks
sampled in the study, 31 (67%) reported year-over-year attendance declines from time to time.
Although this is not a significant event between the two samples, attendance declines often occur
in the year that follows a year of attendance increase, resulting from the addition of a major new
attraction (Price, 1999). In addition, external events such as weather, the economy, gas prices, or
new competitors can cause a temporary decline in annual attendance. As long as these
downturns can be contained, it appears that these event variables do not become an ultimate
cause of business failure/closure.
Lack of Maintenance or Reinvestment
While it was expected that a lack of maintenance or the failure to reinvest in the park
would be drivers for theme park closure, only two occurrences were reported, both among the
failed/closed sample. Pacific Ocean Park in California was not reported as failing to upkeep its
facilities or failing to reinvest in new attractions, but it did report excessive maintenance costs
due to its location on the Pacific Ocean coast (Stanton, 1987). Libertyland in Memphis,
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Tennessee did record instances of declining park maintenance in the years prior to its closure in
2005 (Stevenson & Ogle, 2017). Throughout the industry, it appears that park operators have
internalized that, at a bare minimum, they must keep up with maintenance and reinvestment
campaigns to survive. Even theme parks that went on to fail/close tended to maintain
appearances and add new attractions up to the end of their operations.
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Reports of lawsuits filed against a theme park imply poor management and/or inadequate
operational procedures. Nonetheless, these events do occur from time-to-time and can be
considered a part of normal business operations. There is no known overwhelmingly sensational
lawsuit that has been brought against a park that so damaged its reputation that it can be pointed
to as the contributor to its business failure/closure. Thus, the explanation of why this event
variable did not emerge as a significant differentiator between the two samples.
Instances of Mergers / Acquisitions or Change of Ownership
This was the most commonly occurring event variable in the study. Overall, there were
35 reports of mergers, acquisitions, or changes of ownership among the 46 theme parks (an
incidence rate of 76%). This appears to be a norm within the theme park industry. Frequently,
individual parks were merged or changed hands multiple times throughout their lifespans—this
was true of both failed/closed and surviving parks. SeaWorld Ohio, a part of the failed/closed
sample, was acquired eight times over its operational history (1970 to 2007); among the
surviving sample, Great Adventure in New Jersey (opened in 1974) also was sold eight times.
Cypress Gardens in Central Florida changed ownership six times before closing for good in
2007; Magic Mountain in Southern California (opened in 1971) has experienced six owners, to
date, in its lifespan.
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As the results indicate, there is not something inherently wrong with frequent ownership
changes. In fact, prior studies have suggested that merging is a common strategy for avoiding
business failure/closure (Hamer, 1983; Peel & Wilson, 1989; Shrieves & Stevens, 1979).
However, it was expected that numerous changes of ownership, implying leadership transitions
and alternating business strategies, would contribute to business discontinuity and eventual
failure, but this is not the finding of this study within the theme park industry.
Management Corruption / Graft, Vandalism / Sabotage
Although such events have the potential to be quite sensational and grab headlines, this
event variable did not achieve a statistically significant difference between the two samples.
None of the 23 surviving theme parks reported such an occurrence, but four from the
failed/closed sample did. Corruption occurs among all industries and in all sizes of companies
(Keasey & Watson, 1991), but was only noted at one theme park in the sample – Magic
Mountain in Denver, Colorado – where a member of the senior management team withdrew the
corporation’s treasury and fled the State, leaving an already struggling theme park with an
insurmountable cash flow issue (“Judge Requests,” 1962).
The other three occurrences all involved internal vandalism or sabotage, more
specifically arson. None of these arson events were conclusively tied to park ownership: Pacific
Ocean Park burned down after it had already failed and closed (“Fire Completes,” 1973); and,
Marco Polo Park experienced a suspect fire event that was then followed up by another
questionable fire event a few days later (“Marco Polo Blaze,” 1975). Alleged attempts to end a
business in such a manner appear quite amateurish, below the expectation of management
decorum for an enterprise as large as a theme park operation. It can be imagined that a failing
restaurant owner may attempt to burn down their operation as a way to vacate the business, but it
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is difficult to conceive of such an occurrence being successful at an operation as dispersed as a
theme park.
In closing, hypothesis one showed that the frequency of event variable occurrences was
significantly more common among the failed/closed theme park sample than among the
surviving theme park sample. The individual event variables most commonly associated with
the failed/closed theme park sample (sorted by frequency of occurrences) were:
1. Declaring bankruptcy or temporarily closing with the intent to reorganize
2. Being plagued with excessive debt, cash flow issues or general unprofitability
3. Reputation for low customer satisfaction – defined as not having enough to do in the
park/inadequate capacity/long lines
4. Development pressure stemming from owners’/developers’ belief that there is a higher
best use for the property as something other than a theme park
5. Running out of room or having limited space for expansion
6. Being located in a regional geographic market versus a location in one of the destination
theme park markets of Southern California or Central Florida
Fourteen of the measured event variables did not occur at a frequency statistically significant
between the two samples:


Opening in a specific decade



Experiencing a natural disaster



Receiving complaints from surrounding residents about the park’s operation



The addition of direct theme park competitors in a single market



Failing/closing in five years or less



Constrained operating season/length due to local climatic conditions

146



Engaging in price reductions/discounting strategies



Being overpriced relative to comparable attractions



Experiencing construction cost overruns or delayed openings



Experiencing sustained (year-over-year) attendance declines



Failing to adequately maintain or reinvest in the park



Being subject to numerous lawsuits



Engaging in frequent mergers or being acquired by other companies



Association with management corruption/internal vandalism

The remaining hypotheses consider event variable occurrences among the failed/closed
theme parks only. Specifically, these hypotheses use the structure of the theoretical model to
determine which model constructs are the most frequent contributors to failure/closure within the
North American theme park industry.
Hypothesis 2
H2 – The number of event variable occurrences is greater for the internal constructs than for the
external constructs among the failed/closed theme parks
There is no apparent difference between the contribution of event variables internal
versus event variables external to failure or closure among the failed/closed parks in the study.
This hypothesis includes the entire 21 event variables included in the study but segments them
into those internal to the operation of a theme park versus those external. This tests a seminal
argument: is a business more likely to fail due to its internal strategy, tactics, funding choices, or
marketing initiatives, or can circumstances beyond its control (the economy, political or social
events, or the level of immediate competition) affect the eventual success of the enterprise?
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Prior studies that have analyzed this dynamic have shown that success or failure is more
dependent on internal business factors. Fredland and Morris (1976) acknowledged in their study
that, although it is not possible to isolate the sources of failure, causation factors can be divided
into those “endogenous” (internal) versus those “exogenous” (external) to the firm. They note
that the business community considers failure to be overwhelmingly attributable to internal
conditions, while those firms surveyed after failing, typically, blame external conditions. Their
conclusion is that internal and external factors both contribute to general business failure, but
internal causes are the more likely contributors, especially since failed firms and surviving firms
both are subject to external events.
Boyle and Desai’s (1991) review of 44 published studies on business failure showed only
a few failures were attributable to external causes while the overwhelming majority were
attributable to internal factors. Theng and Boon (1996) sampled 300 randomly selected
companies in Singapore, revealing that the companies ranked internal factors to be more
influential contributors to failure than the impact of external factors.
It was assumed that this relationship would hold for the theme park industry as well.
However, no statistical difference was noted in the results, which does not prove that one
construct (the internal or the external) was more of a contributor than the other. But, considering
that prior studies favor the contribution of internal events to failure, and this study cannot affirm
this result, it opens the discussion whether within the theme park industry, external factors have
the potential to be more impactful to the success or failure of theme parks.
Theme parks are impacted by common external conditions such as the economy,
changing technology, government regulations, and changing cultural/social factors, but are also
subject to consumer sentiment, the price of gasoline, and even local weather conditions. It is
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possible that the impact of external conditions is more profound on this industry than on other
industries that are not so closely tied to consumer discretionary spending or have the potential to
be adversely impacted by new, alternative forms of entertainment that do not require the
consumer to venture out of their household to consume the product.
Further analysis should be conducted to refine and isolate the impact of external event
variables on the eventual success or failure/closure of ventures within the theme park industry
and the greater outdoor entertainment industry. The peculiarities of this industry (mostly
operating outdoors, often operating on a seasonal basis only, and its discretionary nature), might
make it more susceptible to external impacts, and this is worthy of continuing study.
Hypothesis 3
H3 – The number of involuntary closures is greater than the number of voluntary closures among
the failed/closed theme parks
Theme parks are more likely to fail and close due to complications associated with
financial or operational failure than due to the voluntary choice of management to close the
operation. This hypothesis confirmed that involuntary failure was more common among the
sample. Nonetheless, as this study developed, the prevalence of event variable instances where a
theme park was closed for voluntary reasons became apparent – 35 percent of the 23
failed/closed theme parks in the study included voluntary choices by owners to cease the
operation. This implies that the underlying land could be developed as a more viable, and
presumably more profitable, venture than a theme park. In other words, there was an available
higher best use of the property.
The frequency of instances of a higher best use for an operational theme park included in
the study resulted in adapting the inherited theoretical model of Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) to
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display that business failure can be due to “involuntary failure” (the more anticipated type of
failure, attributed to calamity, insolvency, or the declaration of bankruptcy) or can be due to
“voluntary closure,” attributed to owner retirement/sickness/death, or the desire to pursue more
lucrative, alternative financial uses (Bates, 2005; Coad, 2014; Ulmer & Nielsen, 1947).
It must be acknowledged that the prevalence of voluntary closure does not imply that
these parks were profitable at the time of their redevelopment, nor were they free of other
operational challenges. None of the eight theme parks that succumbed to voluntary closure
reported only this as an event variable. In fact, these eight parks exhibited an average of 8.5
event variable occurrences, greater than the overall average of seven event variable occurrences
among the total failed/closed park sample. It is likely that the owners of any financially
struggling park began to explore ways to improve the operation, some of which included the
option to dispose of the current operation and redevelop it as something more profitable. Having
such an option might accelerate the decision to close the park rather than invest in improving it.
Of the eight failed/closed theme parks that ceased operation due to voluntary closure only
two can be considered to have been financially viable at the time of their closure: Opryland in
1997 and Astroworld in 2005 (Burnside, 2005; O’Brien, 1997). A deeper exploration of the
events, timeline and process of closure for these two parks could provide additional insights into
business failure analysis within the theme park industry, as well as insights into the phenomenon
of voluntary business closure.
Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5
H4 – There is a significant difference in the number of event variable occurrences due to
leadership/employee capabilities or strategic/operational policy event variables, than the number
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of event variable occurrences due to company characteristic associated event variables among
the failed/closed theme parks
H5 – There is a significant difference in the number of event variable occurrences due to external
event variables, than the number of event variable occurrences due to company characteristic
associated event variables among the failed/closed theme parks
The last two hypotheses sought to identify a relation among the company’s characteristics
construct and other constructs in the theoretical model. The company’s characteristics construct
is comprised of business traits such as the age, size, and even the industry of the company. The
event variables from this study included within this construct are failing in five years or less (a
surrogate of company age), and market condition factors such as whether the theme park is
located in a destination market versus a regional geographic market, operating season length, and
having room to expand the current theme park facility.
Previous studies have singled out company characteristic-like variables as contributors
to business failure and were the basis for exploring these hypotheses. For example, business
traits such as the contribution to failure of a business’ age or size have been studied by Kale and
Arditi (1998), Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008), and Pretorius (2008). Snyder and Glueck (1982)
examined the impact of industry affiliation on business failure rates.
Hypothesis four compares these company characteristic event variables to the other two
internal constructs of leadership/employee capabilities and strategic/operational policies. It was
unknown which construct would dominate. The result was that no relationship was found and
the hypothesis was rejected. Attributes related to a theme park’s age, geographic location, or its
access to lands to accommodate expansion contribute no more to its ultimate failure than do the
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strategic, operational, leadership, or employee capabilities attributes included in the other two
internal constructs.
Hypothesis five also measured the relative contribution to failure of the company’s
characteristics construct but this time with the two external constructs of the macro internal and
macro external environment. The event variables included within these two constructs are
concerned with the time (decade) the park opened, occurrences of natural disasters, complaints
from surrounding residents, and the degree of in-market direct competition. Again, neither
construct contributed more than the other to theme park failure in this study. No significant
differences were demonstrated among the proportions of event occurrences among either of these
sets of constructs. Future studies could focus on analyzing these variables in a more deliberate
manner, and may provide insights not achieved in this study.
Study Purpose and Research Question Implications
As an intellectual pursuit, this study sought to rectify gaps in the field of business failure
analysis, specifically those related to the theme park industry. The failure or closure of a theme
park results in losses for investors, loss of employment, and a decline in the overall reputation to
the professional credibility of the surviving establishments in the sector. As such, it is worthy to
seek ways to prevent failures in the future.
The findings of this pioneering study demonstrate that failed/closed theme parks exhibit
characteristics that managers of any current theme park operation should be aware of. The
occurrence of any one of these events does not imply that failure is imminent, but serve as an
early warning sign of potential operating issues that must be addressed in the effort to prevent
subsequent decline.
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The overarching research question of this study sought to identify the causes or events
that have contributed to the closure of almost a third of all theme parks that have opened in the
North American market between the years 1955 and 2009. The findings of this study identified
six events that are more common to failed/closed parks than to surviving theme parks: location
outside of a destination theme park market; lacking room for expansion; low customer
satisfaction; financial/debt issues; declaring bankruptcy with the intent to reorganize; and the
belief that the park property could be redeveloped into an alternative, more profitable use. Any
current theme park operator should be aware of these signs of future trouble and strive to avoid
these occurrences and acknowledge if these events do occur that they must be addressed to avert
operating challenges that can lead to business failure and closure.
Theoretical Model Implications
This study affirms that event variables associated with the theme park industry can reside
within the constructs of the Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) conceptual failure model. The
external operating environment construct (changing demographic trends, timeframe of opening,
natural disasters, competitors, and market concentration) as well as the construct of company
characteristics (age and location) are just as meaningful in the context of theme park industry
failure/closure as in the broader study of business failure analysis literature. This relevance is
also true for the model’s constructs of leadership/employee capabilities and the
strategic/operational policies pursued.
However, Ooghe and De Prijcker’s (2008) model failed to consider “voluntary closure”
as a business failure outcome. Businesses fail to exist not always due to a financial failure that
leads to bankruptcy, but sometimes due to planned decisions to close. Owners can become ill,
retire, or die and the business is subsequently closed. In other instances, business owners choose
153

to close a business not because it is failing economically, but because they determine that more
value could be obtained by operating the site as a more profitable business than a theme park
(Bates, 2005; Coad, 2014; Theng & Boon, 1996; Thornhill & Amit, 2003; Ulmer & Nielsen,
1947; Watson & Everett, 1993, 1996). The adopted theoretical framework presented in this
study augmented the construct of “failure” with the addition of “voluntary closure” to allow for
this nuance in the reality of business failure/closure.
Although Ooghe and De Prijcker (2008) symbolized in the graphical design of the model
the relevance of the two opposing external constructs versus the three constructs internal to
organizations, this demarcation was not made explicit. The adopted model used in this study
incorporated a line that stresses this divide between external causes and internal causes of
business failure/closure.
Recommendations—Implications for Practitioners
Identifying what events have preceded failure or closure at theme parks can inform theme
park operators and decision makers of the potential pitfalls that can befall their current
operations. Additionally, foreknowledge of the events that have contributed to failure in this
industry can inform future developers as they evaluate the potential of expanding into the
burgeoning theme park markets of Asia and Latin America (TEA/AECOM, 2016).
Theme park failures or closures result in financial losses for investors and employees, and
damages to the reputation of the management team (Daily, 1994; Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989).
There are also collateral damages for the rest of the industry that follow from any failure of a
theme park firm – theme park closures frequently become media sensations, with
correspondingly negative connotations for the overall industry (Daily, 1994; Hill, 2014; Jacques,
1985). Thus, preventing such collapses can serve to enhance the professional and business
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credibility of the industry. Whatever insights this study can provide into the business failure
process could serve to prevent or better manage such business closures in the future.
Contribution of the Research to the Tourism/Hospitality Literature
The current study aimed to fill a noticeable gap in the tourism and hospitality literature.
For business, in general, a large body of literature exists on failure analysis, theories have been
developed on the types of businesses that fail, when they fail, and how they fail. Within the
tourism and hospitality literature, academic studies have been dedicated to failure in the
restaurant segment (Gu, 2002; Parsa et al., 2005), the lodging segment (Baum & Haveman,
1997; Baum & Ingram, 1998; Baum & Mezias, 1992; Ingram & Baum, 1997), and the special
events segment (Getz, 2002). However, no work had examined when or why theme parks fail.
This study attempted to fill this gap by unveiling the factors that have contributed to failures and
closures in the North American theme park market.
The findings obtained from this study, although focused on failure events specifically
among theme parks, can provide insights into the general business failure/closure/bankruptcy
academic knowledge stream. Additionally, this study has renewed the use of the events
approach to study business failure analysis, which had been neglected since the 1990s (Giroux &
Wiggins, 1984; Kwansa & Parsa, 1990; Tavlin et al., 1989).
Researcher Reflections / Study Limitations
Researcher Assumptions
Throughout the study, it was assumed that theme parks could be adequately studied
separately as an industry despite the relative small number of firms. A total of 76 theme parks
have operated in the North American geographic market between the years of 1955 to 2009; this
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study considered only 46 of these and then further segmented them into two sub-groups: parks
that had failed/closed and those that have survived. The limited number of parks sampled
constrains the types of analysis that can be conducted, which led to the adoption of the events
approach method. Nonetheless, even with the limited sample size, most event variables (except
one) in the study achieved the necessary number of occurrences (at least four occurrences) to
complete the analysis.
Another assumption of this study is the acknowledgment that the occurrence of an event
variable at a theme park, and its subsequent business failure, does not establish that a causal
relationship exists. Similarly, the study assumed that certain events do precede others, and some
of these events can contribute to the ultimate business failure of parks. However, this study is
not able to meet all the criteria of causality, notably the ability to eliminate “plausible alternative
explanations” (Trochim, 2001, p. 174), but it did assume that events and failures can unfold in a
linear fashion over time, and insights can be gained from an analysis of this process.
Researcher Bias
Prior knowledge of and experience within the theme park industry led to researcher bias
in the study. Previous research into failure events at theme parks were the basis for the inclusion
of some of the event variables measured in the study. This introduces a bias into the study – the
event variables measured are those that have already been associated with theme parks failures.
Therefore, it is to be expected that the study’s event variables are more likely to be more
associated with the failed/closed theme park sample. Nonetheless, not all the measured event
variables proved to be relevant, and the study was able to refine among the analyzed 21 event
variables to show which were actually significant, and those that had only been expected to be
contributors to theme park failure/closure.
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Delimitations
This study is limited to the North American market, mainly theme parks located within
the United States and Canada. This market is the oldest, most established global theme park
market and achieves the highest market penetration (number of visits) per capita in the world
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2007). There is a vibrant theme park industry in Europe and Asia,
and an emerging theme park industry in Latin America, but parks from these regions are not
included in this study.
This study’s timeframe encompasses the years 1955 to 2009, which includes the entire
lifespan of the North American theme park industry, except the most recent nine years in which
no theme parks have opened or closed in this region. This study included only theme parks as
units of analysis; traditional amusement parks, water parks, family entertainment centers, or
stand-alone attractions of any type were not included. However, the ultimate findings from this
study might be applicable to these other sectors of the attractions industry.
Furthermore, the parks included in this study excluded any theme parks with sustained
annual attendance levels of more than five million per year. Parks operating on such a scale have
yet to fail, and are of a scope of operations in excess of the subject business units included in this
study.
Suggestions for Future Research
Although prior studies have tabulated the numerous variables that are associated with
business failure in general, it is rare to find unique variables tied to the causes of failure for a
particular industry segment. This study tested 21 event variables of which six were shown to be
more significantly associated with failed/closed theme parks. However, some of the 14 event
variables that did not achieve significance are still worth pursuing to understand what
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contribution they might have on failure analysis, or to determine that they might be contributors
to theme park success.
Also of interest to future research are the event variables collected as part of this study
that were not used. Of the 616 event variable occurrences collected, 224 were not included in
the study, either because they occurred at a theme park that was not included in study’s sample,
or because the frequency of occurrence was too small to adhere to the requirements of the chisquare test. Nonetheless, these unaddressed event variables could be instructive in future studies,
and are reported below for consideration in future theme park analytical studies (see Table 12).

Table 12. Event Variables Identified but Not Utilized in the Study
Unused event variables
Difficulties finding employees/staffing
Year-over-year net revenue declines
Choosing to close on a certain day of the week (frequently Mondays) during the high season,
or transitioning from a daily to weekends-only operation
Park boycotted (for any reason)
Park utilized only one theme or removed theming to save costs
Park was considered boring or was too educationally oriented
Park was not adequately marketed/advertised
Access to the park was constrained due to surrounding construction/urban renewal efforts
High insurance costs (a frequent problem in the 1970s and into the 1980s)
Difficulty obtaining city permits or needed zoning changes
Overbuilt for the market
High gasoline prices

Among the tested event variables, it was surprising that some did not have an impact.
The rates of theme park failure/closure were not significantly different early in the industry’s
lifetime than in more recent decades. It was thought that inexperience and the rush to capitalize
on the theme park trend early in the development of the industry (the late 1950s through the
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1960s) would have resulted in higher rates of failure at this time than the rates of failure recorded
in later decades. This was not the finding. More research should focus on reconciling this result,
or seek to prove that failure rates are a constant that can be expected to continue into the future.
It was hypothesized that the entry of a second theme park establishment into a regional
geographic market would increase competition in the finite market resulting in an increased rate
of closure. Anecdotally there are a number of instances of this occurrence, but it was not proven
in this study. The impact of intra-market competition is still an intriguing topic for consideration
by the theme park industry. Future studies might measure attendance variations resulting from
the introduction of a second park in a market, and explore the tactics employed by the incumbent
park to deal with the new competitor and vice versa. Were differing park characteristics
employed by the two competitors in order to create two value propositions distinct enough to
appeal to an overlapping customer bases, or were the parks too similar to both prosper in the
same market?
The rate of failure for theme parks that failed early on in their lifecycle (the first five
years of operation) were not significantly different from the overall rate of failure for the
industry. Typically, young businesses are more susceptible to failure, yet this relationship was
not proven among the theme parks in this study; exploring why is an avenue of future research.
It may be that the scale of the industry – the large investment required to start a theme park –
brings with it a stamina on the part of the investors to make the parks work even when initial
results do not go as planned.
The most frequently occurring event variable in this study was mergers, acquisitions and
changes of ownership among the theme parks sampled. This event variable occurred among
both the failed/closed and surviving theme parks, at about the same rate. Such events are a
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common occurrence within the industry. But what have been the impacts (positive and negative)
of the consolidation of the industry into a few large theme park chains? Will this trend continue
into the future, or have all the best acquisition candidates already been taken? Does the prospect
of competing with or eventually being acquired by one of the large chains dissuade new entrants
from entering the market?
Hypothesis two failed to demonstrate that event variable constructs internal to and
directly controlled by the business contributed more to business failure than event variable
constructs external to and beyond the control of the business. General business failure analysis
literature finds that businesses fail due to misguided strategies, bad tactics, poor products,
lackluster service, and poorly trained employees, rather than external factors such as political
turmoil, the economy, government regulations or the weather. In this study, we cannot assert
that either construct is more or less of a contributor of failure. Does this imply that external
variables are more impactful on the outdoor entertainment industry than on business in general?
That is a potential research topic for subsequent studies.
More consideration needs to be given to the role and impact of any theme park’s
management teams. Their management proficiency and the strategic directions they pursued can
contribute as much to failure or survival as any event. Often this study focused on physical
characteristics and external environmental influences on the operation, rather that focusing on
management competency. The additional question needs to be asked, were the parks that failed
poorly managed? And, can competent and innovative leadership be the difference between
failure and success despite the event variable occurrences noted in this study?
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Ways to Expand the Study: Implement on Differing Populations or Other Markets
There should be the expectation that the event variables identified in this study as
contributing to the failure/closure of theme parks should be applicable to other sectors of the
entertainment industry. Similar studies could be applied to the water park industry, the greater
amusement park industry, and the family entertainment center sector (arcades, miniature golf,
go-karts, bowling, etc.). In addition, the largest destination parks, the Disney, Universal and
SeaWorld parks, were excluded from this study; however, the consideration of events at these
enterprises would be as relevant and potentially illuminating as the consideration of events at the
less attended regional theme parks. More specifically, this study design should be applied to the
theme park industry in other global geographical markets such as Europe, Asia, and Latin
America.
Suggestions of Differing Study Designs
The most obvious alternative study design would be to build on these findings through
the conduct of an intensive exploration into a sampling of four to five failed theme parks via a
case study analysis. This study method could trace the sequence and timing of events that
precede a failure and document the actions taken and the strategies pursued to stave off a demise
or to explore the events at a particular park that convinced an owner to close the enterprise to
pursue what was expected to be a better more profitable alternative.
A limited survey or a Delphi-analysis of current and retired theme park veterans would
provide inside perspectives on why parks and other attractions have failed. What were the
misguided strategies and tactics pursued by failed competitors? How did competitors exploit
these mistakes? How did sound operations avoid such missteps and learn from the failures of
competitors? What are the reactions of these industry professionals to the findings of this study?
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Summary
This chapter provided a broad review of the study and a discussion of its findings,
including conclusions/interpretations to be drawn from the hypotheses, implications for
practitioners, and recommendations for future research. This study is the first to explicitly
investigate the causes of business failure and closure among the North American theme park
industry and, hopefully, will serve as a framework for additional research on the subject.
Failed/closed theme parks experience more event occurrences than surviving theme parks
overall, and specifically are more likely to record events related to: declaring bankruptcy or
closing with the intent to reorganize; financial difficulties stemming from excessive debt, cash
flow issues, and general unprofitability; low customer satisfaction attributed to too few
attractions in the park, or inadequate capacity resulting in long lines; financial pressures to
redevelop the theme park property as an alternative, more profitable use; and, limited space to
accommodate the need for new rides and attractions. It is hoped that the findings presented here
provide value to current and future operators and developers of theme parks as they seek to
maintain the viability of these enterprises for future audiences and investors.
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APPENDIX A: TABULATION OF EVENT OCCURRENCES
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Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Acts of Nature/Natural
Disasters, Excessive
Maintenance Costs
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

1

1

1

1
8
35

6
26
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Complaints from Adjoining
Residents

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1

Frequency
Percentage

2
9

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Theme Park Market
Concentration/ New
Competitor in Immediate
Market
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
11
48

5
22
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Surviving
Theme Parks

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Failing in Five Years
or Less
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

12
52

0
0
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Failure Rates:
Destination vs. Regional

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1

1
1

1

1

1
6
26

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Constrained Operating
Season/Length

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1
1

1

3
13

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Lack of Space for Expansion

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

7
30

0
0
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Pricing/Ticketing/
Discounting Strategies/Price
Reductions

1

1
1

1

3
13

1
4
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Surviving
Theme Parks

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Overpriced Relative to Similar
Attractions

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1

1

2
9

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name

Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Construction Cost
Overruns/Delayed
Openings/Not Complete
at Opening

Denver’s Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1
1

Frequency
Percentage

1
1
1

1

1

1

1

1

1
1

1

9
39

5
22

1
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Surviving
Theme Parks

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Low Customer Satisfaction:
Not Enough to Do/ Inadequate
Capacity

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1
1

Frequency
Percentage

9
39

1

1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1
4
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Surviving
Theme Parks

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Sustained Attendance
Declines/YOY Declines

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1
1

Frequency
Percentage

12
52

19
83

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Lack of Maintenance/
Reinvestment

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1

1

2
9

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Notable Ride
Accidents/Violence in
Park/Bad WOM
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

3
13

10
43
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Excessive Number of
Lawsuits
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1

7
30

2
9
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Excessive Debt/Debt
Refinancing/Cash Flow
Issues/Unprofitable

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Frequency
Percentage

16
70

1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1

1
1
1

1

1

7
30
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Instances of Declared
Bankruptcy/Temporary
Closure or Forever Closure

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1
1
1
1
1

Frequency
Percentage

20
87

1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1

1

1
1

1

1
1
1
1

1
8
35
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Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA
Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Instances of
Mergers/Acquisitions/
Change of Ownership
1

Surviving
Theme Parks

1
1
1
1

1
1
1

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

16
70

19
83

Frequency
Percentage

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1

1
1
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Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks

Management Corruption/Graft
and Internal
Vandalism/Damage/
Sabotage

Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL

1

Frequency
Percentage

4
17

Surviving
Theme Parks

Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1

1

1

0
0

182

Frequency
Percentage

Tabulation of Event Occurrences
Event Variable Name
Failed/Closed
Theme Parks
Denver's Magic Mountain, CO
Freedomland, U.S.A., NY
Pacific Ocean Park, CA
Pleasure Island, MA
Busch Gardens Houston, TX
Busch Gardens Los Angeles, CA
Marco Polo Park, FL
World of Sid & Marty Krofft, GA
Old Chicago, IL
Circus World, FL
Six Flags Autoworld, MI
Boyertown, PA
Boardwalk & Baseball, FL
Dogpatch USA, AR
Opryland, U.S.A., TN
MGM Grand Adventures, NV
Jazzland, LA
Astroworld, TX
Libertyland, TN
SeaWorld Ohio/Geauga Lake, OH
Hard Rock Park, SC
Kentucky Kingdom, KY
Cypress Gardens, FL
Frequency
Percentage

Higher Best Use for the
Property

Surviving
Theme Parks
Six Flags Over Texas, TX
Silver Dollar City, MO
Dollywood, TN
Six Flags Over Georgia, GA
Knott’s Berry Farm, CA
Six Flags Discovery Kingdom, CA
Six Flags Over Mid-America, MO
Hersheypark, PA
Magic Mountain, CA
Busch Gardens Tampa Bay, FL
Kings Island, OH
Carowinds, NC
Worlds of Fun, MO
Great Adventure, NJ
Adventureland, IA
Busch Gardens Williamsburg, VA
Valleyfair, MN
Great America – Gurnee, IL
Canada's Wonderland, Ontario
Holiday World & Splashin' Safari, IN
Sea World Texas, TX
Fiesta Texas, TX
Legoland California, CA

1
1
1

1

1
1
1
1

8
35

0
0
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Frequency
Percentage

APPENDIX B: CHI-SQUARE TESTS FOR INDEPENDENCE RESULTS
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Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs Crosstabulation
Acts of Nature/Natural Disasters,
Excessive Maintenance
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

8

% within Theme Park
% within Acts of Nature/Natural
Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Acts of Nature/Natural
Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
% of Total

Total

No

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Acts of Nature/Natural
Disasters, Excessive Maintenance Costs
% of Total

Total
15

34.8%

65.2% 100.0%

57.1%

46.9%

50.0%

17.4%

32.6%

50.0%

6

17

23

26.1%

73.9% 100.0%

42.9%

53.1%

50.0%

13.0%

37.0%

50.0%

14

32

46

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

.411a 1

.522

Continuity Correctionb

.103 1

.749

Likelihood Ratio

.412 1

.521

Pearson Chi-Square

.749

Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear Association

.402 1

.526

46

N of Valid Cases

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.094

.522

.094

.522

46

185

23

.375

Market Concentration/New Competitor in Market Crosstabulation
Theme Park Market Concentration/ New
Competitor in Immediate Market
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

11

% within Theme Park
% within Theme Park Market
Concentration/ New Competitor
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Theme Park Market
Concentration/ New Competitor
% of Total

Total

No

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Theme Park Market
Concentration/ New Competitor
% of Total

Total
12

23

47.8%

52.2% 100.0%

68.8%

40.0%

50.0%

23.9%

26.1%

50.0%

5

18

23

21.7%

78.3% 100.0%

31.3%

60.0%

50.0%

10.9%

39.1%

50.0%

16

30

46

34.8%

65.2% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

34.8%

65.2% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

3.450a

1

.063

Continuity Correctionb

2.396

1

.122

Likelihood Ratio

3.514

1

.061

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.120

Linear-by-Linear Association

3.375

N of Valid Cases

1

.066

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 8.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.274

.063

.274

.063

46

186

.060

Constrained Operating Season/Length Crosstabulation
Constrained Operating
Season/Length
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

3

% within Theme Park

13.0%

% within Constrained Operating
Season/Length
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Season/Length
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Constrained Operating
Season/Length
% of Total

Total
20

23

87.0% 100.0%

100.0%

46.5%

50.0%

6.5%

43.5%

50.0%

0

23

23

0.0%

% within Constrained Operating

Total

No

100.0% 100.0%

0.0%

53.5%

50.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

3

43

46

6.5%

93.5% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

6.5%

93.5% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

3.209a

1

.073

Continuity Correctionb

1.426

1

.232

Likelihood Ratio

4.368

1

.037

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.233

Linear-by-Linear Association

3.140

N of Valid Cases

1

.076

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.264

.073

.264

.073

46

187

.117

Lack of Space for Expansion Crosstabulation
Lack of Space for Expansion
Yes
Theme Park Failed/Closed Count

7

% within Theme Park

% of Total

Total

Count

Total
16

30.4%

% within Lack of Space for Expansion

Surviving

No

23

69.6% 100.0%

100.0%

41.0%

50.0%

15.2%

34.8%

50.0%

0

23

23

% within Theme Park

0.0%

% within Lack of Space for Expansion

0.0%

59.0%

50.0%

% of Total

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

7

39

46

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Lack of Space for Expansion
% of Total

100.0% 100.0%

15.2%

84.8% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

15.2%

84.8% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

8.256a

1

.004

6.066

1

.014

10.967

1

.001

Fisher's Exact Test

.009

Linear-by-Linear Association

8.077

N of Valid Cases

1

.004

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 3.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.424

.004

.424

.004

46

188

.005

Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting/Price Reductions Crosstabulation
Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting
Strategies/Price Reductions
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

3

23

13.0%

87.0% 100.0%

% within Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting

75.0%

47.6%

50.0%

6.5%

43.5%

50.0%

1

22

23

Count
% within Theme Park

4.3%

% within Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting

52.4%

50.0%

2.2%

47.8%

50.0%

4

42

46

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Pricing/Ticketing/Discounting

95.7% 100.0%

25.0%

% of Total
Total

20

% within Theme Park

% of Total
Surviving

Total

8.7%

91.3% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

8.7%

91.3% 100.0%

% of Total

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square

1

.295

.274

1

.601

1.142

1

.285

1.095

Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

a

Fisher's Exact Test

.608

Linear-by-Linear Association

1.071

N of Valid Cases

1

.301

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.154

.295

.154

.295

46

189

.304

Overpriced Relative to Similar Attractions Crosstabulation
Overpriced Relative to Similar
Attractions
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

2

% within Theme Park

8.7%

% within Overpriced Relative to Similar
Attractions
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Attractions
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Overpriced Relative to Similar
Attractions
% of Total

Total
21

23

91.3% 100.0%

100.0%

47.7%

50.0%

4.3%

45.7%

50.0%

0

23

23

0.0%

% within Overpriced Relative to Similar

Total

No

100.0% 100.0%

0.0%

52.3%

50.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

2

44

46

4.3%

95.7% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

4.3%

95.7% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

2.091a

1

.148

.523

1

.470

2.864

1

.091

Fisher's Exact Test

.489

Linear-by-Linear Association

2.045

N of Valid Cases

1

.153

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.213

.148

.213

.148

46

190

.244

Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed Openings/Not Complete
Construction Cost Overruns/Delayed
Openings/Not Complete at Opening
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

9

% within Theme Park
% within Construction Cost
Overruns/Delayed Openings
% of Total
Surviving

% within Theme Park
% within Construction Cost
Overruns/Delayed Openings
% of Total

% within Construction Cost
Overruns/Delayed Openings
% of Total

64.3%

43.8%

50.0%

19.6%

30.4%

50.0%

5

18

23

21.7%

78.3% 100.0%

35.7%

56.3%

50.0%

10.9%

39.1%

50.0%

14

32

46

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square

1

.200

.924

1

.336

1.660

1

.198

Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

1.643a

Fisher's Exact Test

.337

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.189

.200

.189

.200

46

191

23

60.9% 100.0%

Count
% within Theme Park

14

39.1%

Count

Total

Total

.168

Low Customer Satisfaction: Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Low Customer Satisfaction: Not
Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

9

% within Theme Park
% within Low Customer Satisfaction:
Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Low Customer Satisfaction:
Not Enough to Do/Inadequate Capacity
% of Total

Total
14

23

39.1%

60.9% 100.0%

90.0%

38.9%

50.0%

19.6%

30.4%

50.0%

1

22

23

4.3%

% within Low Customer Satisfaction:

Total

No

95.7% 100.0%

10.0%

61.1%

50.0%

2.2%

47.8%

50.0%

10

36

46

21.7%

78.3% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

21.7%

78.3% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

8.178a

1

.004

Continuity Correctionb

6.261

1

.012

Likelihood Ratio

9.154

1

.002

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.010

Linear-by-Linear Association

8.000

N of Valid Cases

1

.005

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.422

.004

.422

.004

46

192

.005

Sustained Attendance Declines/YOY Declines
Sustained Attendance
Declines/YOY Declines
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

12

% within Theme Park
% within Sustained Attendance
Declines/YOY Declines
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Sustained Attendance
Declines/YOY Declines
% of Total

Total

No

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Sustained Attendance
Declines/YOY Declines
% of Total

Total
11

23

52.2%

47.8% 100.0%

38.7%

73.3%

50.0%

26.1%

23.9%

50.0%

19

4

23

82.6%

17.4% 100.0%

61.3%

26.7%

50.0%

41.3%

8.7%

50.0%

31

15

46

67.4%

32.6% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

67.4%

32.6% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

4.847a

1

.028

Continuity Correctionb

3.561

1

.059

Likelihood Ratio

4.991

1

.025

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.057

Linear-by-Linear Association

4.742

N of Valid Cases

1

.029

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 7.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

-.325

.028

.325

.028

46

193

.029

Lack of Maintenance/Reinvestment Crosstabulation
Lack of
Maintenance/Reinvestment
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

2

% within Theme Park

8.7%

% within Lack of
Maintenance/Reinvestment
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Maintenance/Reinvestment
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Lack of
Maintenance/Reinvestment
% of Total

Total
21

23

91.3% 100.0%

100.0%

47.7%

50.0%

4.3%

45.7%

50.0%

0

23

23

0.0%

% within Lack of

Total

No

100.0% 100.0%

0.0%

52.3%

50.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

2

44

46

4.3%

95.7% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

4.3%

95.7% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

2.091a

1

.148

.523

1

.470

2.864

1

.091

Fisher's Exact Test

.489

Linear-by-Linear Association

2.045

N of Valid Cases

1

.153

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.213

.148

.213

.148

46

194

.244

Notable Ride Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM Crosstabulation
Notable Ride Accidents/Violence in
Park/Bad WOM
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

3

% within Theme Park
% within Notable Ride
Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM

% within Notable Ride
Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM
% of Total
Total

23.1%

60.6%

50.0%

6.5%

43.5%

50.0%

10

13

23

43.5%

56.5% 100.0%

76.9%

39.4%

50.0%

21.7%

28.3%

50.0%

13

33

46

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Notable Ride
Accidents/Violence in Park/Bad WOM
% of Total

28.3%

71.7% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

28.3%

71.7% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

5.254a

1

.022

Continuity Correctionb

3.860

1

.049

Likelihood Ratio

5.473

1

.019

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.047

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

-.338

.022

.338

.022

46

195

23

87.0% 100.0%

Count
% within Theme Park

20

13.0%

% of Total
Surviving

Total

.024

Excessive Number of Lawsuits Crosstabulation
Excessive Number of Lawsuits
Yes
Theme Park Failed/Closed Count

Surviving

7

Total
16

23

% within Theme Park

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

% within Excessive Number of Lawsuits

77.8%

43.2%

50.0%

% of Total

15.2%

34.8%

50.0%

2

21

23

Count
% within Theme Park

8.7%

% within Excessive Number of Lawsuits
% of Total
Total

No

Count
% within Theme Park
% within Excessive Number of Lawsuits
% of Total

91.3% 100.0%

22.2%

56.8%

50.0%

4.3%

45.7%

50.0%

9

37

46

19.6%

80.4% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

19.6%

80.4% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

3.453a

1

.063

Continuity Correctionb

2.210

1

.137

Likelihood Ratio

3.620

1

.057

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.135

Linear-by-Linear Association

3.378

N of Valid Cases

1

.066

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.274

.063

.274

.063

46

196

.067

Excessive Debt/Debt Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues/Unprofitable
Excessive Debt/Debt Refinancing/Cash
Flow Issues/Unprofitable
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

16

% within Theme Park
% within Excessive Debt/Debt
Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues
% of Total
Surviving

% within Theme Park
% within Excessive Debt/Debt
Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues
% of Total

% within Excessive Debt/Debt
Refinancing/Cash Flow Issues
% of Total

69.6%

30.4%

50.0%

34.8%

15.2%

50.0%

7

16

23

30.4%

69.6% 100.0%

30.4%

69.6%

50.0%

15.2%

34.8%

50.0%

23

23

46

50.0%

50.0% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

50.0%

50.0% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

a

1

.008

Continuity Correctionb

5.565

1

.018

Likelihood Ratio

7.235

1

.007

Pearson Chi-Square

7.043

Fisher's Exact Test

.017

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.391

.008

.391

.008

46

197

23

30.4% 100.0%

Count
% within Theme Park

7

69.6%

Count

Total

Total

.009

Instances of Declared Bankruptcy/Temporary/Forever Closure
Instances of Declared
Bankruptcy/Temporary Closure or
Forever Closure
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

20

% within Theme Park
% within Instances of Declared
Bankruptcy/Temporary/Forever Closure
% of Total
Surviving

% within Theme Park
% within Instances of Declared
Bankruptcy/Temporary/Forever Closure
% of Total

% within Instances of Declared
Bankruptcy/Temporary/Forever Closure
% of Total

71.4%

16.7%

50.0%

43.5%

6.5%

50.0%

8

15

23

34.8%

65.2% 100.0%

28.6%

83.3%

50.0%

17.4%

32.6%

50.0%

28

18

46

60.9%

39.1% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

60.9%

39.1% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)
a

1

.000

Continuity Correctionb

11.044

1

.001

Likelihood Ratio

14.046

1

.000

Pearson Chi-Square

13.143

Fisher's Exact Test

.001

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 9.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.535

.000

.535

.000

46

198

23

13.0% 100.0%

Count
% within Theme Park

3

87.0%

Count

Total

Total

.000

Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions/Change of Ownership
Instances of Mergers/Acquisitions/Change
of Ownership
Yes
Theme

No

Failed/Closed Count

Park

16

% within Theme Park
% within Instances of
Mergers/Change of Ownership
% of Total
Surviving

% within Theme Park
% within Instances of
Mergers/Change of Ownership
% of Total

% within Instances of
Mergers/Change of Ownership
% of Total

45.7%

63.6%

50.0%

34.8%

15.2%

50.0%

19

4

23

82.6%

17.4% 100.0%

54.3%

36.4%

50.0%

41.3%

8.7%

50.0%

35

11

46

76.1%

23.9% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

76.1%

23.9% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correction
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

1.075a

1

.300

.478

1

.489

1.086

1

.297

b

Fisher's Exact Test

.491

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.50.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

-.153

.300

.153

.300

46

199

23

30.4% 100.0%

Count
% within Theme Park

7

69.6%

Count

Total

Total

.245

Management Corruption/Graft and Internal Vandalism / Sabotage
Management Corruption/Graft
Internal Vandalism / Sabotage
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

4

% within Theme Park

17.4%

% within Management Corruption/Graft and
Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Management Corruption/Graft and
Internal Vandalism/Damage/Sabotage
% of Total

19

45.2%

50.0%

8.7%

41.3%

50.0%

0

23

23

100.0% 100.0%

0.0%

54.8%

50.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

4

42

46

8.7%

91.3% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

8.7%

91.3% 100.0%

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

4.381a

1

.036

Continuity Correctionb

2.464

1

.116

Likelihood Ratio

5.927

1

.015

Pearson Chi-Square

Fisher's Exact Test

.109

N of Valid Cases

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 2.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.309

.036

.309

.036

46

200

23

82.6% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value

Total

100.0%

0.0%

% within Management Corruption/Graft and

Total

No

.054

Higher Best Use for the Property Crosstabulation
Higher Best Use for the
Property
Yes
Theme

Failed/Closed Count

Park

8

% within Theme Park

34.8%

% within Higher Best Use for the
Property
% of Total
Surviving

Count
% within Theme Park

Property
% of Total
Count
% within Theme Park
% within Higher Best Use for the
Property
% of Total

Total
15

23

65.2% 100.0%

100.0%

39.5%

50.0%

17.4%

32.6%

50.0%

0

23

23

0.0%

% within Higher Best Use for the

Total

No

100.0% 100.0%

0.0%

60.5%

50.0%

0.0%

50.0%

50.0%

8

38

46

17.4%

82.6% 100.0%

100.0%

100.0% 100.0%

17.4%

82.6% 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests
Value
Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctionb
Likelihood Ratio

df Asymp. Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (2-sided) Exact Sig. (1-sided)

9.684a

1

.002

7.414

1

.006

12.787

1

.000

Fisher's Exact Test

.004

Linear-by-Linear Association

9.474

N of Valid Cases

1

.002

46

a. 2 cells (50.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.00.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table

Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi
Cramer's V
N of Valid Cases

.459

.002

.459

.002

46

201

.002

APPENDIX C: AMUSEMENT BUSINESS ISSUES REVIEWED PERCENT
BY YEAR

202

Data Collection Effort
Amusement Business Issues Reviewed for Event Variables
Issues Reviewed per Year (%)

1961
48
94%

1962
51
100%

1963
52
96%

1964
51
98%

1965
52
100%

1966
53
100%

1967
20
38%

1968
11
21%

1969
3
6%

1970
12
23%

1971
51
100%

1972
1
2%

1973
52
100%

1974
3
6%

1975
52
100%

1976
20
38%

1977
51
96%

1978
0
0%

1979
52
100%

1980
2
4%

1981
48
92%

1982
0
0%

1983
5
10%

1984
0
0%

1985
0
0%

1986
21
40%

1987
0
0%

1988
0
0%

1989
27
52%

1990
48
94%

1991
27
53%

1992
10
20%

1993
10
20%

1994
21
42%

1995
12
24%

1996
13
25%

1997
11
21%

1998
39
76%

1999
12
24%

2000
12
24%

2001
12
24%

2002
12
24%

2003
12
24%

2004
6
26%

2005
6
50%

2006
3
60%

Total Issues Read

203

952
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